Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America : Government-led Renegotiations
The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism.
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Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2005-10
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/10/6330949/infrastructure-concessions-latin-america-government-led-renegotiations https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8525 |
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dig-okr-1098685252024-08-08T17:18:48Z Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America : Government-led Renegotiations Straub, Stéphane Guasch, J. Luis The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism. 2012-06-20T15:46:27Z 2012-06-20T15:46:27Z 2005-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/10/6330949/infrastructure-concessions-latin-america-government-led-renegotiations https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8525 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3749 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
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The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism. |
author |
Straub, Stéphane Guasch, J. Luis |
spellingShingle |
Straub, Stéphane Guasch, J. Luis Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America : Government-led Renegotiations |
author_facet |
Straub, Stéphane Guasch, J. Luis |
author_sort |
Straub, Stéphane |
title |
Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America : Government-led Renegotiations |
title_short |
Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America : Government-led Renegotiations |
title_full |
Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America : Government-led Renegotiations |
title_fullStr |
Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America : Government-led Renegotiations |
title_full_unstemmed |
Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America : Government-led Renegotiations |
title_sort |
infrastructure concessions in latin america : government-led renegotiations |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2005-10 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/10/6330949/infrastructure-concessions-latin-america-government-led-renegotiations https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8525 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT straubstephane infrastructureconcessionsinlatinamericagovernmentledrenegotiations AT guaschjluis infrastructureconcessionsinlatinamericagovernmentledrenegotiations |
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1809106215846805504 |