Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity
Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants.
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2007-02
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| Subjects: | ADVERSE SELECTION, AGRICULTURE, CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE, DIMINISHING RETURNS, EVICTION, HOUSEHOLDS, INCREASING RETURNS, INEFFICIENCY, LAND OWNERSHIP, LAND REFORM, LANDLORD, LANDLORDS, LANDOWNERS, LEASING, LIABILITY, MORAL HAZARD, POINTS, PRODUCTIVITY, PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, RENTS, RISK AVERSE, RISK AVERSION, RISK NEUTRAL, TENANCY, TENANTS, TENURE, TYPES OF CONTRACTS, VALUE OF OUTPUT, VILLAGES, WEALTH, YIELD, |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/02/7351778/incentives-supervision-sharecropper-productivity http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7128 |
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dig-okr-1098671282021-04-23T14:02:32Z Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity Jacoby, Hanan G. Mansuri, Ghazala ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DIMINISHING RETURNS EVICTION HOUSEHOLDS INCREASING RETURNS INEFFICIENCY LAND OWNERSHIP LAND REFORM LANDLORD LANDLORDS LANDOWNERS LEASING LIABILITY MORAL HAZARD POINTS PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES PROPERTY RIGHTS RENTS RISK AVERSE RISK AVERSION RISK NEUTRAL TENANCY TENANTS TENURE TYPES OF CONTRACTS VALUE OF OUTPUT VILLAGES WEALTH YIELD Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants. 2012-06-05T16:33:19Z 2012-06-05T16:33:19Z 2007-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/02/7351778/incentives-supervision-sharecropper-productivity http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7128 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4125 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research South Asia Pakistan |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
| collection |
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| country |
Estados Unidos |
| countrycode |
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| component |
Bibliográfico |
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| databasecode |
dig-okr |
| tag |
biblioteca |
| region |
America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DIMINISHING RETURNS EVICTION HOUSEHOLDS INCREASING RETURNS INEFFICIENCY LAND OWNERSHIP LAND REFORM LANDLORD LANDLORDS LANDOWNERS LEASING LIABILITY MORAL HAZARD POINTS PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES PROPERTY RIGHTS RENTS RISK AVERSE RISK AVERSION RISK NEUTRAL TENANCY TENANTS TENURE TYPES OF CONTRACTS VALUE OF OUTPUT VILLAGES WEALTH YIELD ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DIMINISHING RETURNS EVICTION HOUSEHOLDS INCREASING RETURNS INEFFICIENCY LAND OWNERSHIP LAND REFORM LANDLORD LANDLORDS LANDOWNERS LEASING LIABILITY MORAL HAZARD POINTS PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES PROPERTY RIGHTS RENTS RISK AVERSE RISK AVERSION RISK NEUTRAL TENANCY TENANTS TENURE TYPES OF CONTRACTS VALUE OF OUTPUT VILLAGES WEALTH YIELD |
| spellingShingle |
ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DIMINISHING RETURNS EVICTION HOUSEHOLDS INCREASING RETURNS INEFFICIENCY LAND OWNERSHIP LAND REFORM LANDLORD LANDLORDS LANDOWNERS LEASING LIABILITY MORAL HAZARD POINTS PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES PROPERTY RIGHTS RENTS RISK AVERSE RISK AVERSION RISK NEUTRAL TENANCY TENANTS TENURE TYPES OF CONTRACTS VALUE OF OUTPUT VILLAGES WEALTH YIELD ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DIMINISHING RETURNS EVICTION HOUSEHOLDS INCREASING RETURNS INEFFICIENCY LAND OWNERSHIP LAND REFORM LANDLORD LANDLORDS LANDOWNERS LEASING LIABILITY MORAL HAZARD POINTS PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES PROPERTY RIGHTS RENTS RISK AVERSE RISK AVERSION RISK NEUTRAL TENANCY TENANTS TENURE TYPES OF CONTRACTS VALUE OF OUTPUT VILLAGES WEALTH YIELD Jacoby, Hanan G. Mansuri, Ghazala Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
| description |
Although sharecropping has long
fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual
form are still poorly understood and the debate over the
extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors
address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord
supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost
to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can
receive different levels of supervision and have different
productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected
from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that,
controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants
are significantly more productive than
"unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions
regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of
incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost
of supervising tenants. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| topic_facet |
ADVERSE SELECTION AGRICULTURE CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE DIMINISHING RETURNS EVICTION HOUSEHOLDS INCREASING RETURNS INEFFICIENCY LAND OWNERSHIP LAND REFORM LANDLORD LANDLORDS LANDOWNERS LEASING LIABILITY MORAL HAZARD POINTS PRODUCTIVITY PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES PROPERTY RIGHTS RENTS RISK AVERSE RISK AVERSION RISK NEUTRAL TENANCY TENANTS TENURE TYPES OF CONTRACTS VALUE OF OUTPUT VILLAGES WEALTH YIELD |
| author |
Jacoby, Hanan G. Mansuri, Ghazala |
| author_facet |
Jacoby, Hanan G. Mansuri, Ghazala |
| author_sort |
Jacoby, Hanan G. |
| title |
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
| title_short |
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
| title_full |
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
| title_fullStr |
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Incentives, Supervision, and Sharecropper Productivity |
| title_sort |
incentives, supervision, and sharecropper productivity |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2007-02 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/02/7351778/incentives-supervision-sharecropper-productivity http://hdl.handle.net/10986/7128 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT jacobyhanang incentivessupervisionandsharecropperproductivity AT mansurighazala incentivessupervisionandsharecropperproductivity |
| _version_ |
1756571860664844288 |