Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries
A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection.
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dig-okr-10986171642024-08-08T14:31:57Z Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries Cadot, Olivier Melo, Jaime de Olarreaga, Marcelo AGRICULTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BID CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL OWNERS CD CETERIS PARIBUS CLAIMANTS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES DUTY DRAWBACKS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EQUILIBRIUM VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT TAXES EXPORTS FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GDP GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOVERNMENT GRANTS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY INDUSTRIALIZATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LDCS LOBBYING LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET ENTRY NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OPEN ECONOMY OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE TARIFFS PRICE CHANGE PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION STRUCTURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FUNDS REPUBLIC RETURN RETURNS SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF ESCALATION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORM TRADE TAXES URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION VALUE ADDED WAGES WEALTH WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection. 2014-02-26T14:34:03Z 2014-02-26T14:34:03Z 2004-09 Journal Article Article de journal Artículo de revista http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/17742611/lobbying-counterlobbying-structure-tariff-protection-poor-rich-countries World Bank Economic Review https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17164 English en_US World Bank Economic Review CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank application/pdf text/plain Washington, DC: World Bank |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
| collection |
DSpace |
| country |
Estados Unidos |
| countrycode |
US |
| component |
Bibliográfico |
| access |
En linea |
| databasecode |
dig-okr |
| tag |
biblioteca |
| region |
America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AGRICULTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BID CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL OWNERS CD CETERIS PARIBUS CLAIMANTS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES DUTY DRAWBACKS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EQUILIBRIUM VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT TAXES EXPORTS FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GDP GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOVERNMENT GRANTS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY INDUSTRIALIZATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LDCS LOBBYING LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET ENTRY NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OPEN ECONOMY OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE TARIFFS PRICE CHANGE PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION STRUCTURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FUNDS REPUBLIC RETURN RETURNS SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF ESCALATION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORM TRADE TAXES URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION VALUE ADDED WAGES WEALTH WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO AGRICULTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BID CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL OWNERS CD CETERIS PARIBUS CLAIMANTS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES DUTY DRAWBACKS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EQUILIBRIUM VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT TAXES EXPORTS FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GDP GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOVERNMENT GRANTS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY INDUSTRIALIZATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LDCS LOBBYING LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET ENTRY NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OPEN ECONOMY OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE TARIFFS PRICE CHANGE PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION STRUCTURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FUNDS REPUBLIC RETURN RETURNS SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF ESCALATION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORM TRADE TAXES URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION VALUE ADDED WAGES WEALTH WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO |
| spellingShingle |
AGRICULTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BID CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL OWNERS CD CETERIS PARIBUS CLAIMANTS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES DUTY DRAWBACKS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EQUILIBRIUM VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT TAXES EXPORTS FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GDP GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOVERNMENT GRANTS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY INDUSTRIALIZATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LDCS LOBBYING LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET ENTRY NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OPEN ECONOMY OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE TARIFFS PRICE CHANGE PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION STRUCTURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FUNDS REPUBLIC RETURN RETURNS SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF ESCALATION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORM TRADE TAXES URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION VALUE ADDED WAGES WEALTH WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO AGRICULTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BID CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL OWNERS CD CETERIS PARIBUS CLAIMANTS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES DUTY DRAWBACKS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EQUILIBRIUM VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT TAXES EXPORTS FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GDP GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOVERNMENT GRANTS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY INDUSTRIALIZATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LDCS LOBBYING LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET ENTRY NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OPEN ECONOMY OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE TARIFFS PRICE CHANGE PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION STRUCTURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FUNDS REPUBLIC RETURN RETURNS SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF ESCALATION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORM TRADE TAXES URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION VALUE ADDED WAGES WEALTH WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO Cadot, Olivier Melo, Jaime de Olarreaga, Marcelo Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries |
| description |
A political economy model of protection
is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns
of protection. Three propositions are derived that are
consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection
in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates
escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher
on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect
agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing,
whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations
for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the
endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly
consistent with observed patterns of protection. |
| format |
Journal Article |
| topic_facet |
AGRICULTURE BENEFICIARIES BENEFICIARY BID CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL OWNERS CD CETERIS PARIBUS CLAIMANTS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS DEMOCRACY DERIVATIVE DERIVATIVES DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPING ECONOMIES DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DOMESTIC PRICE DOMESTIC PRICES DUTY DRAWBACKS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC STRUCTURE ECONOMICS RESEARCH ELASTICITY ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY EQUATIONS EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EQUILIBRIUM VALUE EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURES EXPORT TAXES EXPORTS FOREIGN TRADE FOREIGN TRADE POLICY GDP GDP PER CAPITA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL GOVERNMENT GRANTS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT IMPERFECT COMPETITION IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION IMPORTS INCOME INCOME DISTRIBUTION INCOME LEVELS INCOMES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY INDUSTRIALIZATION INTERNATIONAL BANK INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL TRADE INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS LABOR MARKET LABOR MARKETS LDCS LOBBYING LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET ENTRY NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY OPEN ECONOMY OPTIMIZATION OUTPUT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SYSTEM POSITIVE TARIFFS PRICE CHANGE PRICE ELASTICITY PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY PRODUCTION FUNCTION PRODUCTION STRUCTURES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FUNDS REPUBLIC RETURN RETURNS SAFETY NET SOCIAL SAFETY NET SOCIAL WELFARE TARIFF ESCALATION TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUE TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICY TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORM TRADE TAXES URUGUAY ROUND UTILITY FUNCTION VALUE ADDED WAGES WEALTH WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION WTO |
| author |
Cadot, Olivier Melo, Jaime de Olarreaga, Marcelo |
| author_facet |
Cadot, Olivier Melo, Jaime de Olarreaga, Marcelo |
| author_sort |
Cadot, Olivier |
| title |
Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries |
| title_short |
Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries |
| title_full |
Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries |
| title_fullStr |
Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries |
| title_sort |
lobbying, counterlobbying, and the structure of tariff protection in poor and rich countries |
| publisher |
Washington, DC: World Bank |
| publishDate |
2004-09 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/17742611/lobbying-counterlobbying-structure-tariff-protection-poor-rich-countries https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17164 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
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| _version_ |
1807160307207897088 |