The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies
Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia.
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dig-okr-10986182102024-08-08T17:47:08Z The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies Beck, Thorsten ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS APPLICATIONS AUDITING AUDITS BALANCE SHEET BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURE BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK MANAGEMENT BANK REGULATION BANK RUNS BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING SECTOR BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS CAPITAL BASE CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTAGION COOPERATIVE BANKS COUNTRY COMPARISONS CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS EXPLICIT COVERAGE FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL RISK FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPAIRED ASSETS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE FUNDS INSURED DEPOSITS INSURERS INTEREST RATES JUDICIAL SYSTEMS LAWS LENDER OF LAST RESORT LIQUID ASSETS LIQUIDATION LIQUIDATION OF BANKS LIQUIDITY LOOTING MANDATES MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD PENALTIES PREMIUMS PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATION REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT RISK PREMIUM RISK TAKING SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STOCK PRICES SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAFETY NET POLICIES CREDITORS BANK MANAGEMENT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AUDITING INSURANCE PREMIUMS SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia. 2014-05-09T18:27:59Z 2014-05-09T18:27:59Z 2003-05 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2329634/incentive-compatible-design-deposit-insurance-bank-failure-resolution-concepts-country-studies https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18210 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 3043 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
| collection |
DSpace |
| country |
Estados Unidos |
| countrycode |
US |
| component |
Bibliográfico |
| access |
En linea |
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dig-okr |
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biblioteca |
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America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS APPLICATIONS AUDITING AUDITS BALANCE SHEET BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURE BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK MANAGEMENT BANK REGULATION BANK RUNS BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING SECTOR BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS CAPITAL BASE CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTAGION COOPERATIVE BANKS COUNTRY COMPARISONS CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS EXPLICIT COVERAGE FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL RISK FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPAIRED ASSETS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE FUNDS INSURED DEPOSITS INSURERS INTEREST RATES JUDICIAL SYSTEMS LAWS LENDER OF LAST RESORT LIQUID ASSETS LIQUIDATION LIQUIDATION OF BANKS LIQUIDITY LOOTING MANDATES MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD PENALTIES PREMIUMS PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATION REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT RISK PREMIUM RISK TAKING SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STOCK PRICES SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAFETY NET POLICIES CREDITORS BANK MANAGEMENT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AUDITING INSURANCE PREMIUMS SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS APPLICATIONS AUDITING AUDITS BALANCE SHEET BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURE BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK MANAGEMENT BANK REGULATION BANK RUNS BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING SECTOR BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS CAPITAL BASE CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTAGION COOPERATIVE BANKS COUNTRY COMPARISONS CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS EXPLICIT COVERAGE FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL RISK FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPAIRED ASSETS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE FUNDS INSURED DEPOSITS INSURERS INTEREST RATES JUDICIAL SYSTEMS LAWS LENDER OF LAST RESORT LIQUID ASSETS LIQUIDATION LIQUIDATION OF BANKS LIQUIDITY LOOTING MANDATES MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD PENALTIES PREMIUMS PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATION REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT RISK PREMIUM RISK TAKING SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STOCK PRICES SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAFETY NET POLICIES CREDITORS BANK MANAGEMENT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AUDITING INSURANCE PREMIUMS SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS APPLICATIONS AUDITING AUDITS BALANCE SHEET BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURE BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK MANAGEMENT BANK REGULATION BANK RUNS BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING SECTOR BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS CAPITAL BASE CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTAGION COOPERATIVE BANKS COUNTRY COMPARISONS CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS EXPLICIT COVERAGE FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL RISK FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPAIRED ASSETS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE FUNDS INSURED DEPOSITS INSURERS INTEREST RATES JUDICIAL SYSTEMS LAWS LENDER OF LAST RESORT LIQUID ASSETS LIQUIDATION LIQUIDATION OF BANKS LIQUIDITY LOOTING MANDATES MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD PENALTIES PREMIUMS PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATION REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT RISK PREMIUM RISK TAKING SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STOCK PRICES SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAFETY NET POLICIES CREDITORS BANK MANAGEMENT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AUDITING INSURANCE PREMIUMS SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS APPLICATIONS AUDITING AUDITS BALANCE SHEET BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURE BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK MANAGEMENT BANK REGULATION BANK RUNS BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING SECTOR BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS CAPITAL BASE CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTAGION COOPERATIVE BANKS COUNTRY COMPARISONS CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS EXPLICIT COVERAGE FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL RISK FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPAIRED ASSETS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE FUNDS INSURED DEPOSITS INSURERS INTEREST RATES JUDICIAL SYSTEMS LAWS LENDER OF LAST RESORT LIQUID ASSETS LIQUIDATION LIQUIDATION OF BANKS LIQUIDITY LOOTING MANDATES MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD PENALTIES PREMIUMS PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATION REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT RISK PREMIUM RISK TAKING SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STOCK PRICES SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAFETY NET POLICIES CREDITORS BANK MANAGEMENT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AUDITING INSURANCE PREMIUMS SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE Beck, Thorsten The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies |
| description |
Deposit insurance schemes and bank
failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting
public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed
to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from
bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize
aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the
incentive-compatible design and interaction of both
components of the financial safety net and describes and
compares three countries with different safety net
arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia. |
| topic_facet |
ACCOUNTABILITY ADVERSE SELECTION AGENTS APPLICATIONS AUDITING AUDITS BALANCE SHEET BANK DEPOSITS BANK FAILURE BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION BANK FAILURES BANK INSOLVENCY BANK MANAGEMENT BANK REGULATION BANK RUNS BANK SUPERVISION BANKING CRISES BANKING CRISIS BANKING INDUSTRY BANKING SECTOR BANKING STRUCTURE BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS CAPITAL BASE CENTRAL BANK COINSURANCE COMMERCIAL BANKS COMPENSATION CONTAGION COOPERATIVE BANKS COUNTRY COMPARISONS CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES DEPOSITOR PROTECTION DEPOSITORS DEPOSITS EXPLICIT COVERAGE FINANCIAL FRAGILITY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL RISK FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPAIRED ASSETS INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE INSURANCE FUNDS INSURED DEPOSITS INSURERS INTEREST RATES JUDICIAL SYSTEMS LAWS LENDER OF LAST RESORT LIQUID ASSETS LIQUIDATION LIQUIDATION OF BANKS LIQUIDITY LOOTING MANDATES MARKET DISCIPLINE MORAL HAZARD PENALTIES PREMIUMS PRIVATIZATION PUBLIC POLICY REGULATION REGULATORY FORBEARANCE RISK ASSESSMENT RISK MANAGEMENT RISK PREMIUM RISK TAKING SAVINGS SAVINGS BANKS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL BANKS STOCK PRICES SUBORDINATED DEBT SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY SAFETY NET POLICIES CREDITORS BANK MANAGEMENT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AUDITING INSURANCE PREMIUMS SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE |
| author |
Beck, Thorsten |
| author_facet |
Beck, Thorsten |
| author_sort |
Beck, Thorsten |
| title |
The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies |
| title_short |
The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies |
| title_full |
The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies |
| title_fullStr |
The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies |
| title_sort |
incentive-compatible design of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution : concepts and country studies |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2003-05 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2329634/incentive-compatible-design-deposit-insurance-bank-failure-resolution-concepts-country-studies https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18210 |
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AT beckthorsten theincentivecompatibledesignofdepositinsuranceandbankfailureresolutionconceptsandcountrystudies AT beckthorsten incentivecompatibledesignofdepositinsuranceandbankfailureresolutionconceptsandcountrystudies |
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1807158311932395520 |