Two-Sided Market Power in Firm-to-Firm Trade
We develop a quantitative theory of prices in firm-to-firm trade with bilateral negotiations and two-sided market power. Markups reflect oligopoly and oligopsony forces, with relative bargaining power as weight. Cost pass-through elasticities into import prices can be incomplete or complete, depending on the exporters and importers bargaining power and market shares. In U.S. import data, we find that U.S. importers have substantial market power and disproportionate leverage in price negotiations. The estimated model produces accurate predictions of the impact of Trump tariffs on pair-level prices. At the aggregate level, ignoring two-sided market power could exaggerate tariff pass-through by about 60 percent.
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| Language: | English |
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Inter-American Development Bank
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| Subjects: | Value Chain, Export Activity, Firm Performance, Integration and Trade, Tariff System, Import, Service Provider, Small Business, Economy, F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies • Fragmentation, F13 - Trade Policy • International Trade Organizations, F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade, F62 - Macroeconomic Impacts, Market power;global value chains;Pass-through;International trade, |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004746 https://publications.iadb.org/en/two-sided-market-power-firm-firm-trade |
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