Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution
In many countries safety nets consist predominantly of universal subsidies on food and fuel. A key question for policy makers willing to shift to targeted safety nets is under what conditions middle-class citizens would be supportive of redistributive programs. Results from a behavioral experiment based on a nationally representative sample in Jordan reveal that increasing transparency in benefit delivery makes middle-class citizens (particularly among the youth and low-trust individuals) more willing to forgo their own welfare to benefit the poor. Moreover, increasing transparency enhances the relative support for cash-based safety nets, which have greater impact on poverty compared with in-kind transfers, but may be perceived as more prone to elite capture.
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dig-okr-10986245142024-08-07T19:57:39Z Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution Morgandi, Matteo Silva, Joana Levin, Victoria AUCTION LIVING STANDARDS HOME OWNERSHIP EMPLOYMENT SAFETY NET PROGRAMS HOUSEHOLD SIZE POVERTY LINE CHECKS INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES PREVENTIVE CARE VALUATION MINIMUM WAGE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM INCOME INTEREST GUARANTEES EXPECTATIONS LOW TRUST ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXCHANGE OPTION INFORMATION SOCIAL SAFETY NET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WELFARE SYSTEM MONITORING POLITICAL ECONOMY FOOD POLICY WELFARE VARIABLES ENERGY SUBSIDIES SUBSIDY TAX CASH TRANSFER DECISIONS DUMMY VARIABLE WEALTH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK MEASURES INSTRUMENTS SAFETY NETS CREDIBILITY POVERTY REDUCTION PER CAPITA INCOMES FOOD TRANSFER PROGRAM DESIGNS SAVINGS PER CAPITA INCOME TRAINING MORAL HAZARD PUBLIC SUPPORT PUBLIC FUNDS RENT ECONOMETRICS OPTIONS FAILURES AUCTION MECHANISM MONETARY FUND TRANSFERS MARKETS ORGANIZATIONS RETURN PUBLIC FINANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION ECONOMICS LITERATURE STANDARDS LABOR LOTTERIES PRICE SUBSIDIES UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CASH TRANSFERS SUBSIDIES FINANCE ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURE UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SAFETY NETS GOOD MEANS TEST FRAUD POLICIES TRANSPARENCY SOCIAL SERVICES MARKET FAILURES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FUTURE VALUE PATERNALISM SAFETY NET HIGH TRUST CONSUMERS DECISION MAKING VOUCHERS MARKET FOOD TRANSFERS TRANSFER PROGRAMS ECONOMICS PEER PRESSURE PUBLIC PROVISION RECIPROCITY TAXATION TARGETING PUBLIC RESOURCES TRADE GOODS THEORY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RISK HUMAN RESOURCES RANDOM WALK SHARE POVERTY INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY CONDITIONAL CASH BARGAINING TRUSTS SUPPLY REVENUE CHECK CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION POOR SHOCK PUBLIC SPENDING ECONOMIC SHOCKS OUTCOMES SAFETY PUBLIC GOOD PRICE SUBSIDY PRICES INEQUALITY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY In many countries safety nets consist predominantly of universal subsidies on food and fuel. A key question for policy makers willing to shift to targeted safety nets is under what conditions middle-class citizens would be supportive of redistributive programs. Results from a behavioral experiment based on a nationally representative sample in Jordan reveal that increasing transparency in benefit delivery makes middle-class citizens (particularly among the youth and low-trust individuals) more willing to forgo their own welfare to benefit the poor. Moreover, increasing transparency enhances the relative support for cash-based safety nets, which have greater impact on poverty compared with in-kind transfers, but may be perceived as more prone to elite capture. 2016-06-13T22:04:05Z 2016-06-13T22:04:05Z 2016-05 Working Paper Document de travail Documento de trabajo http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/05/26377292/trust-government-support-redistribution-transforming-electricity-governance-india-india’s-power-sector-regulation-enabled-consumers’-power https://hdl.handle.net/10986/24514 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7675 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
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Banco Mundial |
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Estados Unidos |
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US |
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Bibliográfico |
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En linea |
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biblioteca |
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America del Norte |
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Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AUCTION LIVING STANDARDS HOME OWNERSHIP EMPLOYMENT SAFETY NET PROGRAMS HOUSEHOLD SIZE POVERTY LINE CHECKS INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES PREVENTIVE CARE VALUATION MINIMUM WAGE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM INCOME INTEREST GUARANTEES EXPECTATIONS LOW TRUST ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXCHANGE OPTION INFORMATION SOCIAL SAFETY NET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WELFARE SYSTEM MONITORING POLITICAL ECONOMY FOOD POLICY WELFARE VARIABLES ENERGY SUBSIDIES SUBSIDY TAX CASH TRANSFER DECISIONS DUMMY VARIABLE WEALTH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK MEASURES INSTRUMENTS SAFETY NETS CREDIBILITY POVERTY REDUCTION PER CAPITA INCOMES FOOD TRANSFER PROGRAM DESIGNS SAVINGS PER CAPITA INCOME TRAINING MORAL HAZARD PUBLIC SUPPORT PUBLIC FUNDS RENT ECONOMETRICS OPTIONS FAILURES AUCTION MECHANISM MONETARY FUND TRANSFERS MARKETS ORGANIZATIONS RETURN PUBLIC FINANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION ECONOMICS LITERATURE STANDARDS LABOR LOTTERIES PRICE SUBSIDIES UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CASH TRANSFERS SUBSIDIES FINANCE ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURE UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SAFETY NETS GOOD MEANS TEST FRAUD POLICIES TRANSPARENCY SOCIAL SERVICES MARKET FAILURES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FUTURE VALUE PATERNALISM SAFETY NET HIGH TRUST CONSUMERS DECISION MAKING VOUCHERS MARKET FOOD TRANSFERS TRANSFER PROGRAMS ECONOMICS PEER PRESSURE PUBLIC PROVISION RECIPROCITY TAXATION TARGETING PUBLIC RESOURCES TRADE GOODS THEORY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RISK HUMAN RESOURCES RANDOM WALK SHARE POVERTY INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY CONDITIONAL CASH BARGAINING TRUSTS SUPPLY REVENUE CHECK CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION POOR SHOCK PUBLIC SPENDING ECONOMIC SHOCKS OUTCOMES SAFETY PUBLIC GOOD PRICE SUBSIDY PRICES INEQUALITY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY AUCTION LIVING STANDARDS HOME OWNERSHIP EMPLOYMENT SAFETY NET PROGRAMS HOUSEHOLD SIZE POVERTY LINE CHECKS INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES PREVENTIVE CARE VALUATION MINIMUM WAGE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM INCOME INTEREST GUARANTEES EXPECTATIONS LOW TRUST ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXCHANGE OPTION INFORMATION SOCIAL SAFETY NET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WELFARE SYSTEM MONITORING POLITICAL ECONOMY FOOD POLICY WELFARE VARIABLES ENERGY SUBSIDIES SUBSIDY TAX CASH TRANSFER DECISIONS DUMMY VARIABLE WEALTH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK MEASURES INSTRUMENTS SAFETY NETS CREDIBILITY POVERTY REDUCTION PER CAPITA INCOMES FOOD TRANSFER PROGRAM DESIGNS SAVINGS PER CAPITA INCOME TRAINING MORAL HAZARD PUBLIC SUPPORT PUBLIC FUNDS RENT ECONOMETRICS OPTIONS FAILURES AUCTION MECHANISM MONETARY FUND TRANSFERS MARKETS ORGANIZATIONS RETURN PUBLIC FINANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION ECONOMICS LITERATURE STANDARDS LABOR LOTTERIES PRICE SUBSIDIES UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CASH TRANSFERS SUBSIDIES FINANCE ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURE UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SAFETY NETS GOOD MEANS TEST FRAUD POLICIES TRANSPARENCY SOCIAL SERVICES MARKET FAILURES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FUTURE VALUE PATERNALISM SAFETY NET HIGH TRUST CONSUMERS DECISION MAKING VOUCHERS MARKET FOOD TRANSFERS TRANSFER PROGRAMS ECONOMICS PEER PRESSURE PUBLIC PROVISION RECIPROCITY TAXATION TARGETING PUBLIC RESOURCES TRADE GOODS THEORY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RISK HUMAN RESOURCES RANDOM WALK SHARE POVERTY INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY CONDITIONAL CASH BARGAINING TRUSTS SUPPLY REVENUE CHECK CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION POOR SHOCK PUBLIC SPENDING ECONOMIC SHOCKS OUTCOMES SAFETY PUBLIC GOOD PRICE SUBSIDY PRICES INEQUALITY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY |
