Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution

In many countries safety nets consist predominantly of universal subsidies on food and fuel. A key question for policy makers willing to shift to targeted safety nets is under what conditions middle-class citizens would be supportive of redistributive programs. Results from a behavioral experiment based on a nationally representative sample in Jordan reveal that increasing transparency in benefit delivery makes middle-class citizens (particularly among the youth and low-trust individuals) more willing to forgo their own welfare to benefit the poor. Moreover, increasing transparency enhances the relative support for cash-based safety nets, which have greater impact on poverty compared with in-kind transfers, but may be perceived as more prone to elite capture.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Silva, Joana, Morgandi, Matteo, Levin, Victoria
Format: Working Paper biblioteca
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2016-05
Subjects:AUCTION, LIVING STANDARDS, HOME OWNERSHIP, EMPLOYMENT, SAFETY NET PROGRAMS, HOUSEHOLD SIZE, POVERTY LINE, CHECKS, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, PREVENTIVE CARE, VALUATION, MINIMUM WAGE, PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM, INCOME, INTEREST, GUARANTEES, EXPECTATIONS, LOW TRUST, ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, EXCHANGE, OPTION, INFORMATION, SOCIAL SAFETY NET, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WELFARE SYSTEM, MONITORING, POLITICAL ECONOMY, FOOD POLICY, WELFARE, VARIABLES, ENERGY SUBSIDIES, SUBSIDY, TAX, CASH TRANSFER, DECISIONS, DUMMY VARIABLE, WEALTH, SOCIAL ASSISTANCE, INTERNATIONAL BANK, MEASURES, INSTRUMENTS, SAFETY NETS, CREDIBILITY, POVERTY REDUCTION, PER CAPITA INCOMES, FOOD TRANSFER, PROGRAM DESIGNS, SAVINGS, PER CAPITA INCOME, TRAINING, MORAL HAZARD, PUBLIC SUPPORT, PUBLIC FUNDS, RENT, ECONOMETRICS, OPTIONS, FAILURES, AUCTION MECHANISM, MONETARY FUND, TRANSFERS, MARKETS, ORGANIZATIONS, RETURN, PUBLIC FINANCE, SOCIAL PROTECTION, ECONOMICS LITERATURE, STANDARDS, LABOR, LOTTERIES, PRICE SUBSIDIES, UTILITY, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, CASH TRANSFERS, SUBSIDIES, FINANCE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH, EXPENDITURE, UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES, TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS, SOCIAL SAFETY NETS, GOOD, MEANS TEST, FRAUD, POLICIES, TRANSPARENCY, SOCIAL SERVICES, MARKET FAILURES, SCHOOL ATTENDANCE, FUTURE, VALUE, PATERNALISM, SAFETY NET, HIGH TRUST, CONSUMERS, DECISION MAKING, VOUCHERS, MARKET, FOOD TRANSFERS, TRANSFER PROGRAMS, ECONOMICS, PEER PRESSURE, PUBLIC PROVISION, RECIPROCITY, TAXATION, TARGETING, PUBLIC RESOURCES, TRADE, GOODS, THEORY, REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES, RISK, HUMAN RESOURCES, RANDOM WALK, SHARE, POVERTY, INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY, CONDITIONAL CASH, BARGAINING, TRUSTS, SUPPLY, REVENUE, CHECK, CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS, INCOME REDISTRIBUTION, POOR, SHOCK, PUBLIC SPENDING, ECONOMIC SHOCKS, OUTCOMES, SAFETY, PUBLIC GOOD, PRICE SUBSIDY, PRICES, INEQUALITY, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT POLICY,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/05/26377292/trust-government-support-redistribution-transforming-electricity-governance-india-india’s-power-sector-regulation-enabled-consumers’-power
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24514
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