Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Quarantee Employment?

In 2005 India introduced an ambitious national anti-poverty program, now called the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. The program offers up to 100 days of unskilled manual labor per year on public works projects for any rural household member who wants such work at the stipulated minimum wage rate. The aim is to dramatically reduce poverty by providing extra earnings for poor families, as well as empowerment and insurance. If the program worked in practice the way it is designed, then anyone who wanted work on the scheme would get it. However, analysis of data from India's National Sample Survey for 2009/10 reveals considerable un-met demand for work in all states. The authors confirm expectations that poorer families tend to have more demand for work on the scheme, and that (despite the un-met demand) the self-targeting mechanism allows it to reach relatively poor families and backward castes. The extent of the un-met demand is greater in the poorest states -- ironically where the scheme is needed most. Labor-market responses to the scheme are likely to be weak. The scheme is attracting poor women into the workforce, although the local-level rationing processes favor men.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Dutta, Puja, Murgai, Rinku, Ravallion, Martin, van de Walle, Dominique
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012-03
Subjects:	AGGREGATE DEMAND, AGRICULTURAL LABORERS, ANTI-POVERTY, ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAM, ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAM, AVERAGE WAGE, AVERAGE WAGES, BARGAINING POWER, CASH TRANSFERS, CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES, CONSUMPTION QUINTILES, EGS, EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE, EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEME, EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEMES, EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS, FLEXIBILITY, FORCED LABOR, HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, IMPACT ON POVERTY, INCIDENCE OF POVERTY, INCOME, INEQUALITY, INSURANCE, JOBS, LABOR ECONOMICS, LABOR FORCE, LABORERS, LABOUR, LANDHOLDINGS, MANPOWER, MANUAL LABOR, MARKET WAGES, MINIMUM WAGE, MINIMUM WAGES, NATIONAL POVERTY, OCCUPATION, PARTICIPATION RATES, PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POOR, POOR AREAS, POOR FAMILIES, POOR HOUSEHOLDS, POOR INDIVIDUALS, POOR PEOPLE, POOR WOMEN, POORER FAMILIES, POORER HOUSEHOLDS, POVERTY ALLEVIATION, POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS, POVERTY IMPACTS, POVERTY LINE, POVERTY LINES, POVERTY PROGRAMS, POVERTY RATE, POVERTY RATES, POVERTY STATUS, PROGRAM COSTS, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, PUBLIC SPENDING, PUBLIC WORKS, PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMS, PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS, RIGHT TO WORK, RURAL, RURAL AREAS, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, RURAL EMPLOYMENT, RURAL HEADCOUNT, RURAL HEADCOUNT INDEX, RURAL HOUSEHOLD, RURAL HOUSEHOLDS, RURAL LABOR, RURAL LABOR MARKET, RURAL LABOR MARKETS, RURAL POOR, RURAL POPULATION, RURAL POVERTY, RURAL PUBLIC, SCHOOLING, SEASONAL LABOR, SOCIAL PROTECTION, SUBSTITUTION EFFECT, TARGETING, TRANSFER BENEFITS, UNEMPLOYMENT, UNSKILLED LABOR, WAGE EFFECT, WAGE INCREASE, WAGE RATE, WAGE RATES, WORKER, WORKERS,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/03/15958094/indias-employment-guarantee-scheme-guarantee-employment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19877
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