Reassessing Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

During the past decade, the use of conditional cash transfer programs to increase investment in human capital has generated considerable excitement in both research and policy forums. This article surveys the existing literature, which suggests that most conditional cash transfer programs are used for essentially one of two purposes: restoring efficiency when externalities exist or improving equity by targeting resources to poor households. The programs often meet their stated objectives, but in some instances there is tension between the efficiency and equity objectives. The overall impact of a program depends on the gains and losses associated with each objective.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Das, Jishnu, Do, Quy-Toan, Ozler, Berk
Format:	Journal Article biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank 2005-03-01
Subjects:	ADVERSE IMPACT, AGRICULTURE, AID AGENCIES, ANTI-POVERTY, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, BARGAINING, BARGAINING MODELS, BENEFICIARIES, BENEFICIARY, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, BUDGET CONSTRAINT, CALORIC INTAKE, CAPITAL INVESTMENTS, CASH PAYMENT, CASH PAYMENTS, CASH TRANSFER, CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS, CASH TRANSFERS, CD, CHILD LABOR, CHILD LABOUR, CHILD MORTALITY, CHILD NUTRITION, COLLECTIVE APPROACH, CORRELATES OF POVERTY, COST-EFFECTIVENESS, CREDIT CONSTRAINTS, CREDIT RATIONING, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DEVELOPMENT POLICIES, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC MODELS, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, ECONOMICS, ECONOMICS RESEARCH, EFFICIENT OUTCOMES, EMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT STATUS, EXPENDITURE, EXPENDITURES, EXTERNALITIES, EXTERNALITY, EXTREMELY POOR HOUSEHOLDS, FARMERS, FOOD FOR EDUCATION, FOOD INTAKE, FOOD STAMPS, FOOD SUBSIDIES, FOOD TRANSFERS, FUNGIBLE, FUTURE RESEARCH, HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING, HOUSEHOLD HEAD, HOUSEHOLD HEADS, HOUSEHOLD INCOME, HOUSEHOLD WEALTH, HOUSEHOLD WELFARE, HUMAN CAPITAL, HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT, HUMAN RESOURCES, IMPACT ON POVERTY, IMPERFECT INFORMATION, INCOME EFFECT, INCOME LEVEL, INCOME SUPPORT, INCOME TRANSFERS, INDIFFERENCE CURVES, INEFFICIENCY, INEQUALITY, INSURANCE, INSURANCE MARKETS, INTEREST RATES, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, INVESTMENT CHOICES, INVESTMENT DECISIONS, INVESTMENT PATTERNS, LABOR FORCE, LABOR MARKET, LABOR STANDARDS, LABOUR STANDARDS, LAND OWNERSHIP, LANDHOLDINGS, MALNUTRITION, MARKET FAILURE, MARKET FAILURES, MARKET RETURNS, MEANS TESTING, MEANS TESTS, MORAL HAZARD, MOTIVATION, NORMAL GOOD, OPPORTUNITY COST, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POOR, POOR COUNTRIES, POOR HOUSEHOLDS, POOR PEOPLE, POSITIVE EFFECTS, POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES, POVERTY LEVELS, POVERTY REDUCTION, PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, PUBLIC SPENDING, RATE OF RETURN, RATES OF RETURN, RETURNS, RURAL, RURAL FAMILIES, RURAL HOUSEHOLDS, SCHOOL FEEDING, SOCIAL NETWORKS, TARGETED TRANSFERS, TARGETING, UNEMPLOYED, VOTERS, WEALTH EFFECT,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/03/17591988/reassessing-conditional-cash-transfer-programs http://hdl.handle.net/10986/16405
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