Measuring Corruption : Myths and Realities

The report points out that over the past decade measuring corruption has become an ever-growing empirical field. This empirical analysis questions the traditional notion of viewing the firm as an 'investment climate taker' and thus ignoring the view that powerful conglomerates can also shape the business climate and thus become 'investment climate makers'. The study implies that it is warranted to move away from simply blaming government officials for prevailing corruption, and to question the value of popular initiatives such as voluntary-and often un-monitorable-codes of conduct. In this report, some popular notions are espoused, which either lack clarity or are not backed up by rigorous analysis or evidence. In this article the authors highlight some of the main issues in these debates, in the form of seven myths and their associated realities, and conclude by also pointing to some brief implications for the private sector role in fighting corruption.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, Mastruzzi, Massimo
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2007-04
Subjects:ACCOUNTABILITY, AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS, AGGREGATE INDICATORS, ANTI-CORRUPTION, ANTICORRUPTION, ANTICORRUPTION COMMISSION, BRIBES, BUDGET TRANSPARENCY, BUSINESS CLIMATE, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, CITIZENS, CIVIL SOCIETY, CODES OF CONDUCT, COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES, COMPETITIVE BIDDING, CORPORATE ETHICS, CORRUPT OFFICIALS, CORRUPT PRACTICES, CORRUPTION INDICATOR, COUNTRY COVERAGE, DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ENTERPRISE SURVEYS, FIGHTING CORRUPTION, FINANCIAL AUDITS, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNANCE DATA, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, GROWTH PERFORMANCE, HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS, INCOME, INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY, INTEGRITY, INVESTMENT CLIMATE, INVESTMENT RATES, JUDICIARY, LAWS, LEARNING, MALFEASANCE, MEASUREMENT ERROR, MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS, MEASURING CORRUPTION, MEASURING GOVERNANCE, NATIONS, PER CAPITA INCOMES, POVERTY REDUCTION, PRIORITIES, PROCUREMENT BRIBERY, PROGRAMS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS, PUBLIC SECTOR, RULE OF LAW, SOCIAL NORMS, SUBJECTIVE DATA, TAX EVASION,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7563031/measuring-corruption-myths-realities
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/9576
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spelling dig-okr-1098695762024-08-08T16:58:54Z Measuring Corruption : Myths and Realities Kaufmann, Daniel Kraay, Aart Mastruzzi, Massimo ACCOUNTABILITY AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS AGGREGATE INDICATORS ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION COMMISSION BRIBES BUDGET TRANSPARENCY BUSINESS CLIMATE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT CITIZENS CIVIL SOCIETY CODES OF CONDUCT COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES COMPETITIVE BIDDING CORPORATE ETHICS CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION INDICATOR COUNTRY COVERAGE DEMOCRACY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ENTERPRISE SURVEYS FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL AUDITS FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GOVERNANCE DATA GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GROWTH PERFORMANCE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INTEGRITY INVESTMENT CLIMATE INVESTMENT RATES JUDICIARY LAWS LEARNING MALFEASANCE MEASUREMENT ERROR MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS MEASURING CORRUPTION MEASURING GOVERNANCE NATIONS PER CAPITA INCOMES POVERTY REDUCTION PRIORITIES PROCUREMENT BRIBERY PROGRAMS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS PUBLIC SECTOR RULE OF LAW SOCIAL NORMS SUBJECTIVE DATA TAX EVASION The report points out that over the past decade measuring corruption has become an ever-growing empirical field. This empirical analysis questions the traditional notion of viewing the firm as an 'investment climate taker' and thus ignoring the view that powerful conglomerates can also shape the business climate and thus become 'investment climate makers'. The study implies that it is warranted to move away from simply blaming government officials for prevailing corruption, and to question the value of popular initiatives such as voluntary-and often un-monitorable-codes of conduct. In this report, some popular notions are espoused, which either lack clarity or are not backed up by rigorous analysis or evidence. In this article the authors highlight some of the main issues in these debates, in the form of seven myths and their associated realities, and conclude by also pointing to some brief implications for the private sector role in fighting corruption. 2012-08-13T09:00:15Z 2012-08-13T09:00:15Z 2007-04 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7563031/measuring-corruption-myths-realities https://hdl.handle.net/10986/9576 English Africa Region Findings & Good Practice Infobriefs; no. 273 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC
institution Banco Mundial
collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
component Bibliográfico
access En linea
databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language English
topic ACCOUNTABILITY
AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
AGGREGATE INDICATORS
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION COMMISSION
BRIBES
BUDGET TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
CITIZENS
CIVIL SOCIETY
CODES OF CONDUCT
COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
CORPORATE ETHICS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION INDICATOR
COUNTRY COVERAGE
DEMOCRACY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL AUDITS
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
GOVERNANCE DATA
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GROWTH PERFORMANCE
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
INCOME
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
INTEGRITY
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
INVESTMENT RATES
JUDICIARY
LAWS
LEARNING
MALFEASANCE
MEASUREMENT ERROR
MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
MEASURING CORRUPTION
MEASURING GOVERNANCE
NATIONS
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POVERTY REDUCTION
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT BRIBERY
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
PUBLIC SECTOR
RULE OF LAW
SOCIAL NORMS
SUBJECTIVE DATA
TAX EVASION
ACCOUNTABILITY
AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
AGGREGATE INDICATORS
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION COMMISSION
BRIBES
BUDGET TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
CITIZENS
