Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance

This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralized local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long run. This is because localization helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decisionmaking closer to people. Localization strengthens government accountability to citizens by involving citizens in monitoring government performance and demanding corrective actions. Localization as a means to making government responsive and accountable to people can help reduce corruption and improve service delivery. Efforts to improve service delivery usually force the authorities to address corruption and its causes. However, one must pay attention to the institutional environment and the risk of local capture by elites. In the institutional environments typical of some developing countries, when in a geographical area, feudal or industrial interests dominate and institutions of participation and accountability are weak or ineffective and political interference in local affairs is rampant, localization may increase opportunities for corruption. This suggests a pecking order of anticorruption policies and programs where the rule of law and citizen empowerment should be the first priority in any reform efforts. Localization in the absence of rule of law may not prove to be a potent remedy for combating corruption.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Shah, Anwar
Format:	Policy Research Working Paper biblioteca
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2006-01
Subjects:	ABUSES, ABUSES OF POWER, ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCE, ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, ANTI-CORRUPTION, ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY, ANTICORRUPTION, ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES, ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS, AUTHORITY, BANKING SYSTEM, BRIBERY, BRIBES, BUREAUCRAT, BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION, CAMPAIGN FINANCING, CITIZEN, CITIZEN NEEDS, CITIZENS, CIVIL SERVANTS, CIVIL SERVICE, COLLUSION, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION, CORRUPT ACTS, CORRUPT COUNTRIES, CORRUPT OFFICIALS, CORRUPT PRACTICES, CORRUPTION, CRIME, CRITICAL IMPORTANCE, DECENTRALIZATION, DECISION MAKING, DECISION-MAKING, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, DISCRETION, DISTRICTS, DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCE, ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, ECONOMIC POLICIES, ELECTED OFFICIALS, ELECTORAL COMPETITION, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, ETHICS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH, FIGHTING CORRUPTION, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL RUIN, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, FORMAL ECONOMY, FRAUD, GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, GOVERNMENT DECISION, GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, GRAND CORRUPTION, INCOME, INEQUALITY, INFANT MORTALITY, INFORMATION ACCESS, INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT, INTEGRITY, INTEREST GROUPS, JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, JUDICIARY, JUSTICE, LAWS, LEGAL FRAMEWORK, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATORS, LEGISLATURE, LEGITIMACY, LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNANCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL LEVELS, LOCAL POLITICIANS, MACROECONOMIC STABILITY, MALFEASANCE, NATIONAL ELECTIONS, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, NATIONAL LEVEL, NATIONALIZATION, NEWS MEDIA, PARLIAMENT, PETTY CORRUPTION, POLICE FORCES, POLICY DESIGN, POLITICAL CONTESTABILITY, POLITICAL CORRUPTION, POLITICAL INTERFERENCE, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL REFORMS, POLITICIANS, POOR GOVERNANCE, PREFERENTIAL, PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT, PRIORITIES, PROCUREMENT, PROSECUTION, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC AWARENESS, PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC FUNDS, PUBLIC GOVERNANCE, PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH CARE, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC RESOURCES, PUBLIC SECTOR, PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION, PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC SERVICE, PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION, PUBLIC SERVICES, PUNISHMENT, REGULATORY CAPTURE, REMEDIES, REVOLUTION, RULE OF LAW, SERVICE DELIVERY, SOCIAL INTERACTIONS, STATE POWER, STATE PROPERTY, TAX BASE, TAX RATES, TAXATION, TRANSPARENCY, UPPER HOUSE, VETO, VETO POWER,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2006/01/6534264/corruption-decentralized-public-governance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/8805
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!