Partisan Politics and Intergovernmental Transfers in India
Recently there has been a surge in
international empirical evidence that national policymakers
allocate resources across regions based on political
considerations, in addition to any normative considerations
of equity and efficiency. In order to mitigate these
political compulsions, several federations around the world
have attempted to create independent constitutional bodies
that are responsible for determining federal transfers to
subnational jurisdictions. The author tests whether
constitutional rules indeed make a difference in curbing
political influence by contrasting the impact of political
variables on two types of intergovernmental transfers to
states in the Indian federation over a period of time,
1972-95. The pattern of evidence shows that transfers, whose
regional distribution is determined by political agents,
usually provide greater resources to state governments that
are politically affiliated with the national ruling party
and are important in maximizing the party's
representation in the national legislature. But the
political effect on statutory transfers, determined by an
independent agency with constitutional authority, is
strikingly contrary, with greater resources going to
unaffiliated state governments. The author argues that this
contrasting evidence indicates that constitutional rules
indeed restrict the extent to which partisan politics can
affect resources available to subnational governments.
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Bibliographic Details
| Main Author: |
Khemani, Stuti |
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| Language: | English
en_US |
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| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2003-04
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| Subjects: | POLITICS,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER OF FUNDS,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS,
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES,
POLITICAL DECISION MAKING,
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DISPARITIES,
REGIONAL DISPARITY,
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES,
CONSTITUTIONALISM,
POLITICAL PARTIES,
FISCAL FEDERALISM AUTHORITY,
CENTRAL AGENCIES,
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT,
CENTRAL TRANSFERS,
CITIZENS,
COALITIONS,
CONSTITUENCIES,
CONSTITUTION,
DECISION-MAKING,
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS,
DECREE,
DEMOCRACY,
DEVOLUTION,
DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS,
DISTRICTS,
ELECTORAL COMPETITION,
ELECTORAL POLITICS,
EXPENDITURE,
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
FEDERALISM,
FEDERATIONS,
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE,
FISCAL,
FISCAL EQUALIZATION,
FISCAL FEDERALISM,
FISCAL RESOURCES,
FISCAL YEAR,
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS,
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,
GOVERNMENT BUDGETS,
GRANT ALLOCATION,
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS,
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK,
LEGISLATORS,
LEGISLATURE,
LEGISLATURES,
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
MINISTERS,
NATIONAL ELECTIONS,
PARTY AFFILIATION,
PER CAPITA INCOME,
POLITICAL CONTROL,
POLITICIANS,
PROVINCES,
PUBLIC RESOURCES,
PUBLIC SERVICES,
PUBLIC SPENDING,
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA,
RESOURCE ALLOCATION,
REVENUE MOBILIZATION,
REVENUE SHARING,
REVENUE TRANSFERS,
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE,
SOCIAL WELFARE,
STATE BUDGETS,
STATE BUREAUCRACY,
STATE ELECTIONS,
STATE GOVERNMENT,
STATE GOVERNMENTS,
STATE INCOME,
STATE REVENUES,
TAX EFFORTS,
TAX SYSTEM,
TAXATION,
VOTERS,
VOTING,
AUTHORITY, |
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/04/2280438/partisan-politics-intergovernmental-transfers-india
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18257
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