Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries

A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Cadot, Olivier, Melo, Jaime de, Olarreaga, Marcelo
Format:	Journal Article biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	Washington, DC: World Bank 2004-09
Subjects:	AGRICULTURE, BENEFICIARIES, BENEFICIARY, BID, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, CAPITAL OWNERS, CD, CETERIS PARIBUS, CLAIMANTS, CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE, CONSUMER SURPLUS, CONSUMERS, DEMOCRACY, DERIVATIVE, DERIVATIVES, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPING COUNTRY, DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DOMESTIC PRICE, DOMESTIC PRICES, DUTY DRAWBACKS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, ECONOMICS RESEARCH, ELASTICITY, ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION, ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY, EQUATIONS, EQUILIBRIUM, EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF, EQUILIBRIUM VALUE, EXPENDITURE, EXPENDITURES, EXPORT TAXES, EXPORTS, FOREIGN TRADE, FOREIGN TRADE POLICY, GDP, GDP PER CAPITA, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL, GOVERNMENT GRANTS, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, IMPERFECT COMPETITION, IMPORT COMPETITION, IMPORT PROTECTION, IMPORTS, INCOME, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, INCOME LEVELS, INCOMES, INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY, INDUSTRIALIZATION, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS, LABOR MARKET, LABOR MARKETS, LDCS, LOBBYING, LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES, MARGINAL UTILITY, MARKET ENTRY, NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY, OPEN ECONOMY, OPTIMIZATION, OUTPUT, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICAL SYSTEM, POSITIVE TARIFFS, PRICE CHANGE, PRICE ELASTICITY, PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND, PRICE ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY, PRODUCTION FUNCTION, PRODUCTION STRUCTURES, PROTECTIONISM, PROTECTIONIST, PUBLIC FUNDS, REPUBLIC, RETURN, RETURNS, SAFETY NET, SOCIAL SAFETY NET, SOCIAL WELFARE, TARIFF ESCALATION, TARIFF FORMATION, TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS, TARIFF PROTECTION, TARIFF RATE, TARIFF RATES, TARIFF REVENUE, TARIFF STRUCTURE, TAX, TAXATION, TERMS OF TRADE, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TRADE POLICY, TRADE PROTECTION, TRADE REFORM, TRADE TAXES, URUGUAY ROUND, UTILITY FUNCTION, VALUE ADDED, WAGES, WEALTH, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, WORLD TRADE, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/17742611/lobbying-counterlobbying-structure-tariff-protection-poor-rich-countries https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17164
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