KEVIN TOH’S EXPRESSIVIST READING OF H. L. A. HART, OR HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO RONALD DWORKIN

Abstract This paper criticises Kevin Toh’s expressivist reconstruction of H. L. A. Hart’s semantics of legal statements on the grounds that two implications of Toh’s reading are arguably too disruptive to Hart’s theory of law. The first of these implications is that legal statements are rendered indistinguishable from statements of value. The second is that the concept of a rule of recognition (indeed, of secondary rules in general) is rendered dispensable. I argue for the unacceptability of these consequences from a Hartian standpoint in the first two sections of this paper. The last two sections present an alternative view of Hart’s semantics of legal statements, according to which legal normativity is explained in terms of conformity to patterns of validity that by themselves neither provide objective reasons for action nor entail subjective acceptance of such reasons.

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Main Author: FAGGION,ANDREA BUCCHILE
Format: Digital revista
Language:English
Published: UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência 2020
Online Access:http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000200095
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spelling oai:scielo:S0100-604520200002000952020-07-22KEVIN TOH’S EXPRESSIVIST READING OF H. L. A. HART, OR HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO RONALD DWORKINFAGGION,ANDREA BUCCHILE Expressivism Legal statements Rule of recognition Abstract This paper criticises Kevin Toh’s expressivist reconstruction of H. L. A. Hart’s semantics of legal statements on the grounds that two implications of Toh’s reading are arguably too disruptive to Hart’s theory of law. The first of these implications is that legal statements are rendered indistinguishable from statements of value. The second is that the concept of a rule of recognition (indeed, of secondary rules in general) is rendered dispensable. I argue for the unacceptability of these consequences from a Hartian standpoint in the first two sections of this paper. The last two sections present an alternative view of Hart’s semantics of legal statements, according to which legal normativity is explained in terms of conformity to patterns of validity that by themselves neither provide objective reasons for action nor entail subjective acceptance of such reasons.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessUNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da CiênciaManuscrito v.43 n.2 20202020-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articletext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000200095en10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n2.af
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language English
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author FAGGION,ANDREA BUCCHILE
spellingShingle FAGGION,ANDREA BUCCHILE
KEVIN TOH’S EXPRESSIVIST READING OF H. L. A. HART, OR HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO RONALD DWORKIN
author_facet FAGGION,ANDREA BUCCHILE
author_sort FAGGION,ANDREA BUCCHILE
title KEVIN TOH’S EXPRESSIVIST READING OF H. L. A. HART, OR HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO RONALD DWORKIN
title_short KEVIN TOH’S EXPRESSIVIST READING OF H. L. A. HART, OR HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO RONALD DWORKIN
title_full KEVIN TOH’S EXPRESSIVIST READING OF H. L. A. HART, OR HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO RONALD DWORKIN
title_fullStr KEVIN TOH’S EXPRESSIVIST READING OF H. L. A. HART, OR HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO RONALD DWORKIN
title_full_unstemmed KEVIN TOH’S EXPRESSIVIST READING OF H. L. A. HART, OR HOW NOT TO RESPOND TO RONALD DWORKIN
title_sort kevin toh’s expressivist reading of h. l. a. hart, or how not to respond to ronald dworkin
description Abstract This paper criticises Kevin Toh’s expressivist reconstruction of H. L. A. Hart’s semantics of legal statements on the grounds that two implications of Toh’s reading are arguably too disruptive to Hart’s theory of law. The first of these implications is that legal statements are rendered indistinguishable from statements of value. The second is that the concept of a rule of recognition (indeed, of secondary rules in general) is rendered dispensable. I argue for the unacceptability of these consequences from a Hartian standpoint in the first two sections of this paper. The last two sections present an alternative view of Hart’s semantics of legal statements, according to which legal normativity is explained in terms of conformity to patterns of validity that by themselves neither provide objective reasons for action nor entail subjective acceptance of such reasons.
publisher UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publishDate 2020
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000200095
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