Hospital Governance and Incentive Design : The Case of Corporatized Public Hospitals in Lebanon

There are three potential levels of government activity in the health sector: regulation, finance, and direct provision of services, with the government owning and managing hospitals and primary care clinics. Eid focuses on service provision. In recent years corporatization has been introduced as an institutional design for public hospitals-as a means of improving efficiency and reducing transfers in a publicly owned, decentralized health system. Eid treats decentralization as a reallocation of decision rights to lower levels of the public sector. She shows how such a strategy creates new needs for monitoring and control of decentralized units. To improve the understanding of the role of governance and incentives in corporatized hospitals, Eid explores the design of corporate boards of public hospitals, the institutional linchpin of such systems. She shows how principal-agent theory, particularly the multitasking and common agency approaches, can provide a useful analytical lens in understanding hospital board design in the case of Lebanon. She also shows the implications of corporatization for health policy and management.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Eid, Florence
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2001-11
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING, BASIC HEALTH CARE, BENCHMARKS, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, CADRES, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CIVIL SERVICE, CLINICS, CONSTITUTIONS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, DECENTRALIZATION, DECISION MAKING, DECISION-MAKING, DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY, DECREE, DECREES, DOCTORS, EMPLOYMENT, EQUILIBRIUM, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, FINANCIAL RISK, FISCAL, HEALTH CARE, HEALTH INSURANCE, HEALTH PLANS, HEALTH POLICY, HEALTH REFORM, HEALTH SECTOR, HEALTH SYSTEM, HOSPITAL AUTONOMY, HOSPITAL CARE, HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT, HOSPITAL SERVICES, HOSPITALS, INCENTIVE SCHEMES, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, INNOVATION, INSOLVENCY, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, INSURANCE, INTERNAL SECURITY, INTERVENTION, LAWS, LEGAL STRUCTURE, LEGISLATION, LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, MANAGED CARE, MANAGERIAL AUTONOMY, MANAGERS, MANDATES, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL SERVICES, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, MEDICINE, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, MOTIVATION, NATIONAL LEVEL, PATIENTS, PHYSICIANS, PRIMARY CARE, PRIVATE SECTOR, PRIVATIZATION, PROCUREMENT, PUBLIC AGENCY, PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, PUBLIC FUNDS, PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH CARE, PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC HOSPITALS, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION, PURCHASING, QUALITATIVE RESEARCH, QUALITY CONTROL, QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE, RATIONALIZATION, REGULATORY AUTHORITY, REPRESENTATIVES, SCHOOLS, SERVICE DELIVERY, TRANSACTION COSTS, USER FEES, VOTING, WAGES,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/11/1643372/hospital-governance-incentive-design-case-corporatized-public-hospitals-lebanon https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19424
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