Fiscal Determinants of Empowerment

Empowerment of local governments and citizens is a primary object of decentralization. Using the analytic lens of empowerment, the author explores the nature of decentralized governance and how this type of structure is likely to be more or less empowering. His primary concern is fiscal decentralization, specifically the association between fiscal determinants and the degree of empowerment of both citizens and local governments. The author's main argument is that both the revenue and expenditure characteristics of local public finances have an effect on the degree of empowerment. His hypothesis is that in a context of decentralized local governance, empowerment is most likely to occur when three conditions prevail: low costs of participation, large and flexible budgets, and a high proportion of tax revenues from a local base. But these ingredients for empowerment will not necessarily produce outcomes that are progressive and pro-poor. The author contrasts the intrinsic and the instrumental approaches to empowerment, but he does not assess the impact of empowerment on instrumental outcomes. For this hypothesis to support an instrumentalist perspective on empowerment, further empirical work must be conducted.

Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Raich, Uri
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2005-09
Subjects:	ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS, ALM, ASSETS, AUTHORITY, BLOCK GRANTS, BORROWING, BUDGET DEFICITS, BUDGETARY AUTONOMY, CAPITAL PROJECTS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS, CITIES, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, CITIZENS, CONSTITUENCIES, CREDIT CAPACITY, DEBT, DEBT SERVICE, DECENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS, DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS, DECISION MAKING, DECISION MAKING POWER, DECISION-MAKING, DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, DEMOCRATIZATION, DEVOLUTION, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, ECONOMIC STABILITY, EFFICIENT MARKETS, ELECTED OFFICIALS, ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES, ELECTORAL POLITICS, ELECTORAL SYSTEM, EVASION, EXPENDITURE, EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES, EXTERNALITIES, FINANCIAL PLANNING, FINANCIAL SYSTEM, FISCAL, FISCAL CONDITIONS, FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION, FISCAL GAP, FISCAL GAPS, FISCAL POLICY, GOOD GOVERNANCE, GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATORS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, GOVERNMENT REVENUES, GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER, INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS, LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, LATIN AMERICAN, LEGISLATION, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, LEGITIMACY, LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, LOBBYING, LOCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT, LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXES, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE, LOCAL REVENUE, LOCAL SPENDING, LOCAL TAX, LOCAL TAXES, MINISTERS, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, NATIONAL LEGISLATURES, NATIONAL LEVEL, POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION, POLITICAL ELITES, POLITICIANS, POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES, PRIVATE SECTOR, PROPERTY TAXES, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PUBLIC EXPENDITURES, PUBLIC FINANCE, PUBLIC FINANCES, PUBLIC OFFICIALS, PUBLIC RESOURCES, PUBLIC SERVICES, REVENUE SOURCES, SOCIAL WELFARE, STATE APPARATUS, STATE INCOME, SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, SUBNATIONAL TAXES, TAX BURDEN, TAX COLLECTION, TAX COMPLIANCE, TAX LIABILITIES, TAX RATES, TAX REVENUE, TAX REVENUES, TAXATION, TRANSPARENCY,
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/09/6261529/fiscal-determinants-empowerment https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8297
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!