Why Do Populist-Outsiders Get Elected?: A Model of Strategic Populists
The existence of populist regimes led by outsiders is not new in history. In this paper a simple framework is presented that shows how and why a populist outsider can be elected to office, and under what conditions he is more likely to be elected. The results show that countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally distributed. It is also shown that elections with a runoff are less likely to bring these populist outsiders into office.
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| Format: | Working Papers biblioteca |
| Language: | English |
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Inter-American Development Bank
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| Subjects: | Democracy, D31 - Personal Income Wealth and Their Distributions, D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behavior, IDB-WP-248, Outsiders, Populism, Campaign contributions, Inequality, |
| Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011203 https://publications.iadb.org/en/why-do-populist-outsiders-get-elected-model-strategic-populists |
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