A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT

A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT

Abstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.

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Main Author: ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS
Format: Digital revista
Language:English
Published: UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência 2021
Online Access:http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400374
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spelling oai:scielo:S0100-604520210004003742021-12-08A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECTALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS Cosmological Argument Ontological Argument Causation Modality Abstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da CiênciaManuscrito v.44 n.4 20212021-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articletext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400374en10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.ja
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libraryname SciELO
language English
format Digital
author ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS
spellingShingle ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS
A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
author_facet ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS
author_sort ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS
title A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
title_short A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
title_full A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
title_fullStr A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
title_full_unstemmed A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
title_sort modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object
description Abstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.
publisher UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publishDate 2021
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400374
work_keys_str_mv AT alvaradojosetomas amodalcausalargumentforaconcretenecessaryobject
AT alvaradojosetomas modalcausalargumentforaconcretenecessaryobject
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