Système de rémunération et amélioration de la qualité du coton au Bénin

While the debates on the distortions of the prices in the world market of cotton oppose the producer countries poor and rich, the first showing the second not to comply with the fixed rules within the World Trade Organization, this dissertation introduce the failures of the Remuneration System (RS) of the seed-cotton in Benin. The RS includes seven key issues: 1) the contract of production; 2) the modes of evaluating and grading the quality of the cotton; 3) the rule defining the seed cotton price; 4) the modalities of paying producers and transporters; 5) credit over inputs and the joint guarantee; 6) transfer related with task delegation; 7) the price equalization. This system is analyzed as an inefficient instrument in terms of the improvement in the quality of the cotton-fiber exported. The analysis is based on an approach that identifies the RS failures, which are accepted by the actors involved - and to estimate the actors' gains and losses. However, those who benefited the most from the RS are the cotton-ginners and the low-quality seed cotton producers. The general theory of market with asymmetric information, as well as the concepts of rent and rent-seeking, collusion and collusive transactions, scarcity, and the measurement costs, is applied in order to explain how the actors make use of this system. This analysis has also combined the characteristics of seed cotton supply and the qualifications of cotton related with the embodied power of actors, showing kind the political dimension of the RS. Five main lessons have been identified: i) agency relationship imperfections in an embedded structure with tasks delegation - ii) the creation and sharing of the collusive rent between an agent and its supervisor excluding the principal - iii) the inefficiency of the evaluation of seed cotton quality related with the unsuitable of the means and methods used — iv) the prevailing among actors, of information asymmetry over the quality of the cotton in the export markets, although there is an inter-profession - v) the use of RS failures by the economic agents in order to increase their individual profits through collusive transactions and by capturing four types of decentralized rents : a quality, collusion, positioning and scarcity rents, while ignoring their own losses. Therefore, like political decision-makers interested in the maximization of their votes, the economic agents can use inefficient instruments when they benefit from rents of the use of those instruments and do not really know their own losses. This is the major theoretical outcome of our dissertation.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Yerima, Borgui
Format:	thesis biblioteca
Language:	fre
Published:	ENSAM
Subjects:	E16 - Économie de la production, E71 - Commerce international, coton, qualité, rémunération, marché mondial, exportation, prix, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_1926, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_6400, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_6499, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_8450, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_2761, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_6178, http://aims.fao.org/aos/agrovoc/c_875,
Online Access:	http://agritrop.cirad.fr/529984/ http://agritrop.cirad.fr/529984/1/YERIMA-2005-these%20qualite%20coton%20Benin.pdf
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