Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?

Defining vigilance as retrospective voting - where voters evaluate incumbents on their performance during their entire term in office - the author compares voter behavior in local and national elections to make inferences about whether voters are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local level. Using data from 14 major states in India over the period 1960-92, she contrasts voters' behavior in state legislative assembly elections with their behavior in national legislative elections. In state assembly elections voter reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopically, rewarding growth in national income and a fall in inflation and inequality only in the year preceding the election. The evidence is consistent with greater voter vigilance and government accountability in local than in national elections.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Khemani, Stuti
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2001-02
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY, ADVERSE SELECTION, AGRICULTURE, AUTHORITY, BY ELECTION, CANDIDATES, CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS, CITIZENS, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, CONSTITUENCY, CONSTITUTION, DECENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION IN GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACIES, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC INFORMATION, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ELECTION, ELECTORATE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, FEDERALISM, FISCAL, FISCAL POLICY, FOREIGN POLICY, FREEDOM, FUTURE RESEARCH, GINI COEFFICIENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, GOVERNMENT BUDGETS, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES, INFLATION, INTEREST GROUP, LAWS, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, LEGISLATURE, LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, LOCAL ELECTIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS, MARGINAL COST, MONETARY POLICY, MORAL HAZARD, NATIONAL ELECTIONS, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, NATIONAL INCOME, NATIONAL LEVEL, PARTY AFFILIATION, POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL ACTIONS, POLITICAL AFFILIATION, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL FACTORS, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL PARTY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICIANS, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, PRESIDENTIAL RACE, PRIME MINISTER, PUBLIC FINANCE, PUBLIC POLICIES, PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SERVICE, STATE ELECTIONS, STATE FISCAL POLICY, STATE GOVERNMENT, STATE INCOME, TAX CUTS, UNEMPLOYMENT, VOTER PARTICIPATION, VOTER PREFERENCES, VOTERS, VOTING, VOTING BEHAVIOR,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/02/1003165/decentralization-accountability-voters-more-vigilant-local-national-elections http://hdl.handle.net/10986/19702
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