Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance

This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralized local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long run. This is because localization helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decisionmaking closer to people. Localization strengthens government accountability to citizens by involving citizens in monitoring government performance and demanding corrective actions. Localization as a means to making government responsive and accountable to people can help reduce corruption and improve service delivery. Efforts to improve service delivery usually force the authorities to address corruption and its causes. However, one must pay attention to the institutional environment and the risk of local capture by elites. In the institutional environments typical of some developing countries, when in a geographical area, feudal or industrial interests dominate and institutions of participation and accountability are weak or ineffective and political interference in local affairs is rampant, localization may increase opportunities for corruption. This suggests a pecking order of anticorruption policies and programs where the rule of law and citizen empowerment should be the first priority in any reform efforts. Localization in the absence of rule of law may not prove to be a potent remedy for combating corruption.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Shah, Anwar
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2006-01
Subjects:ABUSES, ABUSES OF POWER, ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE, ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, ANTI-CORRUPTION, ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY, ANTICORRUPTION, ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES, ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS, AUTHORITY, BANKING SYSTEM, BRIBERY, BRIBES, BUREAUCRAT, BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION, CAMPAIGN FINANCING, CITIZEN, CITIZEN NEEDS, CITIZENS, CIVIL SERVANTS, CIVIL SERVICE, COLLUSION, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION, CORRUPT ACTS, CORRUPT COUNTRIES, CORRUPT OFFICIALS, CORRUPT PRACTICES, CORRUPTION, CRIME, CRITICAL IMPORTANCE, DECENTRALIZATION, DECISION MAKING, DECISION-MAKING, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, DISCRETION, DISTRICTS, DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, ECONOMIC POLICIES, ELECTED OFFICIALS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, ETHICS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH, FIGHTING CORRUPTION, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL RUIN, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, FORMAL ECONOMY, FRAUD, GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, GOVERNMENT DECISION, GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, GRAND CORRUPTION, INCOME, INEQUALITY, INFANT MORTALITY, INFORMATION ACCESS, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, INTEGRITY, INTEREST GROUPS, JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, JUDICIARY, JUSTICE, LAWS, LEGAL FRAMEWORK, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATORS, LEGISLATURE, LEGITIMACY, LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNANCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL LEVELS, LOCAL POLITICIANS, MACROECONOMIC STABILITY, MALFEASANCE, NATIONAL ELECTIONS, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, NATIONAL LEVEL, NATIONALIZATION, NEWS MEDIA, PARLIAMENT, PETTY CORRUPTION, POLICE FORCES, POLICY DESIGN, POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY, POLITICAL CORRUPTION, POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL REFORMS, POLITICIANS, POOR GOVERNANCE, PREFERENTIAL, PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, PRIORITIES, PROCUREMENT, PROSECUTION, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC AWARENESS, PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC FUNDS, PUBLIC GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH CARE, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC RESOURCES, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION, PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION, PUBLIC SERVICES, PUNISHMENT, REGULATORY CAPTURE, REMEDIES, REVOLUTION, RULE OF LAW, SERVICE DELIVERY, SOCIAL INTERACTIONS, STATE POWER, STATE PROPERTY, TAX BASE, TAX RATES, TAXATION, TRANSPARENCY, UPPER HOUSE, VETO, VETO POWER,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6534264/corruption-decentralized-public-governance
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8805
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collection DSpace
country Estados Unidos
countrycode US
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databasecode dig-okr
tag biblioteca
region America del Norte
libraryname Biblioteca del Banco Mundial
language English
topic ABUSES
ABUSES OF POWER
ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
AUTHORITY
BANKING SYSTEM
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUREAUCRAT
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION
CAMPAIGN FINANCING
CITIZEN
CITIZEN NEEDS
CITIZENS
CIVIL SERVANTS
CIVIL SERVICE
COLLUSION
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT COUNTRIES
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CRIME
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE
DECENTRALIZATION
DECISION MAKING
DECISION-MAKING
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM
DISCRETION
DISTRICTS
DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ELECTED OFFICIALS
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
ETHICS
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL RUIN
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
FORMAL ECONOMY
FRAUD
GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT DECISION
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
GRAND CORRUPTION
INCOME
INEQUALITY
INFANT MORTALITY
INFORMATION ACCESS
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INTEGRITY
INTEREST GROUPS
