The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?
The author investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The author also shows both theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas governments with low accountability may accept poor quality projects either because they are unable to assess the worth of the projects or they will benefit personally.
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Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2004-06
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Subjects: | ACCOUNTABILITY, AID, AID AGENCIES, AID ALLOCATION, CORRUPTION, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, DEVELOPMENT IMPACT, DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH, FATIGUE, INCOME, INTEREST RATES, INTERMEDIARIES, INTERNATIONAL AID, MANAGERS, MORAL HAZARD, POLICY RESEARCH, POVERTY REDUCTION, PROGRAMS, QUALITY OF LIFE, SCREENING, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, PROJECT DESIGN, PROJECT QUALITY, PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL, |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983704/quality-foreign-aid-country-selectivity-or-donors-incentives https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14001 |
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dig-okr-10986140012024-08-08T17:32:59Z The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? Wane, Waly ACCOUNTABILITY AID AID AGENCIES AID ALLOCATION CORRUPTION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH FATIGUE INCOME INTEREST RATES INTERMEDIARIES INTERNATIONAL AID MANAGERS MORAL HAZARD POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS QUALITY OF LIFE SCREENING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROJECT DESIGN PROJECT QUALITY PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL The author investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The author also shows both theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas governments with low accountability may accept poor quality projects either because they are unable to assess the worth of the projects or they will benefit personally. 2013-06-19T14:09:10Z 2013-06-19T14:09:10Z 2004-06 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983704/quality-foreign-aid-country-selectivity-or-donors-incentives https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14001 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No.3325 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
institution |
Banco Mundial |
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Estados Unidos |
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US |
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biblioteca |
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America del Norte |
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Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
language |
English en_US |
topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY AID AID AGENCIES AID ALLOCATION CORRUPTION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH FATIGUE INCOME INTEREST RATES INTERMEDIARIES INTERNATIONAL AID MANAGERS MORAL HAZARD POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS QUALITY OF LIFE SCREENING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROJECT DESIGN PROJECT QUALITY PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL ACCOUNTABILITY AID AID AGENCIES AID ALLOCATION CORRUPTION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH FATIGUE INCOME INTEREST RATES INTERMEDIARIES INTERNATIONAL AID MANAGERS MORAL HAZARD POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS QUALITY OF LIFE SCREENING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROJECT DESIGN PROJECT QUALITY PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL |
spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY AID AID AGENCIES AID ALLOCATION CORRUPTION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH FATIGUE INCOME INTEREST RATES INTERMEDIARIES INTERNATIONAL AID MANAGERS MORAL HAZARD POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS QUALITY OF LIFE SCREENING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROJECT DESIGN PROJECT QUALITY PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL ACCOUNTABILITY AID AID AGENCIES AID ALLOCATION CORRUPTION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH FATIGUE INCOME INTEREST RATES INTERMEDIARIES INTERNATIONAL AID MANAGERS MORAL HAZARD POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS QUALITY OF LIFE SCREENING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROJECT DESIGN PROJECT QUALITY PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL Wane, Waly The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
description |
The author investigates the determinants
of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a
crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that
donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign
assistance they provide. The author also shows both
theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is
endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and
the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable
governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas
governments with low accountability may accept poor quality
projects either because they are unable to assess the worth
of the projects or they will benefit personally. |
topic_facet |
ACCOUNTABILITY AID AID AGENCIES AID ALLOCATION CORRUPTION DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT IMPACT DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS DEVELOPMENT ISSUES DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH FATIGUE INCOME INTEREST RATES INTERMEDIARIES INTERNATIONAL AID MANAGERS MORAL HAZARD POLICY RESEARCH POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMS QUALITY OF LIFE SCREENING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROJECT DESIGN PROJECT QUALITY PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL |
author |
Wane, Waly |
author_facet |
Wane, Waly |
author_sort |
Wane, Waly |
title |
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
title_short |
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
title_full |
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
title_fullStr |
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives? |
title_sort |
quality of foreign aid: country selectivity or donors incentives? |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, D.C. |
publishDate |
2004-06 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983704/quality-foreign-aid-country-selectivity-or-donors-incentives https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14001 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT wanewaly thequalityofforeignaidcountryselectivityordonorsincentives AT wanewaly qualityofforeignaidcountryselectivityordonorsincentives |
_version_ |
1807155765199241216 |