Regulating Banks through Public Disclosure-The Case of New Zealand
New Zealand has adopted a system of market-based bank regulation to try to reduce moral hazard and fiscal risk for the government. The system introduces new elements of public disclosure and enhanced director responsibility. Although the central bank still monitors banks, it now uses only publicly disclosed information. Judging initial reactions, the author argues that banks find the new approach more demanding than the traditional one.
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Viewpoint biblioteca |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
1996-10
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| Subjects: | AGENTS, AUDITS, BALANCE SHEET, BANK FAILURES, BANK MANAGEMENT, BANKING CRISES, BANKING SUPERVISION, BANKING SYSTEM, BANKS, CAPITAL ADEQUACY, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, CENTRAL BANK, CREDIT RATINGS, DEBT, DEPOSITORS, DISCLOSURE, FINANCIAL RISK, FINANCIAL SECTOR, FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, INCOME, INFLATION, LOW INFLATION, MARKET RISK, MONETARY POLICY, MORAL HAZARD, PRICE STABILITY, PRIVATE SECTOR, RISK MANAGEMENT, SECURITIES, SHAREHOLDERS, SMALL BANKS, SUPERVISORY REGIME, TRANSPARENCY BANKING, EXECUTIVES, CENTRAL BANKS, CAPITAL MARKETS, INFORMATION DISSEMINATION, BANK REGULATION, BANK SUPERVISION, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1996/10/693107/regulating-banks-through-public-disclosure-case-new-zealand http://hdl.handle.net/10986/11606 |
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