Can Insurance Increase Financial Risk? The Curious Case of Health Insurance in China
The most basic argument for insurance is that it reduces financial risk. But since insurance opens up new opportunities for consuming expensive high-technology care which permits health improvements that are valued by the insured, and because in many settings the provider is able and has an incentive to exploit the informational advantage he has over the patient, it is not immediately obvious that insurance will in practice reduce financial risk. The authors analyze the effect of insurance on the probability of an individual incurring "high" annual health expenses using data from three household surveys-one a cross-section survey, the other two panel surveys. All come from China, a country where providers have until recently largely been paid fee-for-service (often according to a schedule that encourages the overprovision of high-technology care and the underprovision of basic care) and who are only lightly regulated. The authors define annual spending as "high" if it exceeds 5 percent of average income in the sample and as "catastrophic" if it exceeds 10 percent of the household's own per capita income. The estimates of the effect of insurance on financial risk allow for the possible endogeneity of health insurance in the panel datasets by allowing for a time-invariant fixed effect capturing unobserved risk that may be correlated with insurance status, and in the cross-section dataset by using instrumental variables, where availability of and eligibility for health insurance are used as instruments. The results suggest that during the 1990s China's government and labor insurance schemes increased financial risk associated with household health care spending, but that the rural cooperative medical scheme significantly reduced financial risk in some areas but increased it in others (though not significantly). From the results, it appears that China's new health insurance schemes (private schemes, including coverage of schoolchildren) have also increased the risk of high levels of out-of-pocket spending on health. Where the authors find evidence of health insurance increasing the risk of "high" out-of-pocket expenses, the marginal effect is of the order of 15-20 percent; in the case of "catastrophic" expenses, it is even larger.
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dig-okr-1098685062024-08-08T17:18:50Z Can Insurance Increase Financial Risk? The Curious Case of Health Insurance in China Wagstaff, Adam Lindelow, Magnus AGED AGRICULTURAL WORKERS APPLICATIONS CATASTROPHIC EXPENDITURES CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE CHOICE OF PROVIDER CHRONIC ILLNESS DIAGNOSIS DRUGS ECONOMICS OF HEALTH ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE EMPLOYMENT STATUS EXPENDITURES EXPOSURE FAMILIES FEE-FOR-SERVICE FINANCIAL PROTECTION FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL RISK GOVERNMENT INSURANCE HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE REFORM HEALTH CARE SPENDING HEALTH FINANCING HEALTH INDICATORS HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES HEALTH INSURERS HEALTH POLICY HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SPENDING HEALTH STATUS HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD INCOME ON HEALTH HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS IMMUNIZATION INCOME DISTRIBUTION INSURANCE LIVING STANDARDS MEDICAL BILLS MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL EXPENSES MEDICAL INSURANCE MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY MEDICINES MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY NATIONAL HEALTH NUTRITION PATIENT PATIENTS PHYSICIANS POCKET PAYMENT POCKET PAYMENTS POLICY RESEARCH POOR POOR HEALTH POOR PEOPLE POVERTY IMPACT PRIVATE INSURANCE PRIVATE SCHEMES PROGRAMS PUBLIC INSURANCE RATES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SAVINGS VISITS WORKERS The most basic argument for insurance is that it reduces financial risk. But since insurance opens up new opportunities for consuming expensive high-technology care which permits health improvements that are valued by the insured, and because in many settings the provider is able and has an incentive to exploit the informational advantage he has over the patient, it is not immediately obvious that insurance will in practice reduce financial risk. The authors analyze the effect of insurance on the probability of an individual incurring "high" annual health expenses using data from three household surveys-one a cross-section survey, the other two panel surveys. All come from China, a country where providers have until recently largely been paid fee-for-service (often according to a schedule that encourages the overprovision of high-technology care and the underprovision of basic care) and who are only lightly regulated. The authors define annual spending as "high" if it exceeds 5 percent of average income in the sample and as "catastrophic" if it exceeds 10 percent of the household's own per capita income. The estimates of the effect of insurance on financial risk allow for the possible endogeneity of health insurance in the panel datasets by allowing for a time-invariant fixed effect capturing unobserved risk that may be correlated with insurance status, and in the cross-section dataset by using instrumental variables, where availability of and eligibility for health insurance are used as instruments. The results suggest that during the 1990s China's government and labor insurance schemes increased financial risk associated with household health care spending, but that the rural cooperative medical scheme significantly reduced financial risk in some areas but increased it in others (though not significantly). From the results, it appears that China's new health insurance schemes (private schemes, including coverage of schoolchildren) have also increased the risk of high levels of out-of-pocket spending on health. Where the authors find evidence of health insurance increasing the risk of "high" out-of-pocket expenses, the marginal effect is of the order of 15-20 percent; in the case of "catastrophic" expenses, it is even larger. 2012-06-20T14:23:18Z 2012-06-20T14:23:18Z 2005-10 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/10/6323665/can-insurance-increase-financial-risk-curious-case-health-insurance-china https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8506 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3741 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
