Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries
Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreements
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | External research report biblioteca |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Friedrich Schiller University
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| Subjects: | Life Science, |
| Online Access: | https://research.wur.nl/en/publications/minimum-participation-rules-with-heterogeneous-countries-2 |
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| Summary: | Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreements |
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