Does Participation in Productive Associations Signal Trust and Creditworthiness? Evidence for Nicaragua

This article studies the extent to which participation in productive associations in Nicaragua contributes to increase individuals' access to social programs and credit services. By participating in productive associations, individuals give a good signal to firms and are rewarded with better transactions and more access to the services they provide, ceteris paribus. Estimates using 2005 data indicate that households that participate in productive associations display higher access to credit and to social programs that promote investment. Additionally, participation in productive associations is weakly associated to more favorable credit outcomes among those households that receive loans, such as lower interest rates and a lower probability of wanting more credit than what was accessible to them.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Molina, Ezequiel, Angel-Urdinola, Diego F.
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2008-02
Subjects:ACCESS TO CREDIT, ACCESS TO LOANS, ACCESS TO SERVICES, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, AVERAGE INTEREST, BANKS, BENEFICIARIES, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, CASH TRANSFERS, CHECKS, COLLECTIVE, COLLECTIVE ACTION, COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM, CONSUMER, CONVENTIONAL BANKS, COOPERATIVES, CREDIT CARDS, CREDIT MARKETS, CREDIT NEEDS, CREDIT RATIONING, CREDIT SOURCES, CREDIT UNIONS, CREDITOR, CREDITORS, CREDITWORTHINESS, DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, DUMMY VARIABLE, ECONOMIC BENEFITS, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, ECONOMICS, EDUCATION PROGRAMS, EMPLOYMENT, EMPOWERMENT, EQUALITY, FAMILIES, FARMERS, FORMAL CREDIT, FORMAL LOANS, GAME THEORY, GENDER, HOUSEHOLD ACCESS, HOUSEHOLDS, HUMAN CAPITAL, IMPERFECT INFORMATION, INCOME, INDIRECT COSTS, INDIVIDUALS, INFORMAL CREDIT, INFORMAL LENDERS, INTEREST RATE, INTEREST RATES, INTERNATIONAL BANK, INVESTMENT ASSET, LENDERS, LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE, LOAN, LOAN DECISIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOWER INTEREST RATES, MERCHANTS, MICRO-CREDITS, MICRO-FINANCE, MICRO-FINANCE INSTITUTIONS, MUNICIPALITY, NUTRITION, PACIFIC REGION, PARTICIPATIONS, PERFECT INFORMATION, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, PRINCIPAL-AGENT, PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS, PRIVATE BANKS, PROBABILITY, PRODUCTIVITY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, PROXY, PUBLIC FIRMS, PUBLIC FUNDS, RELIGIOUS GROUPS, RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, RETURN, RETURNS, RULE OF LAW, SAVINGS, SECONDARY SCHOOL, SIGNALING EFFECT, SOCIAL ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL CAPITAL, TYPE OF INVESTMENT, URBAN AREAS, VALUABLE, VILLAGE, WAGE, WORTH,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/8995267/participation-productive-associations-signal-trust-creditworthiness-evidence-nicaragua
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/6425
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spelling dig-okr-1098664252024-08-08T16:46:58Z Does Participation in Productive Associations Signal Trust and Creditworthiness? Evidence for Nicaragua Molina, Ezequiel Angel-Urdinola, Diego F. ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCESS TO LOANS ACCESS TO SERVICES ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AVERAGE INTEREST BANKS BENEFICIARIES CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CASH TRANSFERS CHECKS COLLECTIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM CONSUMER CONVENTIONAL BANKS COOPERATIVES CREDIT CARDS CREDIT MARKETS CREDIT NEEDS CREDIT RATIONING CREDIT SOURCES CREDIT UNIONS CREDITOR CREDITORS CREDITWORTHINESS DEMOCRACY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DUMMY VARIABLE ECONOMIC BENEFITS ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMICS EDUCATION PROGRAMS EMPLOYMENT EMPOWERMENT EQUALITY FAMILIES FARMERS FORMAL CREDIT FORMAL LOANS GAME THEORY GENDER HOUSEHOLD ACCESS HOUSEHOLDS HUMAN CAPITAL IMPERFECT INFORMATION INCOME INDIRECT COSTS INDIVIDUALS INFORMAL CREDIT INFORMAL LENDERS INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK INVESTMENT ASSET LENDERS LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE LOAN LOAN DECISIONS LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOWER INTEREST RATES MERCHANTS MICRO-CREDITS MICRO-FINANCE MICRO-FINANCE INSTITUTIONS MUNICIPALITY NUTRITION PACIFIC REGION PARTICIPATIONS PERFECT INFORMATION POLITICAL PARTICIPATION PRINCIPAL-AGENT PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS PRIVATE BANKS PROBABILITY PRODUCTIVITY PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS PROXY PUBLIC FIRMS PUBLIC FUNDS RELIGIOUS GROUPS RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES RETURN RETURNS RULE OF LAW SAVINGS SECONDARY SCHOOL SIGNALING EFFECT SOCIAL ASSISTANCE SOCIAL CAPITAL TYPE OF INVESTMENT URBAN AREAS VALUABLE VILLAGE WAGE WORTH This article studies the extent to which participation in productive associations in Nicaragua contributes to increase individuals' access to social programs and credit services. By participating in productive associations, individuals give a good signal to firms and are rewarded with better transactions and more access to the services they provide, ceteris paribus. Estimates using 2005 data indicate that households that participate in productive associations display higher access to credit and to social programs that promote investment. Additionally, participation in productive associations is weakly associated to more favorable credit outcomes among those households that receive loans, such as lower interest rates and a lower probability of wanting more credit than what was accessible to them. 2012-05-25T15:21:42Z 2012-05-25T15:21:42Z 2008-02 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/8995267/participation-productive-associations-signal-trust-creditworthiness-evidence-nicaragua https://hdl.handle.net/10986/6425 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 4512 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language English
topic ACCESS TO CREDIT
ACCESS TO LOANS
ACCESS TO SERVICES
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AVERAGE INTEREST
BANKS
BENEFICIARIES
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
CASH TRANSFERS
CHECKS
COLLECTIVE
COLLECTIVE ACTION
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
CONSUMER
CONVENTIONAL BANKS
COOPERATIVES
CREDIT CARDS
CREDIT MARKETS
CREDIT NEEDS
CREDIT RATIONING
CREDIT SOURCES
CREDIT UNIONS
CREDITOR
CREDITORS
CREDITWORTHINESS
DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DUMMY VARIABLE
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMICS
EDUCATION PROGRAMS
EMPLOYMENT
EMPOWERMENT
EQUALITY
FAMILIES
FARMERS
FORMAL CREDIT
FORMAL LOANS
GAME THEORY
GENDER
HOUSEHOLD ACCESS
HOUSEHOLDS
HUMAN CAPITAL
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
INCOME
INDIRECT COSTS
INDIVIDUALS
INFORMAL CREDIT
INFORMAL LENDERS
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INVESTMENT ASSET
LENDERS
LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE
LOAN
LOAN DECISIONS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOWER INTEREST RATES
MERCHANTS
MICRO-CREDITS
MICRO-FINANCE
MICRO-FINANCE INSTITUTIONS
MUNICIPALITY
NUTRITION
PACIFIC REGION
PARTICIPATIONS
PERFECT INFORMATION
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
PRINCIPAL-AGENT
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS
PRIVATE BANKS
PROBABILITY
PRODUCTIVITY
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
PROXY
PUBLIC FIRMS
PUBLIC FUNDS
RELIGIOUS GROUPS
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
RESPONSIBILITIES
RETURN
RETURNS
RULE OF LAW
SAVINGS
SECONDARY SCHOOL
SIGNALING EFFECT
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
SOCIAL CAPITAL
TYPE OF INVESTMENT
URBAN AREAS
VALUABLE
VILLAGE
WAGE
WORTH
ACCESS TO CREDIT
ACCESS TO LOANS
ACCESS TO SERVICES
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AVERAGE INTEREST
BANKS
BENEFICIARIES
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
CASH TRANSFERS
CHECKS
COLLECTIVE
COLLECTIVE ACTION
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
CONSUMER
CONVENTIONAL BANKS
COOPERATIVES
CREDIT CARDS
CREDIT MARKETS
CREDIT NEEDS
CREDIT RATIONING
CREDIT SOURCES
CREDIT UNIONS
CREDITOR
CREDITORS
CREDITWORTHINESS
DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DUMMY VARIABLE
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMICS
EDUCATION PROGRAMS
EMPLOYMENT
EMPOWERMENT
EQUALITY
FAMILIES
FARMERS
FORMAL CREDIT
FORMAL LOANS
GAME THEORY
GENDER
HOUSEHOLD ACCESS
HOUSEHOLDS
HUMAN CAPITAL
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
INCOME
INDIRECT COSTS
INDIVIDUALS
INFORMAL CREDIT
INFORMAL LENDERS
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INVESTMENT ASSET
