O conteúdo da produção legislativa brasileira: leis nacionais ou políticas paroquiais?

This article analyzes whether the pork barrel political approach really exists in the context of legislative output by the Brazilian Congress. According to the author's argument, in the case of medium-large districts, multi-member districts (MMDs) increase the costs of investment in pork barrel bills of law. In addition, members of the Brazilian Congress face high legislative output costs that increase the incentives to avoid pork barrel strategies. The author investigates hypotheses on bills that were either approved or rejected by Congress, as well as those vetoed by the Executive, from 1991 to 2002. The results provide significant evidence for the author's theoretical argument. The study concludes that: (1) pork barrel bills are quantitatively insignificant in Brazil; (2) members of the Brazilian Congress invest much of their time and effort in pursuit of broader interests; and (3) seniority and internal law-making procedures can explain approved versus rejected distributive bills.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Ricci,Paolo
Format:	Digital revista
Language:	Portuguese
Published:	Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) 2003
Online Access:	http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0011-52582003000400003
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