What is the role of technical intermediaries in Payments for Ecosystem Services programs in Chiapas, Mexico?
Programs of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) have been widely adopted in conservation policies as incentives to reduce deforestation. In developing countries, conditional payments contribute to re-regulate land-use change in a context of costly and conflictive law enforcement. Due to the heterogeneity of implementation contexts, the role of technical intermediaries able to translate complex program rules into grounded forest management plan appears critical. For example, in Mexico, certified independent intermediaries have a major role in the selection, the training and the monitoring of participant forest-owners to governmental PES programs. We performed semi-structured interviews with the majority (21) of technical intermediaries in charge of helping PES participation in the state of Chiapas. The interviews aimed at identifying a typology of practices regarding program implementation with private and collective forest owners but also understanding how intermediaries have adapted to evolving procedural rules. Our results suggest that several intermediaries can use PES to promote their own agenda, especially if they are backed by development or conservation NGOs. However, the number of intermediaries has decreased over the year as a result of stricter program rules that control their remuneration and a declining budget for PES programs. Remaining intermediaries have developed strategies in order to maintain their position and anticipate changes in program rules. Overall, our results contribute to document the institutional void existing between policy design and implementation by highlighting the use of expertise and networks by intermediaries in order to remain key players in the governance of PES.
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | conference_item biblioteca |
| Language: | eng |
| Published: |
AAG
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| Online Access: | http://agritrop.cirad.fr/591047/ http://agritrop.cirad.fr/591047/1/ID591047.pdf |
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