A common-agency lobbying model is
developed to help understand why North America and the
European Union have adopted such different policies toward
genetically modified (GM) food. Results show that when
firms (in this case farmers) lobby policy makers to
influence standards and consumers and environmentalists care
about the choice of standard, it is possible that increased
competition from abroad can lead to strategic incentives to
raise standards, not just lower them as shown in earlier
models. We show that differences in comparative advantage in
the adoption of GM crops may be sufficient to explain the
trans-Atlantic difference in GM policies. On the one hand,
farmers in a country with a comparative advantage in GM
technology can gain a strategic cost advantage by lobbying
for lax controls on GM production and usage at home and
abroad. On the other hand, when faced with greater
competition, the optimal response of farmers in countries
with a comparative disadvantage in GM adoption may be to
lobby for more-stringent GM standards. Thus it is rational
for producers in the EU (whose relatively small farms would
enjoy less gains from the new biotechnology than broad-acre
American farms) to reject GM technologies if that enables
them and/or consumer and environmental lobbyists to argue
for restraints on imports from GM-adopting countries. This
theoretical proposition is supported by numerical results
from a global general equilibrium model of GM adoption in
America without and with an EU moratorium.
Bibliographic Details
| Main Authors: |
Anderson, Kym,
Damania, Richard,
Jackson, Lee Ann |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper
biblioteca
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| Language: | English
en_US |
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| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2004-09-01
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| Subjects: | ADVERSE IMPACTS,
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS,
AGRICULTURE,
BIOTECHNOLOGY,
CLIMATIC CONDITIONS,
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE,
CONSUMER PREFERENCES,
CONSUMERS,
COST FUNCTIONS,
COST SAVINGS,
CROP PRODUCTION,
CROPS,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
ECONOMIC GROWTH,
ECONOMIC MODELS,
ECONOMIC RESEARCH,
ECONOMIC WELFARE,
ECONOMISTS,
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS,
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
EQUILIBRIUM,
EQUIVALENT VARIATION,
EXPORTS,
EXTERNALITIES,
FARMERS,
FARMS,
FOOD POLICY RESEARCH,
FOOD PRODUCTION,
FUTURE RESEARCH,
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM,
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL,
HOUSEHOLDS,
HUNGER,
IMPORTS,
INCOMES,
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS,
INNOVATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES,
LAND USE,
LOBBYISTS,
MARGINAL BENEFITS,
MARGINAL COST,
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION,
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT,
POLICY DECISIONS,
POLICY MAKERS,
POLITICAL ECONOMY,
POLLUTION,
PRICE DECLINES,
PRODUCERS,
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION,
PRODUCTION COSTS,
PRODUCTION FUNCTION,
PRODUCTIVITY,
PUBLIC GOODS,
QUALITY STANDARDS,
REGULATORY REGIMES,
RENT SEEKING,
RESOURCE ALLOCATION,
SAFETY,
STATIC ANALYSIS,
TERMS OF TRADE,
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY,
TRADE BARRIERS,
VOTERS,
WEALTH,
WELFARE EFFECTS,
WILLINGNESS TO PAY,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
WTO, |
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/09/5126874/trade-standards-political-economy-genetically-modified-food
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/14144
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