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
JUDICIARY
JUSTICE
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATORS
LEGISLATURE
LEGITIMACY
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNANCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL LEVELS
LOCAL POLITICIANS
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
MALFEASANCE
NATIONAL ELECTIONS
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
NATIONAL LEVEL
NATIONALIZATION
NEWS MEDIA
PARLIAMENT
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLICE FORCES
POLICY DESIGN
POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL REFORMS
POLITICIANS
POOR GOVERNANCE
PREFERENTIAL
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT
PROSECUTION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC AWARENESS
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC HEALTH CARE
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC RESOURCES
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUNISHMENT
REGULATORY CAPTURE
REMEDIES
REVOLUTION
RULE OF LAW
SERVICE DELIVERY
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
STATE POWER
STATE PROPERTY
TAX BASE
TAX RATES
TAXATION
TRANSPARENCY
UPPER HOUSE
VETO
VETO POWER
ABUSES
ABUSES OF POWER
ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
AUTHORITY
BANKING SYSTEM
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUREAUCRAT
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION
CAMPAIGN FINANCING
CITIZEN
CITIZEN NEEDS
CITIZENS
CIVIL SERVANTS
CIVIL SERVICE
COLLUSION
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT COUNTRIES
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CRIME
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE
DECENTRALIZATION
DECISION MAKING
DECISION-MAKING
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM
DISCRETION
DISTRICTS
DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ELECTED OFFICIALS
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
ETHICS
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL RUIN
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
FORMAL ECONOMY
FRAUD
GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT DECISION
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
GRAND CORRUPTION
INCOME
INEQUALITY
INFANT MORTALITY
INFORMATION ACCESS
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INTEGRITY
INTEREST GROUPS
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
JUDICIARY
JUSTICE
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATORS
LEGISLATURE
LEGITIMACY
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNANCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL LEVELS
LOCAL POLITICIANS
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
MALFEASANCE
NATIONAL ELECTIONS
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
NATIONAL LEVEL
NATIONALIZATION
NEWS MEDIA
PARLIAMENT
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLICE FORCES
POLICY DESIGN
POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL REFORMS
POLITICIANS
POOR GOVERNANCE
PREFERENTIAL
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT
PROSECUTION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC AWARENESS
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC HEALTH CARE
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC RESOURCES
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUNISHMENT
REGULATORY CAPTURE
REMEDIES
REVOLUTION
RULE OF LAW
SERVICE DELIVERY
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
STATE POWER
STATE PROPERTY
TAX BASE
TAX RATES
TAXATION
TRANSPARENCY
UPPER HOUSE
VETO
VETO POWER
spellingShingle ABUSES
ABUSES OF POWER
ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
AUTHORITY
BANKING SYSTEM
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUREAUCRAT
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION
CAMPAIGN FINANCING
CITIZEN
CITIZEN NEEDS
CITIZENS
CIVIL SERVANTS
CIVIL SERVICE
COLLUSION
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT COUNTRIES
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CRIME
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE
DECENTRALIZATION
DECISION MAKING
DECISION-MAKING
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM
DISCRETION
DISTRICTS
DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ELECTED OFFICIALS
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
ETHICS
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL RUIN
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
FORMAL ECONOMY
FRAUD
GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT DECISION
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
GRAND CORRUPTION
INCOME
INEQUALITY
INFANT MORTALITY
INFORMATION ACCESS
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INTEGRITY
INTEREST GROUPS
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
JUDICIARY
JUSTICE
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATORS
LEGISLATURE
LEGITIMACY
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNANCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL LEVELS
LOCAL POLITICIANS
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
MALFEASANCE
NATIONAL ELECTIONS
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
NATIONAL LEVEL
NATIONALIZATION
NEWS MEDIA
PARLIAMENT
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLICE FORCES
POLICY DESIGN
POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL REFORMS
POLITICIANS
POOR GOVERNANCE
PREFERENTIAL
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT
PROSECUTION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC AWARENESS
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC HEALTH CARE
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC RESOURCES
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUNISHMENT
REGULATORY CAPTURE
REMEDIES
REVOLUTION
RULE OF LAW
SERVICE DELIVERY
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
STATE POWER
STATE PROPERTY
TAX BASE
TAX RATES
TAXATION
TRANSPARENCY
UPPER HOUSE
VETO
VETO POWER
ABUSES
ABUSES OF POWER
ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
AUTHORITY
BANKING SYSTEM
