Renegociação da dívida pública interna em condições de sobreendividamento
Renegotiation of the public debt in conditions of excessive debt. This paper studies the debt overhang models and maturity management models, and analyses both theoretically and historically the debt renegotiations which the final outcome is a lower public debt burden. From the theoretical view the renegotiation plans can be Pareto improving, both creditors and debtors can be better-off, and the value of the new debt will price the new reputation and debtors' willingness to pay. From the historical point of view, funded debts were the instrument that debtors used to improve reputation.
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Centro de Economia Política
2005
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oai:scielo:S0101-315720050004000092006-03-21Renegociação da dívida pública interna em condições de sobreendividamentoAlmeida,Rodrigo Octávio Marques de monetary policy public debt management debt overhang Renegotiation of the public debt in conditions of excessive debt. This paper studies the debt overhang models and maturity management models, and analyses both theoretically and historically the debt renegotiations which the final outcome is a lower public debt burden. From the theoretical view the renegotiation plans can be Pareto improving, both creditors and debtors can be better-off, and the value of the new debt will price the new reputation and debtors' willingness to pay. From the historical point of view, funded debts were the instrument that debtors used to improve reputation.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCentro de Economia PolíticaBrazilian Journal of Political Economy v.25 n.4 20052005-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articletext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572005000400009pt10.1590/S0101-31572005000400009 |
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author |
Almeida,Rodrigo Octávio Marques de |
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Almeida,Rodrigo Octávio Marques de Renegociação da dívida pública interna em condições de sobreendividamento |
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Almeida,Rodrigo Octávio Marques de |
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Almeida,Rodrigo Octávio Marques de |
title |
Renegociação da dívida pública interna em condições de sobreendividamento |
title_short |
Renegociação da dívida pública interna em condições de sobreendividamento |
title_full |
Renegociação da dívida pública interna em condições de sobreendividamento |
title_fullStr |
Renegociação da dívida pública interna em condições de sobreendividamento |
title_full_unstemmed |
Renegociação da dívida pública interna em condições de sobreendividamento |
title_sort |
renegociação da dívida pública interna em condições de sobreendividamento |
description |
Renegotiation of the public debt in conditions of excessive debt. This paper studies the debt overhang models and maturity management models, and analyses both theoretically and historically the debt renegotiations which the final outcome is a lower public debt burden. From the theoretical view the renegotiation plans can be Pareto improving, both creditors and debtors can be better-off, and the value of the new debt will price the new reputation and debtors' willingness to pay. From the historical point of view, funded debts were the instrument that debtors used to improve reputation. |
publisher |
Centro de Economia Política |
publishDate |
2005 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572005000400009 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT almeidarodrigooctaviomarquesde renegociacaodadividapublicainternaemcondicoesdesobreendividamento |
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1756392935956414464 |