Corporate Governance : A North American Perspective

The recent wave of US corporate governance failures prompted a round of legal and regulatory reform which has attracted worldwide attention. The author's essay puts the debate into a wider context for the US. The missing link here is the rights of the shareholders in the US who have comparatively weaker rights than shareholders in some other countries, thereby making it difficult for shareholders to hold boards to account without prohibitive cost and effort. The message is that law and regulation must be seen to complement, and to facilitate market action, but not to substitute for it. That is a valuable insight from the author who is one of the world's most experienced and thoughtful corporate governance practitioners.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	World Bank
Language:	English
Published:	Washington, DC 2006-05
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY, ANTITRUST LAW, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, AUDIT COMMITTEES, AUTHORITY, BANKS, BOARD MEMBER, BUSINESS COMMUNITY, BUSINESS CORPORATION, BUSINESS LAWYER, BUSINESS SECTOR, CAPITAL MARKETS, CEO, CEOS, CHARTER, COALITIONS, COMMON LAW, COMMON LAW SYSTEM, COMPANY, COMPENSATION PACKAGE, COMPENSATION POLICIES, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, CONGRESSMAN, CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, CORPORATE CONSTITUENCY, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE COUNSEL, CORPORATE DIRECTORS, CORPORATE FORM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM, CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE MANAGERS, CORPORATE PENSION, CORPORATE POWER, CORPORATIONS, DECISION-MAKING, DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES, DELAWARE, DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, DISCRIMINATION, EXCHANGE ACT, FEDERAL LEGISLATION, FIRMS, FOREIGN COMPANIES, FULL DISCLOSURE, GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, GOOD GOVERNANCE, GOVERNANCE FAILURES, GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES, GOVERNANCE SYSTEM, INCORPORATION, INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES, INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER, INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS, INVESTOR PROTECTION, JUDICIARY, LARGE COMPANY, LAWYERS, LEGISLATION, LIMITED, LISTED COMPANIES, MAJORITY VOTE, MAJORITY VOTES, MAJORITY VOTING, MANAGERS, MOTIVATIONS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS, PERFORMANCE MEASURES, POLITICAL POWER, PRIME MINISTER, PRIVATE COMPANIES, PROPRIETARY, PROXY, PROXY MATERIALS, PROXY SEASON, PROXY STATEMENTS, PUBLIC COMPANIES, PUBLIC DEBT, REGULATORY REFORM, SENATE, SHARE OPTIONS, SHAREHOLDER, SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL, SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS, SHAREHOLDER MEETING, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS, SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS, SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS, SHAREHOLDER VOTES, SHAREHOLDER VOTING, SHAREHOLDERS, SOCIETY, SPONSORS, STAKEHOLDER, STOCK EXCHANGE, STOCK OPTIONS, STOCKHOLDERS, SUBSIDIARY, TAKEOVER, TAKEOVER THREATS, TAKEOVERS, TRANSITION ECONOMIES, TRANSPARENCY, UNION, VETO,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/05/7287395/corporate-governance-north-american-perspective https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11186
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