Policy Selectivity Forgone: Debt and Donor Behavior in Africa

Authors assess the dynamics behind the high net resource transfers by donors and creditors to Sub-Saharan African countries. Analyzing the determinants of overall net transfers for a panel of 37 recipient countries in 1978-98, Authors find that country policies mattered little. Donors especially bilateral donors actually made greater transfers to countries with high debt, largely owed to multilateral creditors, when policies were 'bad'. Authors conclude that comprehensive debt relief has the potential, though not the certainty, to restore selectivity in support of good policies. That would make development assistance more effective going forward and increase public support in donor countries.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Birdsall, Nancy, Claessens, Stijn, Diwan, Ishac
Format:	Journal Article biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	Washington, DC: World Bank 2003-09
Subjects:	ACCUMULATION OF DEBT, ACTUAL DEBT, AID EFFECTIVENESS, ARREARS, BANK POLICY, BILATERAL DONORS, BORROWING, BUDGET SURPLUS, CLAIM, CLASS OF CREDITOR, CLASSES OF CREDITORS, COMMERCIAL CREDITOR, COMMERCIAL CREDITORS, COMMERCIAL DEBT, CREDITOR, CREDITOR BEHAVIOR, CREDITOR CLASS, CREDITORS, CREDITWORTHINESS, DEBT, DEBT ACCUMULATION, DEBT BUILDUP, DEBT BURDEN, DEBT BURDENS, DEBT CATEGORIES, DEBT CATEGORY, DEBT CLASSIFICATION, DEBT CLASSIFICATIONS, DEBT COMPOSITION, DEBT DATA, DEBT DISBURSEMENTS, DEBT FORGIVENESS, DEBT LEVELS, DEBT OVERHANG, DEBT PROBLEM, DEBT PROBLEMS, DEBT REDUCTION, DEBT REDUCTION PROGRAM, DEBT RELIEF, DEBT RESCHEDULING, DEBT RESTRUCTURING, DEBT SERVICE, DEBT SERVICE PAYMENTS, DEBT SERVICE REDUCTION, DEBT SERVICE RELIEF, DEBT SERVICING, DEBT STOCK, DEBT STOCK VARIABLE, DEBT STOCKS, DEBT TRAP, DEBTOR, DEBTOR CLASSES, DEBTORS, DEBTS, DEFAULTS, DEFICITS, DEPENDENT, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, DEVELOPMENT BANK, DISBURSEMENTS, DONOR RESOURCES, DUMMY VARIABLE, DUMMY VARIABLES, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC POLICIES, ECONOMIC REFORM, EQUAL AMOUNT, EXISTING DEBT, EXTERNAL DEBT, FACE VALUE, FACE VALUE OF DEBT, FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, FISCAL DEFICITS, FOREIGN AID, FUTURE DEBT, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, GRANT PROGRAMS, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, HIGH DEBT, HIGH DEBTS, HIGHLY INDEBTED COUNTRIES, INCOME SHOCKS, INDEBTED, INDEBTED COUNTRIES, INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES, INDEBTEDNESS, INFLATION, INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS, INTEREST PAYMENT, INTEREST PAYMENTS, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, INVESTMENT BANK, JUDGMENT, LEVELS OF DEBT, LEVERAGE, LOW DEBT, MACRO-IMBALANCES, MISREPORTING, MONETARY FUND, MULTILATERAL CREDITORS, MULTILATERAL DEBT, MULTILATERAL DEBTS, OLD DEBT, OUTSTANDING STOCK, POLICY ENVIRONMENT, POLICY RESPONSE, PORTFOLIO, POSITIVE COEFFICIENT, POSITIVE COEFFICIENTS, PRESENT VALUE, PRESENT VALUE OF DEBT, PRINCIPAL REPAYMENT, PRIVATE CREDITORS, PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC POLICY, RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, RECIPIENT COUNTRY, REPAYMENTS, RETURN, RULE OF LAW, SOVEREIGN DEBT, STOCK OF DEBT, TAX, TAX REVENUES, TOTAL DEBT, TOTAL DEBT STOCK,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2003/09/17742575/policy-selectivity-forgone-debt-donor-behavior-africa https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17182
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