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUREAUCRAT
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION
CAMPAIGN FINANCING
CITIZEN
CITIZEN NEEDS
CITIZENS
CIVIL SERVANTS
CIVIL SERVICE
COLLUSION
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT COUNTRIES
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CRIME
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE
DECENTRALIZATION
DECISION MAKING
DECISION-MAKING
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM
DISCRETION
DISTRICTS
DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ELECTED OFFICIALS
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
ETHICS
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL RUIN
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
FORMAL ECONOMY
FRAUD
GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT DECISION
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
GRAND CORRUPTION
INCOME
INEQUALITY
INFANT MORTALITY
INFORMATION ACCESS
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INTEGRITY
INTEREST GROUPS
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
JUDICIARY
JUSTICE
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATORS
LEGISLATURE
LEGITIMACY
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNANCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL LEVELS
LOCAL POLITICIANS
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
MALFEASANCE
NATIONAL ELECTIONS
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
NATIONAL LEVEL
NATIONALIZATION
NEWS MEDIA
PARLIAMENT
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLICE FORCES
POLICY DESIGN
POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL REFORMS
POLITICIANS
POOR GOVERNANCE
PREFERENTIAL
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT
PROSECUTION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC AWARENESS
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC HEALTH CARE
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC RESOURCES
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUNISHMENT
REGULATORY CAPTURE
REMEDIES
REVOLUTION
RULE OF LAW
SERVICE DELIVERY
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
STATE POWER
STATE PROPERTY
TAX BASE
TAX RATES
TAXATION
TRANSPARENCY
UPPER HOUSE
VETO
VETO POWER
Shah, Anwar
Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance
description This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralized local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long run. This is because localization helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decisionmaking closer to people. Localization strengthens government accountability to citizens by involving citizens in monitoring government performance and demanding corrective actions. Localization as a means to making government responsive and accountable to people can help reduce corruption and improve service delivery. Efforts to improve service delivery usually force the authorities to address corruption and its causes. However, one must pay attention to the institutional environment and the risk of local capture by elites. In the institutional environments typical of some developing countries, when in a geographical area, feudal or industrial interests dominate and institutions of participation and accountability are weak or ineffective and political interference in local affairs is rampant, localization may increase opportunities for corruption. This suggests a pecking order of anticorruption policies and programs where the rule of law and citizen empowerment should be the first priority in any reform efforts. Localization in the absence of rule of law may not prove to be a potent remedy for combating corruption.
topic_facet ABUSES
ABUSES OF POWER
ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
ANTI-CORRUPTION
ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY
ANTICORRUPTION
ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS
AUTHORITY
BANKING SYSTEM
BRIBERY
BRIBES
BUREAUCRAT
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION
CAMPAIGN FINANCING
CITIZEN
CITIZEN NEEDS
CITIZENS
CIVIL SERVANTS
CIVIL SERVICE
COLLUSION
CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
CONTROLLING CORRUPTION
CORRUPT ACTS
CORRUPT COUNTRIES
CORRUPT OFFICIALS
CORRUPT PRACTICES
CORRUPTION
CRIME
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE
DECENTRALIZATION
DECISION MAKING
DECISION-MAKING
DEMOCRACY
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM
DISCRETION
DISTRICTS
DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
ECONOMIC POLICIES
ELECTED OFFICIALS
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
ETHICS
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
FIGHTING CORRUPTION
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
FINANCIAL RUIN
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FOREIGN EXCHANGE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
FORMAL ECONOMY
FRAUD
GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
GOVERNMENT DECISION
GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
GRAND CORRUPTION
INCOME
INEQUALITY
INFANT MORTALITY
INFORMATION ACCESS
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
INTEGRITY
INTEREST GROUPS
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS
JUDICIARY
JUSTICE
LAWS
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
LEGISLATION
LEGISLATORS
LEGISLATURE
LEGITIMACY
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNANCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
LOCAL LEVELS
LOCAL POLITICIANS
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
MALFEASANCE
NATIONAL ELECTIONS
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
NATIONAL LEVEL
NATIONALIZATION
NEWS MEDIA
PARLIAMENT
PETTY CORRUPTION
POLICE FORCES
POLICY DESIGN
POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY
POLITICAL CORRUPTION
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
POLITICAL PARTIES
POLITICAL REFORMS
POLITICIANS
POOR GOVERNANCE
PREFERENTIAL
PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
PRIORITIES
PROCUREMENT
PROSECUTION
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC AWARENESS
PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES
PUBLIC FUNDS
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC HEALTH
PUBLIC HEALTH CARE
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
PUBLIC POLICY
PUBLIC RESOURCES
PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION
PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT
PUBLIC SERVICE
PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION
PUBLIC SERVICES
PUNISHMENT
REGULATORY CAPTURE
REMEDIES
REVOLUTION
RULE OF LAW
SERVICE DELIVERY
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
STATE POWER
STATE PROPERTY
TAX BASE
TAX RATES
TAXATION
TRANSPARENCY
UPPER HOUSE
VETO
VETO POWER
author Shah, Anwar
author_facet Shah, Anwar
author_sort Shah, Anwar
title Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance
title_short Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance
title_full Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance
title_fullStr Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance
title_full_unstemmed Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance
title_sort corruption and decentralized public governance
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2006-01
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6534264/corruption-decentralized-public-governance
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8805
work_keys_str_mv AT shahanwar corruptionanddecentralizedpublicgovernance
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spelling dig-okr-1098688052024-08-08T17:14:23Z Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance Shah, Anwar ABUSES ABUSES OF POWER ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ANTI-CORRUPTION ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY ANTICORRUPTION ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS AUTHORITY BANKING SYSTEM BRIBERY BRIBES BUREAUCRAT BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING CITIZEN CITIZEN NEEDS CITIZENS CIVIL SERVANTS CIVIL SERVICE COLLUSION CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT CONTROLLING CORRUPTION CORRUPT ACTS CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPT OFFICIALS CORRUPT PRACTICES CORRUPTION CRIME CRITICAL IMPORTANCE DECENTRALIZATION DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION DEMOCRATIC PROCESS DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM DISCRETION DISTRICTS DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ECONOMIC POLICIES ELECTED OFFICIALS ELECTORAL COMPETITION ELECTORAL SYSTEMS ETHICS EXECUTIVE BRANCH FIGHTING CORRUPTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL RUIN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOREIGN INVESTMENT FORMAL ECONOMY FRAUD GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES GOVERNMENT DECISION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE GRAND CORRUPTION INCOME INEQUALITY INFANT MORTALITY INFORMATION ACCESS INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT INTEGRITY INTEREST GROUPS JUDICIAL SYSTEMS JUDICIARY JUSTICE LAWS LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEGISLATION LEGISLATORS LEGISLATURE LEGITIMACY LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNANCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LOCAL LEVELS LOCAL POLITICIANS MACROECONOMIC STABILITY MALFEASANCE NATIONAL ELECTIONS NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NATIONAL LEVEL NATIONALIZATION NEWS MEDIA PARLIAMENT PETTY CORRUPTION POLICE FORCES POLICY DESIGN POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY POLITICAL CORRUPTION POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL REFORMS POLITICIANS POOR GOVERNANCE PREFERENTIAL PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT PRIORITIES PROCUREMENT PROSECUTION PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION PUBLIC AWARENESS PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PUBLIC FUNDS PUBLIC GOVERNANCE PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT PUBLIC OFFICIALS PUBLIC POLICY PUBLIC RESOURCES PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT PUBLIC SERVICE PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION PUBLIC SERVICES PUNISHMENT REGULATORY CAPTURE REMEDIES REVOLUTION RULE OF LAW SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL INTERACTIONS STATE POWER STATE PROPERTY TAX BASE TAX RATES TAXATION TRANSPARENCY UPPER HOUSE VETO VETO POWER This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralized local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long run. This is because localization helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decisionmaking closer to people. Localization strengthens government accountability to citizens by involving citizens in monitoring government performance and demanding corrective actions. Localization as a means to making government responsive and accountable to people can help reduce corruption and improve service delivery. Efforts to improve service delivery usually force the authorities to address corruption and its causes. However, one must pay attention to the institutional environment and the risk of local capture by elites. In the institutional environments typical of some developing countries, when in a geographical area, feudal or industrial interests dominate and institutions of participation and accountability are weak or ineffective and political interference in local affairs is rampant, localization may increase opportunities for corruption. This suggests a pecking order of anticorruption policies and programs where the rule of law and citizen empowerment should be the first priority in any reform efforts. Localization in the absence of rule of law may not prove to be a potent remedy for combating corruption. 2012-06-22T17:00:03Z 2012-06-22T17:00:03Z 2006-01 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6534264/corruption-decentralized-public-governance https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8805 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3824 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC