Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program

We analyze the effects on teacher retention and between school mobility of a program that rewards excellence in pedagogical practice in Chile. Teachers apply voluntarily for the award and those who succeed on a set of assessments receive a 6 percent annual wage increase for up to 10 years. We use a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of receiving the award. Using administrative data over several cohorts of applicants, our estimates indicate that locally the award does not alter transitions out of the school system. This suggests that around the threshold the skills rewarded by the program are not strongly correlated with the value of the teachers’ outside option. We observe, however, an increase in mobility within the school system among teachers that receive the award. These mobility patterns are consistent with the award providing a signal of teacher ability.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Inter-American Development Bank
Other Authors: Samuel Berlinski
Format: Working Papers biblioteca
Language:English
Published: Inter-American Development Bank
Subjects:Educational Institution, Teaching Effectiveness, Wage, Public School, Impact Evaluation, Regression Discontinuity Design, Wage Growth, I21 - Analysis of Education, J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets, J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs, M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects, Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers,
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001159
https://publications.iadb.org/en/does-rewarding-pedagogical-excellence-keep-teachers-classroom-evidence-voluntary-award-program
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
id dig-bid-node-12989
record_format koha
spelling dig-bid-node-129892020-04-20T16:43:47ZDoes Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program 2018-06-13T00:00:00+0000 http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001159 https://publications.iadb.org/en/does-rewarding-pedagogical-excellence-keep-teachers-classroom-evidence-voluntary-award-program Inter-American Development Bank Educational Institution Teaching Effectiveness Wage Public School Impact Evaluation Regression Discontinuity Design Wage Growth I21 - Analysis of Education J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers We analyze the effects on teacher retention and between school mobility of a program that rewards excellence in pedagogical practice in Chile. Teachers apply voluntarily for the award and those who succeed on a set of assessments receive a 6 percent annual wage increase for up to 10 years. We use a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of receiving the award. Using administrative data over several cohorts of applicants, our estimates indicate that locally the award does not alter transitions out of the school system. This suggests that around the threshold the skills rewarded by the program are not strongly correlated with the value of the teachers’ outside option. We observe, however, an increase in mobility within the school system among teachers that receive the award. These mobility patterns are consistent with the award providing a signal of teacher ability. Inter-American Development Bank Samuel Berlinski Working Papers application/pdf IDB Publications Chile en
institution BID
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-bid
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca Felipe Herrera del BID
language English
topic Educational Institution
Teaching Effectiveness
Wage
Public School
Impact Evaluation
Regression Discontinuity Design
Wage Growth
I21 - Analysis of Education
J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers
Educational Institution
Teaching Effectiveness
Wage
Public School
Impact Evaluation
Regression Discontinuity Design
Wage Growth
I21 - Analysis of Education
J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers
spellingShingle Educational Institution
Teaching Effectiveness
Wage
Public School
Impact Evaluation
Regression Discontinuity Design
Wage Growth
I21 - Analysis of Education
J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers
Educational Institution
Teaching Effectiveness
Wage
Public School
Impact Evaluation
Regression Discontinuity Design
Wage Growth
I21 - Analysis of Education
J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers
Inter-American Development Bank
Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program
description We analyze the effects on teacher retention and between school mobility of a program that rewards excellence in pedagogical practice in Chile. Teachers apply voluntarily for the award and those who succeed on a set of assessments receive a 6 percent annual wage increase for up to 10 years. We use a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of receiving the award. Using administrative data over several cohorts of applicants, our estimates indicate that locally the award does not alter transitions out of the school system. This suggests that around the threshold the skills rewarded by the program are not strongly correlated with the value of the teachers’ outside option. We observe, however, an increase in mobility within the school system among teachers that receive the award. These mobility patterns are consistent with the award providing a signal of teacher ability.
author2 Samuel Berlinski
author_facet Samuel Berlinski
Inter-American Development Bank
format Working Papers
topic_facet Educational Institution
Teaching Effectiveness
Wage
Public School
Impact Evaluation
Regression Discontinuity Design
Wage Growth
I21 - Analysis of Education
J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
J63 - Turnover • Vacancies • Layoffs
M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Employee turnover rates;Public sector compensation;Teachers
author Inter-American Development Bank
author_sort Inter-American Development Bank
title Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program
title_short Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program
title_full Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program
title_fullStr Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program
title_full_unstemmed Does Rewarding Pedagogical Excellence Keep Teachers in the Classroom?: Evidence from a Voluntary Award Program
title_sort does rewarding pedagogical excellence keep teachers in the classroom?: evidence from a voluntary award program
publisher Inter-American Development Bank
url http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0001159
https://publications.iadb.org/en/does-rewarding-pedagogical-excellence-keep-teachers-classroom-evidence-voluntary-award-program
work_keys_str_mv AT interamericandevelopmentbank doesrewardingpedagogicalexcellencekeepteachersintheclassroomevidencefromavoluntaryawardprogram
_version_ 1809107463556825088