The Quality of Foreign Aid: Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?
The author investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The author also shows both theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas governments with low accountability may accept poor quality projects either because they are unable to assess the worth of the projects or they will benefit personally.
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| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, D.C.
2004-06
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| Subjects: | ACCOUNTABILITY, AID, AID AGENCIES, AID ALLOCATION, CORRUPTION, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, DEVELOPMENT IMPACT, DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH, FATIGUE, INCOME, INTEREST RATES, INTERMEDIARIES, INTERNATIONAL AID, MANAGERS, MORAL HAZARD, POLICY RESEARCH, POVERTY REDUCTION, PROGRAMS, QUALITY OF LIFE, SCREENING, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, SUSTAINABILITY FOREIGN AID, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, PROJECT DESIGN, PROJECT QUALITY, PROJECT QUALITY CONTROL, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/06/4983704/quality-foreign-aid-country-selectivity-or-donors-incentives https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14001 |
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