New Open Economy Industrial Policy : Making Choices without Picking Winners

This note starts from the premise that policy makers invariably make mistakes, both intentional and unintentional. That requires shifting the focus from one-time choice of winners (sectors, industries, firms, and other organizations) to the process of error detection and error correction of the choices (with corresponding attention to governance). This note shifts the debate on government activism in support of globally competitive industries from a choice of picking/dropping winners to a process of step-by-step transformation of private and public sectors. In such a process, new industrial policy creates its own context for efficient design and implementation in two ways. First, by shifting the focus of analysis and institutional design from private sector to a new public sector capable of providing customized and flexible public goods and enabling private agents to compete globally. The key concept here is heterogeneity (discretionary differences) of institutions: it is almost always possible to find some that are working. The issue is using the ones that work to improve those that don't. This hypothesis assumes that there are nearly always opportunities for development in a given economy, and that some actors, private and public, begin to take advantage of them.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kuznetsov, Yevgeny, Sabel, Charles
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2011-09
Subjects:ACCOUNTING, ACTIVISM, BANK POLICY, BENCHMARKING, BIOTECHNOLOGY, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, BUSINESS PLAN, BUSINESSES, BUYERS, CALL CENTERS, CAPABILITIES, CAPABILITY, CAPACITY BUILDING, CAPACITY-BUILDING, CHECKS, COLLABORATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM, COMPETITIVENESS, CORPORATE PROFITS, CORRUPT, DEBT, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, DEVELOPMENT BANK, DIRECTED CREDIT, DOMAIN, DOMAINS, DOMESTIC BANKS, ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, ECONOMIC ORDER, ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES, ENGINEERS, EQUIPMENT, EXPORTS, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, FINANCIAL MARKETS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS, GOVERNMENT POLICIES, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INITIATIVE, INNOVATION, INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, INSTRUMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, INVESTMENT CLIMATE, KICKBACKS, LEARNING, MARKET FAILURES, MEDIUM ENTERPRISES, MINISTER, MINISTERS, MULTINATIONAL, MULTINATIONALS, NETWORKS, OPEN ECONOMIES, OPEN ECONOMY, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICIANS, PORTFOLIO, PRIVATE SECTOR, PRIVATE SECTORS, PROGRAMS, PUBLIC FUNDS, PUBLIC GOOD, PUBLIC MONEY, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, R&D, REGULATORY AUTHORITIES, REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT, REGULATORY REFORM, RELIABILITY, REMEDY, RENT SEEKING, RESULT, RESULTS, RETURNS, SEARCH, SEARCHES, SEMICONDUCTOR, SILICON, STOCK EXCHANGE, SUPPLY CHAIN, SUPPLY NETWORKS, TAX, TAX EXEMPTIONS, TAX INCENTIVES, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, TECHNICAL ISSUES, TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE, TECHNICAL TRAINING, TECHNICIANS, TRAINING SYSTEMS, TRANSPARENCY, USERS, VALUE ADDED, VIRUS, WEB, WEB SITE,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/09/16359423/new-open-economy-industrial-policy-making-choices-without-picking-winners
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11057
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