Price Caps, Rate-of-Return Regulation, and the Cost of Capital
This Note compares the effects of price cap and rate-of-return regulation on the risk borne by regulated utilities. It present evidence that price cap regulation subjects firms to greater risks and therefore raises their cost of capital. This result has one clear implication: firms regulated by price caps must be permitted to earn higher returns. If they are not, they will be unable to attract new investment capital and the quality of their service will decline.
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
1997-09
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| Subjects: | AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS, CAPITAL COSTS, CONSUMERS, COST OF CAPITAL, COST SAVINGS, COSTS OF CAPITAL, DECISIONMAKING, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, EQUITY HOLDINGS, INFLATION, INVESTMENT CAPITAL, PORTFOLIO, PRICE CAP, PRICE CAP REGULATION, PRICE CAPS, PRICE OF WATER, PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTIVITY, REGULATORY AGENCIES, UTILITIES CAPITAL COSTS, RATE OF RETURN, REGULATIONS, PRICE POLICY, PRICE CONTROLS, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1997/09/694600/price-caps-rate-of-return-regulation-cost-capital https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11575 |
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