What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development and Vice Versa?

The author reviews how three pillars of political economy-collective action, institutions, and political market imperfections-help us answer the question: Why do some countries develop and others do not? Each makes tremendous advances in our understanding of who wins and who loses in government decision making, generally, but only a subset of this literature helps us answer the question. The study of political market imperfections strongly suggests that the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political promises and incomplete voter information are especially robust in explaining development outcomes. From the institutional literature, the most powerful explanation of contrasting development outcomes links political checks and balances to the credibility of government commitments.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Keefer, Philip
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, D.C. 2004-03
Subjects:	POLITICAL ECONOMY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, COLLECTIVE ACTION, INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICY, VOTERS, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AGRICULTURE, ANTI-CORRUPTION, AUTHORITY, BARRIERS TO ENTRY, CABINET, CABINET GOVERNMENTS, CITIZEN, CITIZENS, COLONIES, CONSTITUENCIES, CONSTITUENCY, CONSTITUENTS, CONSTITUTION, CORRUPTION, CORRUPTION DATA, COUNTRY DATA, DECISION MAKERS, DECISION MAKING, DEMOCRACIES, DEMOCRACY, DEREGULATION, DICTATORSHIP, DISTRICTS, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, ECONOMIC EFFECTS, ECONOMIC POLICIES, ECONOMIC POWER, ECONOMIC RENTS, ELECTION, ELECTORAL RULES, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, ELECTORATE, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, EXECUTIVE BRANCH, FINANCIAL CRISES, FORMAL INSTITUTIONS, FRANCHISE, GOVERNMENT ACTION, GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY, GOVERNMENT DECISION, GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, GOVERNMENT POLICY, GOVERNMENT SPENDING, GROWTH, INCOME, INEFFICIENCY, INEQUALITY, INSOLVENT, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, LAWS, LEGAL OBSTACLES, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES, LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, LEGISLATOR, LEGISLATORS, LEGISLATURE, LEGISLATURES, LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LOWER HOUSE, MINISTERS, MONETARY POLICY, MOTIVATIONS, NATIONAL BUDGET, NATIONAL INTEREST, NATIONAL POLICY, NATIONS, NATURAL RESOURCES, PARLIAMENT, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS, PARTY DISCIPLINE, PER CAPITA INCOME, PER CAPITA INCOMES, POLICY MAKERS, POLICY MAKING, POLICY OUTCOMES, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM, POLITICAL INSTABILITY, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL LEADERS, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL POWER, POLITICAL RISK, POLITICAL SYSTEM, POLITICIANS, PRESIDENTS, PRICE CONTROLS, PRIME MINISTER, PRIVATE GOODS, PRODUCER INCENTIVES, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC GOODS, PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC SPENDING, PURCHASING POWER, PURCHASING POWER PARITY, REPRESENTATIVES, RULE OF LAW, SAVINGS, SENATE, SEPARATION OF POWERS, SKILLED WORKERS, STANDING ORDERS, STATE GOVERNORS, TAX RATE, TAXATION, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, TRADEOFFS, VETO, VETO POWER, VOTER PREFERENCES, VOTING, WEALTH,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/03/3211802/political-economy-tell-economic-development-vice-versa https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14786
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