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Banco Mundial |
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Estados Unidos |
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Bibliográfico |
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En linea |
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biblioteca |
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America del Norte |
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Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
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English |
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AGED AGRICULTURAL WORKERS APPLICATIONS CATASTROPHIC EXPENDITURES CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE CHOICE OF PROVIDER CHRONIC ILLNESS DIAGNOSIS DRUGS ECONOMICS OF HEALTH ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE EMPLOYMENT STATUS EXPENDITURES EXPOSURE FAMILIES FEE-FOR-SERVICE FINANCIAL PROTECTION FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL RISK GOVERNMENT INSURANCE HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE REFORM HEALTH CARE SPENDING HEALTH FINANCING HEALTH INDICATORS HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES HEALTH INSURERS HEALTH POLICY HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SPENDING HEALTH STATUS HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD INCOME ON HEALTH HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS IMMUNIZATION INCOME DISTRIBUTION INSURANCE LIVING STANDARDS MEDICAL BILLS MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL EXPENSES MEDICAL INSURANCE MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY MEDICINES MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY NATIONAL HEALTH NUTRITION PATIENT PATIENTS PHYSICIANS POCKET PAYMENT POCKET PAYMENTS POLICY RESEARCH POOR POOR HEALTH POOR PEOPLE POVERTY IMPACT PRIVATE INSURANCE PRIVATE SCHEMES PROGRAMS PUBLIC INSURANCE RATES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SAVINGS VISITS WORKERS AGED AGRICULTURAL WORKERS APPLICATIONS CATASTROPHIC EXPENDITURES CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE CHOICE OF PROVIDER CHRONIC ILLNESS DIAGNOSIS DRUGS ECONOMICS OF HEALTH ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE EMPLOYMENT STATUS EXPENDITURES EXPOSURE FAMILIES FEE-FOR-SERVICE FINANCIAL PROTECTION FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL RISK GOVERNMENT INSURANCE HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE REFORM HEALTH CARE SPENDING HEALTH FINANCING HEALTH INDICATORS HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES HEALTH INSURERS HEALTH POLICY HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SPENDING HEALTH STATUS HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD INCOME ON HEALTH HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS IMMUNIZATION INCOME DISTRIBUTION INSURANCE LIVING STANDARDS MEDICAL BILLS MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL EXPENSES MEDICAL INSURANCE MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY MEDICINES MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY NATIONAL HEALTH NUTRITION PATIENT PATIENTS PHYSICIANS POCKET PAYMENT POCKET PAYMENTS POLICY RESEARCH POOR POOR HEALTH POOR PEOPLE POVERTY IMPACT PRIVATE INSURANCE PRIVATE SCHEMES PROGRAMS PUBLIC INSURANCE RATES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SAVINGS VISITS WORKERS |
spellingShingle |
AGED AGRICULTURAL WORKERS APPLICATIONS CATASTROPHIC EXPENDITURES CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE CHOICE OF PROVIDER CHRONIC ILLNESS DIAGNOSIS DRUGS ECONOMICS OF HEALTH ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE EMPLOYMENT STATUS EXPENDITURES EXPOSURE FAMILIES FEE-FOR-SERVICE FINANCIAL PROTECTION FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL RISK GOVERNMENT INSURANCE HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE REFORM HEALTH CARE SPENDING HEALTH FINANCING HEALTH INDICATORS HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES HEALTH INSURERS HEALTH POLICY HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SPENDING HEALTH STATUS HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD INCOME ON HEALTH HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS IMMUNIZATION INCOME DISTRIBUTION INSURANCE LIVING STANDARDS MEDICAL BILLS MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL EXPENSES MEDICAL INSURANCE MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY MEDICINES MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY NATIONAL HEALTH NUTRITION PATIENT PATIENTS PHYSICIANS POCKET PAYMENT POCKET PAYMENTS POLICY RESEARCH POOR POOR HEALTH POOR PEOPLE POVERTY IMPACT PRIVATE INSURANCE PRIVATE SCHEMES PROGRAMS PUBLIC INSURANCE RATES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SAVINGS VISITS WORKERS AGED AGRICULTURAL WORKERS APPLICATIONS CATASTROPHIC EXPENDITURES CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE CHOICE OF PROVIDER CHRONIC ILLNESS DIAGNOSIS DRUGS ECONOMICS OF HEALTH ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE EMPLOYMENT STATUS EXPENDITURES EXPOSURE FAMILIES FEE-FOR-SERVICE FINANCIAL PROTECTION FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL RISK GOVERNMENT INSURANCE HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE REFORM HEALTH CARE SPENDING HEALTH