Greed and Grievance in Civil War

The authors compare two contrasting motivations for rebellion: greed and grievance. Most rebellions are ostensibly in pursuit of a cause, supported by a narrative of grievance. But since grievance assuagement through rebellion is a public good that a government will not supply, economists predict such rebellions would be rare. Empirically, many rebellions appear to be linked to the capture of resources (such as diamonds in Angola, and Sierra Leone, drugs in Colombia, and timber in Cambodia). The authors set up a simple rational choice model of greed-rebellion, and contrasts its predictions with those of a simple grievance model. Some countries return to conflict repeatedly. Are they conflict-prone, or is there a feedback effect whereby conflict generates grievance, which in turn generates further conflict? The authors show why such a feedback effect might be present in both greed-motivated and grievance rebellions. The authors' results contrast with conventional beliefs, about the causes of conflict. A stylized version of conventional beliefs would be that grievance begets conflict, which begets grievance, which begets further conflict. With such a model, the only point at which to intervene is to reduce the level of objective grievance. The authors' model suggests that what actually happens is that opportunities for predation (controlling primary commodity exports) cause conflict, and the grievances this generates induce diasporas to finance further conflict. The point of policy intervention here is to reduce the absolute, and relative attraction of primary commodity predation, and to reduce the ability of diasporas to fund rebel movements.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2000-05
Subjects:	ARMIES, ARMS, ARMS RACE, BOUNDARIES, CAUSE OF CONFLICT, CAUSES OF CONFLICT, CIVIL CONFLICT, CIVIL WAR, CIVIL WARS, COLD WAR, COMBAT, CONFLICT RISK, CONFLICTS, COSTS OF REBELLION, COUNTER-INSURGENCY, CRIME, DEFENSE, DIASPORA, DIASPORA LIVING, DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS, DIASPORAS, DRUG ADDICTS, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, ECONOMIC THEORY OF REBELLION, ETHNIC COMPOSITION, ETHNIC DOMINANCE, ETHNIC GROUP, ETHNIC GROUPS, ETHNIC HATRED, ETHNIC MAJORITY, ETHNICALLY DIVERSE SOCIETIES, EXTORTION, FOREIGN BORN POPULATION, FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION, GOVERNMENT ARMY, GREED-GRIEVANCE, GREED-REBELLION, GRIEVANCE MODEL, GRIEVANCE MODELS, GROUP HATRED, HIGH INEQUALITY, HOMOGENOUS SOCIETIES, INCOME, INCOME-EARNING OPPORTUNITIES, INSURRECTIONS, INTERNAL CONFLICT, INTERNAL REBELLION, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION, LINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATION INDEX, MILITARY ADVANTAGE, MILITARY FORCES, MILITARY HISTORY, MILITARY OPPOSITION, MODEL OF CONFLICT, OBJECTIVE GRIEVANCE, OBJECTIVE GRIEVANCES, PEACE, PEACE RESEARCH, POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE, POLITICAL ANALYSIS, POLITICAL CONTEST, POLITICAL REPRESSION, POLITICAL RIGHTS, POOR, POST- CONFLICT, POST-CONFLICT, PREDATORY REBELLION, PROTEST MOVEMENT, PROTEST MOVEMENTS, REBEL COHESION, REBEL FORCES, REBEL GROUP, REBEL GROUPS, REBEL LEADER, REBEL MILITARY ADVANTAGE, REBEL MOVEMENT, REBEL MOVEMENTS, REBEL ORGANIZATION, REBEL ORGANIZATIONS, REBEL RECRUITMENT, REBELLIONS, RELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATION, RELIGIOUS HATREDS, RISK OF CONFLICT, RISK OF REBELLION, RISKS OF CONFLICT, RISKS OF CONFLICT RENEWAL, SOCIAL FRACTIONALIZATION, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, TAXATION,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2000/05/437634/greed-grievance-civil-war https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18853
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