The Organization of Political Parties and the Politics of Bureaucratic Reform

Bureaucratic reform is a priority of donor organizations, including the World Bank, but is notoriously difficult to implement. In many countries, politicians have little interest in the basic financial and personnel management systems that are essential to political oversight of bureaucratic performance. To explain this, this paper presents a new perspective on the political economy of bureaucracy. Politicians in some countries belong to parties that are organized to allow party members to act collectively to limit leader shirking. This is particularly the case with programmatic parties. Such politicians have stronger incentives to pursue public policies that require a well-functioning public administration. Novel evidence offers robust support for this argument. From a sample of 439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries, the paper finds that public sector reforms are more likely to succeed in countries with programmatic political parties.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Cruz, Cesi, Keefer, Philip
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2013-11
Subjects:	ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS, ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS, ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS, AGREEMENTS, ANALYTICAL CAPACITY, BANK, BENEFICIARIES, BEST PRACTICE, BORROWING, BUDGET ENVELOPE, BUDGET MANAGEMENT, BUDGET PLANNING, BUDGET PREPARATION, BUDGET REFORMS, BUDGETS, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION, CASH TRANSFERS, CIVIL SERVICE, CIVIL SERVICE REFORM, CIVIL SERVICE REFORMS, CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM, COLLAPSE, COMPETITION, CONFIDENCE, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, CONTRACTS, CORRUPTION, COSTS OF SERVICE PROVISION, DEBT, DEBT MANAGEMENT, DECENTRALIZATION, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DISCRETION, DONOR AGENCIES, DONOR COLLABORATION, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ECONOMIC POLICY, ECONOMIES OF SCALE, EDUCATION PROGRAMS, FINANCE, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, FINANCIAL RESOURCES, FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY, GOVERNANCE, GOVERNANCE REFORM, GOVERNMENTS, HEALTH CARE, HEALTH PROGRAM, INCENTIVES, INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES, INFRASTRUCTURE, INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT, INSTITUTIONAL REFORM, INSTITUTIONAL SETTING, INVESTIGATION, JUDICIAL REVIEW, LAND, LEADERSHIP, LOANS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, MANAGEMENT, MEDIA, MINISTER, MINISTERS, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, NATIONAL BUDGET, NATURAL RESOURCES, OPERATIONAL PROCESSES, ORGANIZATIONS, OUTCOME INDICATOR, OUTCOMES, PATRONAGE, PER, PER CAPITA INCOME, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PROCESS, PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, PERSONNEL SYSTEMS, POLICE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL INTEREST, POLITICIAN, POLITICIANS, POLITICS, PRIVATE GOODS, PROCUREMENT, PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS, PROJECTS, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, PUBLIC, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM, PUBLIC CHOICE, PUBLIC ECONOMICS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC POLICIES, PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC RESOURCES, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR CAPACITY, PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE, PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM, PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AREAS, PUBLIC SECTORS, REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES, REFORM PROJECT, REFORM PROJECTS, REGULATION, REPORTS, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, REVENUE, REVENUES, RULE OF LAW, RULING PARTY, SANCTIONS, SECTORAL OBJECTIVES, SERVICE PROVISION, SERVICE QUALITY, SERVICES, SOCIAL PROGRAMS, SPENDING, STATES, STRATEGIES, STRATEGY, SUBSIDIES, TAX, TAX ADMINISTRATION, TAX INCIDENCE, TAX LAW, TAX POLICY, TAX SYSTEMS, TAXATION, TAXPAYERS, UNCERTAINTY, UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS, VOTERS,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/11/18474749/organization-political-parties-politics-bureaucratic-reform https://hdl.handle.net/10986/16926
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