LENDERS
LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE
LOAN
LOAN DECISIONS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOWER INTEREST RATES
MERCHANTS
MICRO-CREDITS
MICRO-FINANCE
MICRO-FINANCE INSTITUTIONS
MUNICIPALITY
NUTRITION
PACIFIC REGION
PARTICIPATIONS
PERFECT INFORMATION
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
PRINCIPAL-AGENT
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS
PRIVATE BANKS
PROBABILITY
PRODUCTIVITY
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
PROXY
PUBLIC FIRMS
PUBLIC FUNDS
RELIGIOUS GROUPS
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
RESPONSIBILITIES
RETURN
RETURNS
RULE OF LAW
SAVINGS
SECONDARY SCHOOL
SIGNALING EFFECT
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
SOCIAL CAPITAL
TYPE OF INVESTMENT
URBAN AREAS
VALUABLE
VILLAGE
WAGE
WORTH
spellingShingle ACCESS TO CREDIT
ACCESS TO LOANS
ACCESS TO SERVICES
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AVERAGE INTEREST
BANKS
BENEFICIARIES
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
CASH TRANSFERS
CHECKS
COLLECTIVE
COLLECTIVE ACTION
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
CONSUMER
CONVENTIONAL BANKS
COOPERATIVES
CREDIT CARDS
CREDIT MARKETS
CREDIT NEEDS
CREDIT RATIONING
CREDIT SOURCES
CREDIT UNIONS
CREDITOR
CREDITORS
CREDITWORTHINESS
DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DUMMY VARIABLE
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMICS
EDUCATION PROGRAMS
EMPLOYMENT
EMPOWERMENT
EQUALITY
FAMILIES
FARMERS
FORMAL CREDIT
FORMAL LOANS
GAME THEORY
GENDER
HOUSEHOLD ACCESS
HOUSEHOLDS
HUMAN CAPITAL
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
INCOME
INDIRECT COSTS
INDIVIDUALS
INFORMAL CREDIT
INFORMAL LENDERS
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INVESTMENT ASSET
LENDERS
LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE
LOAN
LOAN DECISIONS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOWER INTEREST RATES
MERCHANTS
MICRO-CREDITS
MICRO-FINANCE
MICRO-FINANCE INSTITUTIONS
MUNICIPALITY
NUTRITION
PACIFIC REGION
PARTICIPATIONS
PERFECT INFORMATION
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
PRINCIPAL-AGENT
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS
PRIVATE BANKS
PROBABILITY
PRODUCTIVITY
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
PROXY
PUBLIC FIRMS
PUBLIC FUNDS
RELIGIOUS GROUPS
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
RESPONSIBILITIES
RETURN
RETURNS
RULE OF LAW
SAVINGS
SECONDARY SCHOOL
SIGNALING EFFECT
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
SOCIAL CAPITAL
TYPE OF INVESTMENT
URBAN AREAS
VALUABLE
VILLAGE
WAGE
WORTH
ACCESS TO CREDIT
ACCESS TO LOANS
ACCESS TO SERVICES
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AVERAGE INTEREST
BANKS
BENEFICIARIES
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
CASH TRANSFERS
CHECKS
COLLECTIVE
COLLECTIVE ACTION
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
CONSUMER
CONVENTIONAL BANKS
COOPERATIVES
CREDIT CARDS
CREDIT MARKETS
CREDIT NEEDS
CREDIT RATIONING
CREDIT SOURCES
CREDIT UNIONS
CREDITOR
CREDITORS
CREDITWORTHINESS
DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DUMMY VARIABLE
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMICS
EDUCATION PROGRAMS
EMPLOYMENT
EMPOWERMENT
EQUALITY
FAMILIES
FARMERS
FORMAL CREDIT
FORMAL LOANS
GAME THEORY
GENDER
HOUSEHOLD ACCESS
HOUSEHOLDS
HUMAN CAPITAL
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
INCOME
INDIRECT COSTS
INDIVIDUALS
INFORMAL CREDIT
INFORMAL LENDERS
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INVESTMENT ASSET
LENDERS
LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE
LOAN
LOAN DECISIONS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOWER INTEREST RATES
MERCHANTS
MICRO-CREDITS
MICRO-FINANCE
MICRO-FINANCE INSTITUTIONS
MUNICIPALITY
NUTRITION
PACIFIC REGION
PARTICIPATIONS
PERFECT INFORMATION
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
PRINCIPAL-AGENT
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS
PRIVATE BANKS
PROBABILITY
PRODUCTIVITY
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
PROXY
PUBLIC FIRMS
PUBLIC FUNDS
RELIGIOUS GROUPS
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
RESPONSIBILITIES
RETURN
RETURNS
RULE OF LAW
SAVINGS
SECONDARY SCHOOL
SIGNALING EFFECT
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
SOCIAL CAPITAL
TYPE OF INVESTMENT
URBAN AREAS
VALUABLE
VILLAGE
WAGE
WORTH
Molina, Ezequiel
Angel-Urdinola, Diego F.
Does Participation in Productive Associations Signal Trust and Creditworthiness? Evidence for Nicaragua
description This article studies the extent to which participation in productive associations in Nicaragua contributes to increase individuals' access to social programs and credit services. By participating in productive associations, individuals give a good signal to firms and are rewarded with better transactions and more access to the services they provide, ceteris paribus. Estimates using 2005 data indicate that households that participate in productive associations display higher access to credit and to social programs that promote investment. Additionally, participation in productive associations is weakly associated to more favorable credit outcomes among those households that receive loans, such as lower interest rates and a lower probability of wanting more credit than what was accessible to them.
topic_facet ACCESS TO CREDIT
ACCESS TO LOANS
ACCESS TO SERVICES
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
AVERAGE INTEREST
BANKS
BENEFICIARIES
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
CASH TRANSFERS
CHECKS
COLLECTIVE
COLLECTIVE ACTION
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
CONSUMER
CONVENTIONAL BANKS
COOPERATIVES
CREDIT CARDS
CREDIT MARKETS
CREDIT NEEDS
CREDIT RATIONING
CREDIT SOURCES
CREDIT UNIONS
CREDITOR
CREDITORS
CREDITWORTHINESS
DEMOCRACY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
DUMMY VARIABLE
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
ECONOMICS
EDUCATION PROGRAMS
EMPLOYMENT
EMPOWERMENT
EQUALITY
FAMILIES
FARMERS
FORMAL CREDIT
FORMAL LOANS
GAME THEORY
GENDER
HOUSEHOLD ACCESS
HOUSEHOLDS
HUMAN CAPITAL
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
INCOME
INDIRECT COSTS
INDIVIDUALS
INFORMAL CREDIT
INFORMAL LENDERS
INTEREST RATE
INTEREST RATES
INTERNATIONAL BANK
INVESTMENT ASSET
LENDERS
LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE
LOAN
LOAN DECISIONS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOWER INTEREST RATES
MERCHANTS
MICRO-CREDITS
MICRO-FINANCE
MICRO-FINANCE INSTITUTIONS
MUNICIPALITY
NUTRITION
PACIFIC REGION
PARTICIPATIONS
PERFECT INFORMATION
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
PRINCIPAL-AGENT
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS
PRIVATE BANKS
PROBABILITY
PRODUCTIVITY
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
PROXY
PUBLIC FIRMS
PUBLIC FUNDS
RELIGIOUS GROUPS
RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
RESPONSIBILITIES
RETURN
RETURNS
RULE OF LAW
SAVINGS
SECONDARY SCHOOL
SIGNALING EFFECT
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
SOCIAL CAPITAL
TYPE OF INVESTMENT
URBAN AREAS
VALUABLE
VILLAGE
WAGE
WORTH
author Molina, Ezequiel
Angel-Urdinola, Diego F.
author_facet Molina, Ezequiel
Angel-Urdinola, Diego F.
author_sort Molina, Ezequiel
title Does Participation in Productive Associations Signal Trust and Creditworthiness? Evidence for Nicaragua
title_short Does Participation in Productive Associations Signal Trust and Creditworthiness? Evidence for Nicaragua
title_full Does Participation in Productive Associations Signal Trust and Creditworthiness? Evidence for Nicaragua
title_fullStr Does Participation in Productive Associations Signal Trust and Creditworthiness? Evidence for Nicaragua
title_full_unstemmed Does Participation in Productive Associations Signal Trust and Creditworthiness? Evidence for Nicaragua
title_sort does participation in productive associations signal trust and creditworthiness? evidence for nicaragua
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2008-02
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2008/02/8995267/participation-productive-associations-signal-trust-creditworthiness-evidence-nicaragua
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/6425
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