FINANCING HEALTH INDICATORS HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES HEALTH INSURERS HEALTH POLICY HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SPENDING HEALTH STATUS HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD INCOME ON HEALTH HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS IMMUNIZATION INCOME DISTRIBUTION INSURANCE LIVING STANDARDS MEDICAL BILLS MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL EXPENSES MEDICAL INSURANCE MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY MEDICINES MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY NATIONAL HEALTH NUTRITION PATIENT PATIENTS PHYSICIANS POCKET PAYMENT POCKET PAYMENTS POLICY RESEARCH POOR POOR HEALTH POOR PEOPLE POVERTY IMPACT PRIVATE INSURANCE PRIVATE SCHEMES PROGRAMS PUBLIC INSURANCE RATES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SAVINGS VISITS WORKERS Wagstaff, Adam Lindelow, Magnus Can Insurance Increase Financial Risk? The Curious Case of Health Insurance in China |
description |
The most basic argument for insurance is that it reduces financial risk. But since insurance opens up new opportunities for consuming expensive high-technology care which permits health improvements that are valued by the insured, and because in many settings the provider is able and has an incentive to exploit the informational advantage he has over the patient, it is not immediately obvious that insurance will in practice reduce financial risk. The authors analyze the effect of insurance on the probability of an individual incurring "high" annual health expenses using data from three household surveys-one a cross-section survey, the other two panel surveys. All come from China, a country where providers have until recently largely been paid fee-for-service (often according to a schedule that encourages the overprovision of high-technology care and the underprovision of basic care) and who are only lightly regulated. The authors define annual spending as "high" if it exceeds 5 percent of average income in the sample and as "catastrophic" if it exceeds 10 percent of the household's own per capita income. The estimates of the effect of insurance on financial risk allow for the possible endogeneity of health insurance in the panel datasets by allowing for a time-invariant fixed effect capturing unobserved risk that may be correlated with insurance status, and in the cross-section dataset by using instrumental variables, where availability of and eligibility for health insurance are used as instruments. The results suggest that during the 1990s China's government and labor insurance schemes increased financial risk associated with household health care spending, but that the rural cooperative medical scheme significantly reduced financial risk in some areas but increased it in others (though not significantly). From the results, it appears that China's new health insurance schemes (private schemes, including coverage of schoolchildren) have also increased the risk of high levels of out-of-pocket spending on health. Where the authors find evidence of health insurance increasing the risk of "high" out-of-pocket expenses, the marginal effect is of the order of 15-20 percent; in the case of "catastrophic" expenses, it is even larger. |
topic_facet |
AGED AGRICULTURAL WORKERS APPLICATIONS CATASTROPHIC EXPENDITURES CATASTROPHIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE CHOICE OF PROVIDER CHRONIC ILLNESS DIAGNOSIS DRUGS ECONOMICS OF HEALTH ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE EMPLOYMENT STATUS EXPENDITURES EXPOSURE FAMILIES FEE-FOR-SERVICE FINANCIAL PROTECTION FINANCIAL RESOURCES FINANCIAL RISK GOVERNMENT INSURANCE HEALTH CARE HEALTH CARE REFORM HEALTH CARE SPENDING HEALTH FINANCING HEALTH INDICATORS HEALTH INSURANCE HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEMES HEALTH INSURERS HEALTH POLICY HEALTH SERVICES HEALTH SPENDING HEALTH STATUS HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION HOUSEHOLD INCOME HOUSEHOLD INCOME ON HEALTH HOUSEHOLD SURVEY HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS IMMUNIZATION INCOME DISTRIBUTION INSURANCE LIVING STANDARDS MEDICAL BILLS MEDICAL CARE MEDICAL EXPENSES MEDICAL INSURANCE MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY MEDICINES MORAL HAZARD MORTALITY NATIONAL HEALTH NUTRITION PATIENT PATIENTS PHYSICIANS POCKET PAYMENT POCKET PAYMENTS POLICY RESEARCH POOR POOR HEALTH POOR PEOPLE POVERTY IMPACT PRIVATE INSURANCE PRIVATE SCHEMES PROGRAMS PUBLIC INSURANCE RATES RISK SHARING RURAL RURAL AREAS RURAL HOUSEHOLD RURAL POPULATION RURAL RESIDENTS RURAL VILLAGES SAVINGS VISITS WORKERS |
author |
Wagstaff, Adam Lindelow, Magnus |
author_facet |
Wagstaff, Adam Lindelow, Magnus |
author_sort |
Wagstaff, Adam |
title |
Can Insurance Increase Financial Risk? The Curious Case of Health Insurance in China |
title_short |
Can Insurance Increase Financial Risk? The Curious Case of Health Insurance in China |
title_full |
Can Insurance Increase Financial Risk? The Curious Case of Health Insurance in China |
title_fullStr |
Can Insurance Increase Financial Risk? The Curious Case of Health Insurance in China |
title_full_unstemmed |
Can Insurance Increase Financial Risk? The Curious Case of Health Insurance in China |
title_sort |
can insurance increase financial risk? the curious case of health insurance in china |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2005-10 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/10/6323665/can-insurance-increase-financial-risk-curious-case-health-insurance-china https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8506 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT wagstaffadam caninsuranceincreasefinancialriskthecuriouscaseofhealthinsuranceinchina AT lindelowmagnus caninsuranceincreasefinancialriskthecuriouscaseofhealthinsuranceinchina |
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1807160486934872064 |