Does Sharecropping Affect Productivity and Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal’s Tenancy Reforms

Although transfer of agricultural land ownership through land reform had positive impacts on productivity, investment, and political empowerment in many cases, institutional arrangements in West Bengal -- which made tenancy heritable and imposed a prohibition on subleasing -- imply that early land reform benefits may not be sustained and gains from this policy remain well below potential. Data from a listing of 96,000 households in 200 villages, complemented by a detailed survey of 1,800 owner-cum tenants, point toward binding policy constraints and large contemporaneous inefficiency of share tenancy that is exacerbated by strong disincentives to investment. A conservative estimate puts the efficiency losses from such arrangements in any period at 25 percent.

Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Deininger, Klaus, Jin, Songqing, Yadav, Vandana
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2012-12
Subjects:	ACCOUNTING, ADVERSE SELECTION, AGRARIAN REFORM, AGRICULTURAL LAND, AGRICULTURE, BARGAINING, BARGAINING POWER, BENEFICIARIES, BORROWING, CAPITAL STOCK, CLAIMANTS, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS, CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS, CREDIT ACCESS, CREDIT CONSTRAINTS, CREDIT MARKET, CREDIT MARKETS, CREDIT RATIONING, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, DEVELOPMENT POLICY, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ECONOMICS, ECONOMIES OF SCOPE, ELASTICITY, EMPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES, EQUIPMENT, FAMILY LABOR, FINANCIAL SUPPORT, FIXED EFFECT MODEL, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, HOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECT, HOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECTS, HOUSEHOLDS, HOUSES, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INCOME, INEFFICIENCY, INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT, INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INSURANCE, INSURANCE MARKETS, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INVESTMENT DECISION, INVESTMENT DECISIONS, ISSUANCE, LAND OWNERSHIP, LAND POLICIES, LAND PRICES, LAND REFORM, LAND REFORMS, LAND TENURE, LAND USE, LAND VALUES, LANDLORDS, LEASE AGREEMENTS, LEASES, LEASING, LEGAL CONSTRAINTS, LEGAL RIGHTS, LIMITED LIABILITY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LONG-TERM INVESTMENT, LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS, MARGINAL BENEFITS, MARKET OPERATION, MARKET TRANSACTIONS, MORAL HAZARD, MOTIVATION, OPPORTUNITY COST, OUTPUT LOSS, PERFECT INFORMATION, POINTS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL POWER, PRODUCTION FUNCTION, PRODUCTIVITY, PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH, PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, PUBLIC FINANCE, RENTS, RISK AVERSE, SAVINGS, SIDE EFFECTS, TENANTS, TOTAL OUTPUT, TRANSACTION, TRANSACTION COSTS, TRANSFER OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, WEALTH,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/12/17066318/sharecropping-affect-productivity-long-term-investment-evidence-west-bengal s-tenancy-reforms http://hdl.handle.net/10986/12185
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!