Sub-National Performance Incentives in the Intergovernmental Framework : Current Practice and Options for Reform in Indonesia

This paper provides background for the Government of Indonesia as it considers if and how to introduce more robust local government performance incentives into the intergovernmental fiscal framework. The next section briefly examines the forces that have driven the recent national wave of interest in improving local government performance. This is followed by a review of the relatively limited set of local government performance incentives currently in force in Indonesia. The fourth section provides a conceptual overview of how to think about the possible expansion of local government incentive programs, outlining the potential role(s) of such programs in general and the key issues involved in designing and implementing them. The fifth section tentatively considers a number of options for additional local government incentives in Indonesia that the central government may wish to consider pursuing. The paper concludes with an outline of next steps for moving forward with the possible development of more purposeful and meaningful performance incentives in Indonesia's intergovernmental fiscal framework.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Lewis, Blane D., Smoke, Paul
Format:	Report biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2008-06
Subjects:	ACCESS TO LOANS, ACCOUNTING, ANNUAL BUDGET, ARREARS, BANK ACCOUNT, BANK DEPOSITS, BENEFIT SPILLOVERS, BENEFITS OF DECENTRALIZATION, BUDGET CONSTRAINT, BUDGET CYCLE, BUDGET ESTIMATES, BUDGET PERFORMANCE, BUDGETING, BUSINESS CYCLE, CAPACITY BUILDING, CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, CAPITAL INVESTMENT, CAPITAL SPENDING, CENTRAL AGENCIES, CENTRAL AGENCY, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES, CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS, CENTRAL TAX, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, CIVIL SOCIETY, COMMERCIAL BANK, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, DEBT LIMITS, DEBT RESTRUCTURING, DEBT SERVICE, DECENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION FRAMEWORK, DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS, DECISION MAKING, DEFICITS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRY, DEVELOPMENT BANK, DISBURSEMENT, DISBURSEMENTS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, EQUALIZATION FORMULA, EQUALIZATION FUNDS, EXPENDITURE, EXPENDITURE DATA, EXPENDITURE NEEDS, EXPENDITURES, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, FINANCIAL REPORTS, FINANCIAL RESOURCES, FISCAL CAPACITY, FISCAL DISCIPLINE, FISCAL DISPARITIES, FISCAL EQUALIZATION, FISCAL FRAMEWORK, FISCAL GAP, FISCAL INCENTIVES, FISCAL MANAGEMENT, FISCAL OUTCOMES, FISCAL PERFORMANCE, FISCAL PLANNING, FISCAL RESOURCES, FISCAL SURPLUSES, FISCAL SYSTEM, FISCAL TRANSFERS, GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS, GOVERNMENT AGENCY, GOVERNMENT BANK, GOVERNMENT BUDGETING, GOVERNMENT BUDGETS, GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, GOVERNMENT CONTROL, GOVERNMENT DATA, GOVERNMENT DEBT, GOVERNMENT REGULATION, GOVERNMENT REVENUE, GOVERNMENT REVENUES, GOVERNMENT SPENDING, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, HARD BUDGET, HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINT, HOLDING, INCENTIVE STRUCTURE, INCENTIVE SYSTEM, INSTRUMENT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL SYSTEM, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FRAMEWORK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER, INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS, LEGAL SYSTEM, LENDING AGREEMENT, LITERACY RATES, LOAN, LOAN REPAYMENT, LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, LOCAL AUTHORITY, LOCAL AUTONOMY, LOCAL BUDGET, LOCAL DEVELOPMENT, LOCAL ELECTIONS, LOCAL EXPENDITURES, LOCAL GOVERNANCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT BORROWING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL BEHAVIOR, LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE DELIVERY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING, LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXES, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL OFFICIALS, LOCAL OWN-SOURCE, LOCAL OWN-SOURCE REVENUES, LOCAL REVENUE, LOCAL REVENUES, LOCAL SERVICES, LOCAL TAX, LOCAL TAX ADMINISTRATION, LOCAL TAX BASE, LOCAL TRANSFERS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, MORAL HAZARD, NATIONAL ELECTIONS, NATIONAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE, NATIONAL POLICIES, NATIONAL REVENUES, POLICY DEVELOPMENT, POLICY ENVIRONMENT, POLICY MAKERS, POLICY OBJECTIVES, PROPERTY TAX, PROPERTY TAX REVENUES, PROVINCE, PROVINCES, PROVINCIAL LEVEL, PUBLIC EDUCATION, PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC SERVICES, RECORD KEEPING, REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS, REPAYMENT INCENTIVE, RESERVE, RESERVE FUND, RESERVE FUNDS, RESERVES, RETURNS, REVENUE COLLECTION, REVENUE PERFORMANCE, REVENUE SHARING, REVENUE SOURCE, SALES TAX, SECTORAL MINISTRIES, SERVICE DELIVERY, SERVICE STANDARDS, SOCIAL SERVICES, SUB-NATIONAL, SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, SUB-NATIONAL LENDING, SUBNATIONAL, SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT, SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, TAX, TAX ADMINISTRATION, TAX BASE, TAX COLLECTION, TAX EFFORT, TAX INCENTIVES, TAX OFFICES, TAX REVENUE, TAX REVENUES, TAX TRANSFERS, TRANSPARENCY, TYPES OF DECENTRALIZATION, USER CHARGES,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/236681468049841295/Sub-national-performance-incentives-in-the-intergovernmental-framework-current-practice-and-options-for-reform-in-Indonesia http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28248
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