Does Female Empowerment Promote Economic Development?

Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers (as opposed to their husbands) benefits children. Does this observation imply that targeting transfers to women is good economic policy? The authors develop a series of noncooperative family bargaining models to understand what kind of frictions can give rise to the observed empirical relationships. Then they assess the policy implications of these models. The authors find that targeting transfers to women can have unintended consequences and may fail to make children better off. Moreover, different forms of empowering women may lead to opposite results. More research is needed to distinguish between alternative theoretical models.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Doepke, Matthias, Tertilt, Michele
Language:	English
Published:	2011-06-01
Subjects:	ASSET HOLDINGS, ASSETS, BUDGET CONSTRAINT, BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, CAPITAL INVESTMENT, CASH PAYMENT, CASH TRANSFER, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, CONSUMER EXPENDITURE, CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES, CONSUMPTION INCREASES, CREDIT ASSOCIATION, CREDIT MARKET, CREDIT MARKETS, CREDIT PROGRAMS, CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA, DECISION MAKING, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, DEVELOPMENT POLICY, DISCOUNT RATE, DISCOUNT RATES, DISCRIMINATION, DIVORCE, DYNAMIC SETTING, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC MECHANISM, ECONOMIC MODELS, ECONOMIC POLICY, ECONOMIC THEORIES, ECONOMIC THEORY, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, EMPIRICAL LITERATURE, EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, EMPOWERMENT, EQUAL INCREASE, EQUALITY, EQUILIBRIUM, EXOGENOUS CHANGES, EXPENDITURE, EXPENDITURES, FACE VALUE, FAMILIES, FEMALE, FINANCIAL SUPPORT, FUTURE RESEARCH, GENDER, GENDER DIFFERENCES, GENDERS, HEALTH OUTCOMES, HOLDING, HOME, HOUSEHOLD DATA, HOUSEHOLD INCOME, HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS, HUMAN CAPITAL, HUSBAND, HUSBANDS, IMMUNIZATION, IMMUNIZATIONS, IMPERFECT SUBSTITUTES, INCOME, INCOME DIFFERENCES, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INCOME EFFECT, INCOME INEQUALITY, INCOME REDISTRIBUTION, INCOME SHARE, INCOME TRANSFER, INCOMES, INEFFICIENCY, INEQUALITIES, INEQUALITY, INEQUALITY AVERSION, INSTRUMENT, INTEREST RATE, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES, LABOR MARKET, LIVING STANDARDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MARGINAL PROPENSITY TO SAVE, MARKET ACCESS, MARRIAGES, MARRIED WOMEN, MICRO-CREDIT, MICRO-ENTERPRISES, MICROCREDIT, MULTIPLIERS, NASH EQUILIBRIUM, NET EFFECT, OLD-AGE PENSION, OPTIMIZATION, PARETO EFFICIENCY, PARETO OPTIMUM, PENSION, PENSION SYSTEM, PENSIONS, PERMANENT INCOME, POLICY DISCUSSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, POLICY INTERVENTION, POLICY INTERVENTIONS, POLICY RESEARCH, POSITIVE EFFECT, POVERTY REDUCTION, PRIVATE CONSUMPTION, PRIVATE GOODS, PRODUCT MARKETS, PRODUCTION FUNCTION, PUBLIC, PUBLIC CONSUMPTION, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC SPENDING, RELATIVE CHANGE, RELATIVE IMPORTANCE, RELATIVE INCOME, RELATIVE INCREASE, RELATIVE WAGES, RETURN, RETURNS, RISK AVERSE, RISK AVERSION, ROADS, SEX, SHARE OF ASSETS, SIGNIFICANT EFFECT, SIGNIFICANT IMPACT, SINGLE WOMEN, SINGLE-PARENT HOUSEHOLDS, TAX, TRANSFER PAYMENTS, UTILITY FUNCTION, UTILITY FUNCTIONS, UTILITY MAXIMIZATION, WAGES, WEALTH, WIDOW, WIFE, WILL, WIVES, WOMAN,
Online Access:	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110629130437 https://hdl.handle.net/10986/3479
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!