A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT
Abstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.
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UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
2021
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oai:scielo:S0100-604520210004003742021-12-08A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECTALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS Cosmological Argument Ontological Argument Causation Modality Abstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da CiênciaManuscrito v.44 n.4 20212021-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articletext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400374en10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n4.ja |
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ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS |
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ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT |
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ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS |
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ALVARADO,JOSÉ TOMÁS |
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A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT |
title_short |
A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT |
title_full |
A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT |
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A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT |
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A MODAL-CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR A CONCRETE NECESSARY OBJECT |
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modal-causal argument for a concrete necessary object |
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Abstract Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument. |
publisher |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
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2021 |
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http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000400374 |
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AT alvaradojosetomas amodalcausalargumentforaconcretenecessaryobject AT alvaradojosetomas modalcausalargumentforaconcretenecessaryobject |
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1756388549506105344 |