Stabilising cooperation through pragmatic tolerance : the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) tuna fishery

Purse seine fishing of skipjack tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) raises concern over increasing impacts on yellowfin and bigeye tuna by-catch. To address sustainability concerns, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) adopted the vessel day scheme (VDS) for the management of purse seine fishing in the WCPO. The VDS has the potential to improve economic benefits for PNA members and to contribute to sustainability of the tuna stocks, and since 2012, has become an important mechanism to regulate fishing access rights in PNA waters. Despite this, monitoring and enforcement remains weak leading to violations of the agreement. Using a game theoretic framework, this paper examines the effectiveness of the VDS and its implications for fisheries regionalism. We examine the payoffs of member countries of the Nauru Agreement under full compliance and payoffs under the currently observed partial compliance. Our findings indicate that member states’ partial compliance with VDS rules plays a role in stabilising the agreement. Requiring full compliance, on the other hand, may encompass strong incentives for PNA members to deviate from the VDS since third parties offer attractive benefits in return for privileged access to fishing grounds. However, pragmatic tolerance of deviations from full VDS compliance seems to play a facilitative role in promoting cooperation and fisheries regionalism.

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Main Authors: Yeeting, Agnes David, Weikard, Hans Peter, Bailey, Megan, Ram-Bidesi, Vina, Bush, S.R.
Format: Article/Letter to editor biblioteca
Language:English
Subjects:Coalition stability, Compliance, Economic instruments, Fisheries regionalism, International fisheries agreements, RFMOs, Tuna management,
Online Access:https://research.wur.nl/en/publications/stabilising-cooperation-through-pragmatic-tolerance-the-case-of-t
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spelling dig-wur-nl-wurpubs-5308452024-08-14 Yeeting, Agnes David Weikard, Hans Peter Bailey, Megan Ram-Bidesi, Vina Bush, S.R. Article/Letter to editor Regional Environmental Change 18 (2018) 3 ISSN: 1436-3798 Stabilising cooperation through pragmatic tolerance : the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) tuna fishery 2018 Purse seine fishing of skipjack tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) raises concern over increasing impacts on yellowfin and bigeye tuna by-catch. To address sustainability concerns, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) adopted the vessel day scheme (VDS) for the management of purse seine fishing in the WCPO. The VDS has the potential to improve economic benefits for PNA members and to contribute to sustainability of the tuna stocks, and since 2012, has become an important mechanism to regulate fishing access rights in PNA waters. Despite this, monitoring and enforcement remains weak leading to violations of the agreement. Using a game theoretic framework, this paper examines the effectiveness of the VDS and its implications for fisheries regionalism. We examine the payoffs of member countries of the Nauru Agreement under full compliance and payoffs under the currently observed partial compliance. Our findings indicate that member states’ partial compliance with VDS rules plays a role in stabilising the agreement. Requiring full compliance, on the other hand, may encompass strong incentives for PNA members to deviate from the VDS since third parties offer attractive benefits in return for privileged access to fishing grounds. However, pragmatic tolerance of deviations from full VDS compliance seems to play a facilitative role in promoting cooperation and fisheries regionalism. en application/pdf https://research.wur.nl/en/publications/stabilising-cooperation-through-pragmatic-tolerance-the-case-of-t 10.1007/s10113-017-1219-0 https://edepot.wur.nl/429569 Coalition stability Compliance Economic instruments Fisheries regionalism International fisheries agreements RFMOs Tuna management https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Wageningen University & Research
institution WUR NL
collection DSpace
country Países bajos
countrycode NL
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-wur-nl
tag biblioteca
region Europa del Oeste
libraryname WUR Library Netherlands
language English
topic Coalition stability
Compliance
Economic instruments
Fisheries regionalism
International fisheries agreements
RFMOs
Tuna management
Coalition stability
Compliance
Economic instruments
Fisheries regionalism
International fisheries agreements
RFMOs
Tuna management
spellingShingle Coalition stability
Compliance
Economic instruments
Fisheries regionalism
International fisheries agreements
RFMOs
Tuna management
Coalition stability
Compliance
Economic instruments
Fisheries regionalism
International fisheries agreements
RFMOs
Tuna management
Yeeting, Agnes David
Weikard, Hans Peter
Bailey, Megan
Ram-Bidesi, Vina
Bush, S.R.
Stabilising cooperation through pragmatic tolerance : the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) tuna fishery
description Purse seine fishing of skipjack tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) raises concern over increasing impacts on yellowfin and bigeye tuna by-catch. To address sustainability concerns, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) adopted the vessel day scheme (VDS) for the management of purse seine fishing in the WCPO. The VDS has the potential to improve economic benefits for PNA members and to contribute to sustainability of the tuna stocks, and since 2012, has become an important mechanism to regulate fishing access rights in PNA waters. Despite this, monitoring and enforcement remains weak leading to violations of the agreement. Using a game theoretic framework, this paper examines the effectiveness of the VDS and its implications for fisheries regionalism. We examine the payoffs of member countries of the Nauru Agreement under full compliance and payoffs under the currently observed partial compliance. Our findings indicate that member states’ partial compliance with VDS rules plays a role in stabilising the agreement. Requiring full compliance, on the other hand, may encompass strong incentives for PNA members to deviate from the VDS since third parties offer attractive benefits in return for privileged access to fishing grounds. However, pragmatic tolerance of deviations from full VDS compliance seems to play a facilitative role in promoting cooperation and fisheries regionalism.
format Article/Letter to editor
topic_facet Coalition stability
Compliance
Economic instruments
Fisheries regionalism
International fisheries agreements
RFMOs
Tuna management
author Yeeting, Agnes David
Weikard, Hans Peter
Bailey, Megan
Ram-Bidesi, Vina
Bush, S.R.
author_facet Yeeting, Agnes David
Weikard, Hans Peter
Bailey, Megan
Ram-Bidesi, Vina
Bush, S.R.
author_sort Yeeting, Agnes David
title Stabilising cooperation through pragmatic tolerance : the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) tuna fishery
title_short Stabilising cooperation through pragmatic tolerance : the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) tuna fishery
title_full Stabilising cooperation through pragmatic tolerance : the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) tuna fishery
title_fullStr Stabilising cooperation through pragmatic tolerance : the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) tuna fishery
title_full_unstemmed Stabilising cooperation through pragmatic tolerance : the case of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) tuna fishery
title_sort stabilising cooperation through pragmatic tolerance : the case of the parties to the nauru agreement (pna) tuna fishery
url https://research.wur.nl/en/publications/stabilising-cooperation-through-pragmatic-tolerance-the-case-of-t
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