CIVIL SOCIETY
CODES OF CONDUCT
COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
CORPORATE ETHICS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION INDICATOR
COUNTRY COVERAGE
DEMOCRACY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL AUDITS
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
GOVERNANCE DATA
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GROWTH PERFORMANCE
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
INCOME
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
INTEGRITY
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
INVESTMENT RATES
JUDICIARY
LAWS
LEARNING
MALFEASANCE
MEASUREMENT ERROR
MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
MEASURING CORRUPTION
MEASURING GOVERNANCE
NATIONS
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POVERTY REDUCTION
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT BRIBERY
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
PUBLIC SECTOR
RULE OF LAW
SOCIAL NORMS
SUBJECTIVE DATA
TAX EVASION
spellingShingle ACCOUNTABILITY
AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
AGGREGATE INDICATORS
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION COMMISSION
BRIBES
BUDGET TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
CITIZENS
CIVIL SOCIETY
CODES OF CONDUCT
COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
CORPORATE ETHICS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION INDICATOR
COUNTRY COVERAGE
DEMOCRACY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL AUDITS
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
GOVERNANCE DATA
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GROWTH PERFORMANCE
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
INCOME
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
INTEGRITY
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
INVESTMENT RATES
JUDICIARY
LAWS
LEARNING
MALFEASANCE
MEASUREMENT ERROR
MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
MEASURING CORRUPTION
MEASURING GOVERNANCE
NATIONS
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POVERTY REDUCTION
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT BRIBERY
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
PUBLIC SECTOR
RULE OF LAW
SOCIAL NORMS
SUBJECTIVE DATA
TAX EVASION
ACCOUNTABILITY
AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
AGGREGATE INDICATORS
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION COMMISSION
BRIBES
BUDGET TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
CITIZENS
CIVIL SOCIETY
CODES OF CONDUCT
COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
CORPORATE ETHICS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION INDICATOR
COUNTRY COVERAGE
DEMOCRACY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL AUDITS
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
GOVERNANCE DATA
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GROWTH PERFORMANCE
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
INCOME
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
INTEGRITY
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
INVESTMENT RATES
JUDICIARY
LAWS
LEARNING
MALFEASANCE
MEASUREMENT ERROR
MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
MEASURING CORRUPTION
MEASURING GOVERNANCE
NATIONS
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POVERTY REDUCTION
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT BRIBERY
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
PUBLIC SECTOR
RULE OF LAW
SOCIAL NORMS
SUBJECTIVE DATA
TAX EVASION
Kaufmann, Daniel
Kraay, Aart
Mastruzzi, Massimo
Measuring Corruption : Myths and Realities
description The report points out that over the past decade measuring corruption has become an ever-growing empirical field. This empirical analysis questions the traditional notion of viewing the firm as an 'investment climate taker' and thus ignoring the view that powerful conglomerates can also shape the business climate and thus become 'investment climate makers'. The study implies that it is warranted to move away from simply blaming government officials for prevailing corruption, and to question the value of popular initiatives such as voluntary-and often un-monitorable-codes of conduct. In this report, some popular notions are espoused, which either lack clarity or are not backed up by rigorous analysis or evidence. In this article the authors highlight some of the main issues in these debates, in the form of seven myths and their associated realities, and conclude by also pointing to some brief implications for the private sector role in fighting corruption.
topic_facet ACCOUNTABILITY
AGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
AGGREGATE INDICATORS
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION COMMISSION
BRIBES
BUDGET TRANSPARENCY
BUSINESS CLIMATE
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
CITIZENS
CIVIL SOCIETY
CODES OF CONDUCT
COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES
COMPETITIVE BIDDING
CORPORATE ETHICS
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION INDICATOR
COUNTRY COVERAGE
DEMOCRACY
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC GROWTH
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
ENTERPRISE SURVEYS
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL AUDITS
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
GOVERNANCE DATA
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GROWTH PERFORMANCE
HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS
INCOME
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
INTEGRITY
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
INVESTMENT RATES
JUDICIARY
LAWS
LEARNING
MALFEASANCE
MEASUREMENT ERROR
MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
MEASURING CORRUPTION
MEASURING GOVERNANCE
NATIONS
PER CAPITA INCOMES
POVERTY REDUCTION
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT BRIBERY
PROGRAMS
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
PUBLIC SECTOR
RULE OF LAW
SOCIAL NORMS
SUBJECTIVE DATA
TAX EVASION
author Kaufmann, Daniel
Kraay, Aart
Mastruzzi, Massimo
author_facet Kaufmann, Daniel
Kraay, Aart
Mastruzzi, Massimo
author_sort Kaufmann, Daniel
title Measuring Corruption : Myths and Realities
title_short Measuring Corruption : Myths and Realities
title_full Measuring Corruption : Myths and Realities
title_fullStr Measuring Corruption : Myths and Realities
title_full_unstemmed Measuring Corruption : Myths and Realities
title_sort measuring corruption : myths and realities
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2007-04
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2007/04/7563031/measuring-corruption-myths-realities
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/9576
work_keys_str_mv AT kaufmanndaniel measuringcorruptionmythsandrealities
AT kraayaart measuringcorruptionmythsandrealities
AT mastruzzimassimo measuringcorruptionmythsandrealities
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