| spellingShingle |
AUCTION LIVING STANDARDS HOME OWNERSHIP EMPLOYMENT SAFETY NET PROGRAMS HOUSEHOLD SIZE POVERTY LINE CHECKS INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES PREVENTIVE CARE VALUATION MINIMUM WAGE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM INCOME INTEREST GUARANTEES EXPECTATIONS LOW TRUST ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXCHANGE OPTION INFORMATION SOCIAL SAFETY NET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WELFARE SYSTEM MONITORING POLITICAL ECONOMY FOOD POLICY WELFARE VARIABLES ENERGY SUBSIDIES SUBSIDY TAX CASH TRANSFER DECISIONS DUMMY VARIABLE WEALTH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK MEASURES INSTRUMENTS SAFETY NETS CREDIBILITY POVERTY REDUCTION PER CAPITA INCOMES FOOD TRANSFER PROGRAM DESIGNS SAVINGS PER CAPITA INCOME TRAINING MORAL HAZARD PUBLIC SUPPORT PUBLIC FUNDS RENT ECONOMETRICS OPTIONS FAILURES AUCTION MECHANISM MONETARY FUND TRANSFERS MARKETS ORGANIZATIONS RETURN PUBLIC FINANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION ECONOMICS LITERATURE STANDARDS LABOR LOTTERIES PRICE SUBSIDIES UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CASH TRANSFERS SUBSIDIES FINANCE ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURE UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SAFETY NETS GOOD MEANS TEST FRAUD POLICIES TRANSPARENCY SOCIAL SERVICES MARKET FAILURES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FUTURE VALUE PATERNALISM SAFETY NET HIGH TRUST CONSUMERS DECISION MAKING VOUCHERS MARKET FOOD TRANSFERS TRANSFER PROGRAMS ECONOMICS PEER PRESSURE PUBLIC PROVISION RECIPROCITY TAXATION TARGETING PUBLIC RESOURCES TRADE GOODS THEORY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RISK HUMAN RESOURCES RANDOM WALK SHARE POVERTY INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY CONDITIONAL CASH BARGAINING TRUSTS SUPPLY REVENUE CHECK CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION POOR SHOCK PUBLIC SPENDING ECONOMIC SHOCKS OUTCOMES SAFETY PUBLIC GOOD PRICE SUBSIDY PRICES INEQUALITY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY AUCTION LIVING STANDARDS HOME OWNERSHIP EMPLOYMENT SAFETY NET PROGRAMS HOUSEHOLD SIZE POVERTY LINE CHECKS INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES PREVENTIVE CARE VALUATION MINIMUM WAGE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM INCOME INTEREST GUARANTEES EXPECTATIONS LOW TRUST ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXCHANGE OPTION INFORMATION SOCIAL SAFETY NET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WELFARE SYSTEM MONITORING POLITICAL ECONOMY FOOD POLICY WELFARE VARIABLES ENERGY SUBSIDIES SUBSIDY TAX CASH TRANSFER DECISIONS DUMMY VARIABLE WEALTH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK MEASURES INSTRUMENTS SAFETY NETS CREDIBILITY POVERTY REDUCTION PER CAPITA INCOMES FOOD TRANSFER PROGRAM DESIGNS SAVINGS PER CAPITA INCOME TRAINING MORAL HAZARD PUBLIC SUPPORT PUBLIC FUNDS RENT ECONOMETRICS OPTIONS FAILURES AUCTION MECHANISM MONETARY FUND TRANSFERS MARKETS ORGANIZATIONS RETURN PUBLIC FINANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION ECONOMICS LITERATURE STANDARDS LABOR LOTTERIES PRICE SUBSIDIES UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CASH TRANSFERS SUBSIDIES FINANCE ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURE UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SAFETY NETS GOOD MEANS TEST FRAUD POLICIES TRANSPARENCY SOCIAL SERVICES MARKET FAILURES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FUTURE VALUE PATERNALISM SAFETY NET HIGH TRUST CONSUMERS DECISION MAKING VOUCHERS MARKET FOOD TRANSFERS TRANSFER PROGRAMS ECONOMICS PEER PRESSURE PUBLIC PROVISION RECIPROCITY TAXATION TARGETING PUBLIC RESOURCES TRADE GOODS THEORY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RISK HUMAN RESOURCES RANDOM WALK SHARE POVERTY INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY CONDITIONAL CASH BARGAINING TRUSTS SUPPLY REVENUE CHECK CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION POOR SHOCK PUBLIC SPENDING ECONOMIC SHOCKS OUTCOMES SAFETY PUBLIC GOOD PRICE SUBSIDY PRICES INEQUALITY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY Morgandi, Matteo Silva, Joana Levin, Victoria Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution |
| description |
In many countries safety nets consist
predominantly of universal subsidies on food and fuel. A key
question for policy makers willing to shift to targeted
safety nets is under what conditions middle-class citizens
would be supportive of redistributive programs. Results from
a behavioral experiment based on a nationally representative
sample in Jordan reveal that increasing transparency in
benefit delivery makes middle-class citizens (particularly
among the youth and low-trust individuals) more willing to
forgo their own welfare to benefit the poor. Moreover,
increasing transparency enhances the relative support for
cash-based safety nets, which have greater impact on poverty
compared with in-kind transfers, but may be perceived as
more prone to elite capture. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| topic_facet |
AUCTION LIVING STANDARDS HOME OWNERSHIP EMPLOYMENT SAFETY NET PROGRAMS HOUSEHOLD SIZE POVERTY LINE CHECKS INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES PREVENTIVE CARE VALUATION MINIMUM WAGE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM INCOME INTEREST GUARANTEES EXPECTATIONS LOW TRUST ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS EXCHANGE OPTION INFORMATION SOCIAL SAFETY NET DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WELFARE SYSTEM MONITORING POLITICAL ECONOMY FOOD POLICY WELFARE VARIABLES ENERGY SUBSIDIES SUBSIDY TAX CASH TRANSFER DECISIONS DUMMY VARIABLE WEALTH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONAL BANK MEASURES INSTRUMENTS SAFETY NETS CREDIBILITY POVERTY REDUCTION PER CAPITA INCOMES FOOD TRANSFER PROGRAM DESIGNS SAVINGS PER CAPITA INCOME TRAINING MORAL HAZARD PUBLIC SUPPORT PUBLIC FUNDS RENT ECONOMETRICS OPTIONS FAILURES AUCTION MECHANISM MONETARY FUND TRANSFERS MARKETS ORGANIZATIONS RETURN PUBLIC FINANCE SOCIAL PROTECTION ECONOMICS LITERATURE STANDARDS LABOR LOTTERIES PRICE SUBSIDIES UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CASH TRANSFERS SUBSIDIES FINANCE ECONOMIC RESEARCH EXPENDITURE UNIVERSAL SUBSIDIES TARGETED SOCIAL SAFETY NETS SOCIAL SAFETY NETS GOOD MEANS TEST FRAUD POLICIES TRANSPARENCY SOCIAL SERVICES MARKET FAILURES SCHOOL ATTENDANCE FUTURE VALUE PATERNALISM SAFETY NET HIGH TRUST CONSUMERS DECISION MAKING VOUCHERS MARKET FOOD TRANSFERS TRANSFER PROGRAMS ECONOMICS PEER PRESSURE PUBLIC PROVISION RECIPROCITY TAXATION TARGETING PUBLIC RESOURCES TRADE GOODS THEORY REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES RISK HUMAN RESOURCES RANDOM WALK SHARE POVERTY INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY CONDITIONAL CASH BARGAINING TRUSTS SUPPLY REVENUE CHECK CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS INCOME REDISTRIBUTION POOR SHOCK PUBLIC SPENDING ECONOMIC SHOCKS OUTCOMES SAFETY PUBLIC GOOD PRICE SUBSIDY PRICES INEQUALITY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICY |
| author |
Morgandi, Matteo Silva, Joana Levin, Victoria |
| author_facet |
Morgandi, Matteo Silva, Joana Levin, Victoria |
| author_sort |
Morgandi, Matteo |
| title |
Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution |
| title_short |
Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution |
| title_full |
Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution |
| title_fullStr |
Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Trust in Government and Support for Redistribution |
| title_sort |
trust in government and support for redistribution |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2016-05 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/05/26377292/trust-government-support-redistribution-transforming-electricity-governance-india-india’s-power-sector-regulation-enabled-consumers’-power https://hdl.handle.net/10986/24514 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT morgandimatteo trustingovernmentandsupportforredistribution AT silvajoana trustingovernmentandsupportforredistribution AT levinvictoria trustingovernmentandsupportforredistribution |
| _version_ |
1807157608653520896 |