The Incentive-Compatible Design of Deposit Insurance and Bank Failure Resolution : Concepts and Country Studies

Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Beck, Thorsten
Format: Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2003-05
Subjects:ACCOUNTABILITY, ADVERSE SELECTION, AGENTS, APPLICATIONS, AUDITING, AUDITS, BALANCE SHEET, BANK DEPOSITS, BANK FAILURE, BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION, BANK FAILURES, BANK INSOLVENCY, BANK MANAGEMENT, BANK REGULATION, BANK RUNS, BANK SUPERVISION, BANKING CRISES, BANKING CRISIS, BANKING INDUSTRY, BANKING SECTOR, BANKING STRUCTURE, BANKING SYSTEM, BANKRUPTCY, BANKS, CAPITAL BASE, CENTRAL BANK, COINSURANCE, COMMERCIAL BANKS, COMPENSATION, CONTAGION, COOPERATIVE BANKS, COUNTRY COMPARISONS, CROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMES, DEPOSITOR PROTECTION, DEPOSITORS, DEPOSITS, EXPLICIT COVERAGE, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, FINANCIAL RISK, FINANCIAL STABILITY, IMPAIRED ASSETS, INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, INSURANCE, INSURANCE FUNDS, INSURED DEPOSITS, INSURERS, INTEREST RATES, JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, LAWS, LENDER OF LAST RESORT, LIQUID ASSETS, LIQUIDATION, LIQUIDATION OF BANKS, LIQUIDITY, LOOTING, MANDATES, MARKET DISCIPLINE, MORAL HAZARD, PENALTIES, PREMIUMS, PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC POLICY, REGULATION, REGULATORY FORBEARANCE, RISK ASSESSMENT, RISK MANAGEMENT, RISK PREMIUM, RISK TAKING, SAVINGS, SAVINGS BANKS, SHAREHOLDERS, SMALL BANKS, STOCK PRICES, SUBORDINATED DEBT, SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES, TRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCE, SAFETY NET POLICIES, CREDITORS, MARKET EQUILIBRIUM, INSURANCE PREMIUMS, SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS, TRANSPARENCY,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/05/2329634/incentive-compatible-design-deposit-insurance-bank-failure-resolution-concepts-country-studies
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/18210
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