Only a small number of studies have
empirically examined the determinants of the monitoring and
enforcement performed by environmental regulators, and most
of these have focused on industrial countries. In contrast,
the authors empirically examine the determinants of
enforcement in China. More precisely, they analyze the
determinants of firms' relative bargaining power with
local environmental authorities with respect to the
enforcement of pollution charges. The authors show that
private sector firms appear to have less bargaining power
than state-owned enterprises. Contrary to earlier findings,
they also show that firms facing adverse financial
situations have more bargaining power than other firms and
are more likely to pay smaller pollution charges than they
should be paying. Finally, the authors show that the greater
the social impact of a firm's emissions (as measured by
complaints), the less bargaining power it has with local
environmental authorities.
Bibliographic Details
| Main Authors: |
Wang, Hua,
Mamingi, Nlandu,
Laplante, Benoît,
Dasgupta, Susmita |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper
biblioteca
|
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| Language: | English
en_US |
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| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2002-01
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| Subjects: | INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS,
ENFORCEMENT POWERS,
FACTORIES,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
CUSTOMER FEEDBACK,
BARGAINING,
EMISSIONS CONTROL,
FINANCIAL FLOWS,
FINANCIAL LEVERAGE,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ABATEMENT EFFORT,
ACCIDENTS,
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES,
AIR,
AIR POLLUTION,
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY,
CHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND,
COD,
CONSTRUCTION,
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,
ECONOMETRICS,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS,
ELASTICITIES,
EMISSIONS,
EMPIRICAL STUDIES,
EMPLOYMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES,
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS,
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES,
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
FOOD PROCESSING,
INCOME,
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR,
INSURANCE,
LABOR FORCE,
LABOR MARKETS,
LAWS,
LEGISLATION,
LOCAL AUTHORITIES,
OXYGEN,
PAPER INDUSTRY,
POLITICAL ECONOMY,
POLLUTERS,
POLLUTION,
POLLUTION ABATEMENT,
POLLUTION CHARGES,
POLLUTION CONTROL,
POLLUTION DISCHARGE,
POLLUTION REGULATION,
PRIVATE SECTOR,
PUBLIC SECTOR,
SAFETY,
SAVINGS,
SOLID WASTE,
SUSPENDED SOLIDS,
TEXTILE INDUSTRY,
TIMBER,
UNEMPLOYMENT,
WASTE,
WASTEWATER,
WATER POLLUTION,
WORKERS, |
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2002/01/1687150/incomplete-enforcement-pollution-regulation-bargaining-power-chinese-factories
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/15751
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