Recapitalizing Banking Systems : Implications for Incentives and Fiscal and Monetary Policy

In the aftermath of a banking crisis, most attention is rightly focused on allocating losses, rebuilding properly managed institutions, and achieving debt recovery. But the authorities' decision to use budgetary funds to help restructure a large failed bank or banking system also has consequences for the incentive structure for the new bank management, for the government's budget, and for monetary stability. These issues tend to be lumped together, but each should be dealt with in a distinctive manner. The author points out, among other things, how apparent conflicts between the goals in each of these areas can be resolved by suitably designing financial instruments and appropriately allocating responsibility between different arms of government. First the government must have a coherent medium-term fiscal strategy that determines broadly how the costs of the crisis will be absorbed. Then the failed bank must be securely reestablished with enough capital and franchise value to move forward as a normal bank. This will typically entail new financial institutions involving the government on both the asset and the liability sides of the bank's balance sheet. The bank should not be left with mismatches of maturity, currency, repricing. Assets that are injected should be bankable and preferably negotiable. The liability structure should give bank insiders the incentive to manage the bank prudently. Financial instruments can be complex and sophisticated but only if the government has the credibility to warrant market confidence that it will deliver on the contracts rather than trying to use its lawmaking powers to renege. Innovative use of segregating sinking funds and "Brady"-type bonds can help where government credibility is weak. Restructuring the bank will alter the size, maturity, and other characteristics of the government's debt. These characteristics should be optimized separately and with the market as a whole, not just the affected banks.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Honohan, Patrick
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2001-02
Subjects:BANKING SYSTEMS, RECAPITALIZATION, INCENTIVES, MONETARY POLICY, FISCAL POLICY, BANK RESTRUCTURING, BANK MANAGEMENT, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, LIQUIDITY, ASSET YIELDS, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, DEBT MANAGEMENT, BANK LENDING INSTRUMENTS ACCOUNTING, ASSET MANAGEMENT, ASSET RECOVERY, ASSET VALUE, ASSETS, AUTONOMY, BAD DEBT, BAD DEBTS, BALANCE SHEET, BALANCE SHEETS, BANK ASSETS, BANK CAPITAL, BANK DEPOSITS, BANK FAILURE, BANK INSOLVENCY, BANK RECAPITALIZATION, BANK REGULATION, BANKING CRISES, BANKING CRISIS, BANKING SYSTEM, BANKS, BENCHMARK, BOND MARKETS, BONDS, CAPITAL BUDGETING, CAPITAL GAIN, CAPITAL MARKETS, CAPITAL REQUIREMENT, CENTRAL BANK, CENTRAL BANK LENDING, COUPON BONDS, COUPON RATE, CURRENCY ASSETS, DEBT, DEBT STRUCTURE, DEPOSIT INSURANCE, DEPOSIT PROTECTION, DEPOSITORS, DEPOSITS, DISCOUNT RATE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC VALUE, EXPROPRIATION, FACE VALUE, FAILED BANKS, FINANCIAL MARKETS, FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, GOVERNMENT BONDS, INFLATION, INSOLVENT BANKS, INTEREST RATE, INTEREST RATES, LIQUIDATION, LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS, LOOTING, LOSS ALLOCATION, MACROECONOMIC STABILITY, MARGINAL COST, MARKET VALUE, MATURITIES, MONETARY STABILITY, MORAL HAZARD, NET LOSSES, OPERATING COSTS, PAYOUT, PORTFOLIO, PRESENT VALUE, PROFITABILITY, PUBLIC FINANCE, PUBLIC GOOD, SECURITIES, SHAREHOLDERS, SINKING FUNDS, SOLVENCY RATIOS, SUBORDINATED DEBT, SUBORDINATED LIABILITIES, SUBVENTIONS, TAXATION, TIER 2 CAPITAL, VALUATION, WEALTH,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2001/02/1000493/recapitalizing-banking-systems-implications-incentives-fiscal-monetary-policy
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/15744
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