Resource Rents, Coercion, and Local Development

This paper examines how the dismantling of coercive institutions associated with the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994 affected the distribution of rents from natural resource exports. It identifies the interplay between coercive institutions and natural resource rents as an important driver of local development. Using data from the 1996 census, the paper documents large income gaps between communities located just-inside and just-outside the former self-governing territories set aside for black inhabitants. Examining relative changes between 1996 and 2011, the paper finds that spatial income convergence was considerably stronger among marginalized communities with higher initial exposure to resource rents. These results accord with standard bargaining theory in which the dismantling of coercive institutions improves the negotiating position of unionized workers in the mining industry.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Bottan, Nicolas Luis, Bastos, Paulo, Bottan, Nicolas
Format:	Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2016-02
Subjects:	LIVING STANDARDS, GROWTH RATES, EMPLOYMENT, COMMUNITIES, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, LABOR NEGOTIATIONS, RIGHTS, EXPORT MARKETS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ACCOUNTING, PRODUCTION, ADVERSE IMPACTS, INCOME, INTEREST, LABOR LEGISLATION, PROPERTY RIGHTS, EXCHANGE, INFORMATION, LABOR FORCE, SERVICES, EXPORTS, MARGINAL PRODUCT, POLITICAL ECONOMY, EFFECTS, HEALTH, VARIABLES, PRICE, OWNERSHIP, CITIES, MARKET ACCESS, RENTS, DEVELOPING COUNTRY, OLIGOPOLY, DRIVERS, APARTHEID, DEVELOPMENT PATH, DEVELOPMENT, LABOR MARKET, PER CAPITA INCOME, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, MIGRANT LABOR, INTERVENTION, FERTILITY RATES, BARGAINING POWER, RENT, EXCHANGE RATES, DEMOCRACY, LABOR UNIONS, MOBILITY, ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, INCREASING RETURNS, INHABITANTS, MARKETS, ORGANIZATIONS, CONNECTIVITY, SETTLEMENT, RIGHT TO STRIKE, STANDARDS, LABOR, UTILITY, NATURAL RESOURCES, UNEMPLOYMENT, EQUITY, DATA AVAILABILITY, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, WAGES, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, BARRIERS, FUTURE, VALUE, PENSIONS, WAGE RATES, GENDER, HOMES, ECONOMIC SECTORS, OCCUPATIONS, UTILITY FUNCTION, OCCUPATION, MARGINAL COSTS, HOUSEHOLD, LABOR RELATIONS, SHARES, AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS, FOREIGN COMPETITORS, MARKET, TRADE UNIONS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, ECONOMICS, OUTPUT, EXPOSURE, INSURANCE, LABOR ORGANIZATION, SOCIAL CAPITAL, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, GDP, GOODS, THEORY, LEGAL SYSTEM, FEMALES, GROWTH RATE, INVESTMENT, NATURAL RESOURCE, RESIDENTIAL AREAS, SHARE, HOUSEHOLDS, BARGAINING, SUPPLY, AFFILIATED, COMMUNITY SERVICES, TRADES, WAGE DIFFERENTIALS, LAW, HOUSES, COMMUNICATION, INTERVENTIONS, COMMUNITY, POLITICAL PROCESS, COMMODITIES, DEMOGRAPHIC, LABOUR, HOSPITALS, LABOR MARKETS, OUTCOMES, COMMODITY PRICES, SAFETY, COMMODITY, SERVICE, PRICES, DEVELOPMENT POLICY, COMPETITION,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/02/25959143/resource-rents-coercion-local-development-evidence-post-apartheid-south-africa https://hdl.handle.net/10986/23892
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