Allocating irrigation water: The impact of strategic interactions on the efficiency of rules
In many irrigation schemes, farmers are autonomous in decision making regarding cropping patterns. Some allocation rules currently used in such schemes share water according to what farmers cultivate but then permit an interaction among farmers' choices, whose outcome may be described as a Nash equilibrium. Such rules are compared with other existing and potential rules, when farmers differ in their individual abilities to create value from water. A model simulating the Nash equilibrium associated with farmers' cropping choices reproduces the overcropping pattern observed in an irrigation scheme in Tunisia and makes possible the recommendation of better allocation rules.
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| Format: | article biblioteca |
| Language: | eng |
| Subjects: | F06 - Irrigation, P10 - Ressources en eau et leur gestion, |
| Online Access: | http://agritrop.cirad.fr/580536/ http://agritrop.cirad.fr/580536/7/Eur%20Rev%20Agric%20Econ-2003-Faysse-305-32-1.pdf |
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