Do Incumbents Manipulate Access to Finance During Banking Crises?
The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three-digit manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for about 15 industrial and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. The author shows that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of corruption. He finds the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation techniques.
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dig-okr-1098682092024-08-08T17:21:55Z Do Incumbents Manipulate Access to Finance During Banking Crises? Feijen, Erik ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION ASSET PRICES ASSOCIATED COMPANIES AVERAGE COSTS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING CONCENTRATION BANKING CRISES BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAPITAL BUDGETING CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CONNECTED LENDING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION VARIABLE CREDIT MARKETS DATA AVAILABILITY DEBT DEREGULATION DEVALUATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMERGING MARKETS EXCHANGE RATES FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL ECONOMICS FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS GDP GDP PER CAPITA ILLIQUIDITY INCOME INFLATION INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES MONOPOLY RENTS MORAL HAZARD NET PROFIT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PRESENT VALUE PRIME MINISTER PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS REAL SECTOR REGRESSION MODELS SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRANSPARENCY VALUE ADDED VALUE OF OUTPUT WAGES WORKING CAPITAL The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three-digit manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for about 15 industrial and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. The author shows that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of corruption. He finds the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation techniques. 2012-06-15T20:31:39Z 2012-06-15T20:31:39Z 2005-07 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6048663/incumbents-manipulate-access-finance-during-banking-crises https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8209 English Policy Research Working Paper; No. 3660 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank application/pdf text/plain World Bank, Washington, DC |
| institution |
Banco Mundial |
| collection |
DSpace |
| country |
Estados Unidos |
| countrycode |
US |
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Bibliográfico |
| access |
En linea |
| databasecode |
dig-okr |
| tag |
biblioteca |
| region |
America del Norte |
| libraryname |
Biblioteca del Banco Mundial |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION ASSET PRICES ASSOCIATED COMPANIES AVERAGE COSTS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING CONCENTRATION BANKING CRISES BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAPITAL BUDGETING CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CONNECTED LENDING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION VARIABLE CREDIT MARKETS DATA AVAILABILITY DEBT DEREGULATION DEVALUATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMERGING MARKETS EXCHANGE RATES FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL ECONOMICS FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS GDP GDP PER CAPITA ILLIQUIDITY INCOME INFLATION INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES MONOPOLY RENTS MORAL HAZARD NET PROFIT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PRESENT VALUE PRIME MINISTER PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS REAL SECTOR REGRESSION MODELS SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRANSPARENCY VALUE ADDED VALUE OF OUTPUT WAGES WORKING CAPITAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION ASSET PRICES ASSOCIATED COMPANIES AVERAGE COSTS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING CONCENTRATION BANKING CRISES BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAPITAL BUDGETING CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CONNECTED LENDING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION VARIABLE CREDIT MARKETS DATA AVAILABILITY DEBT DEREGULATION DEVALUATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMERGING MARKETS EXCHANGE RATES FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL ECONOMICS FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS GDP GDP PER CAPITA ILLIQUIDITY INCOME INFLATION INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES MONOPOLY RENTS MORAL HAZARD NET PROFIT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PRESENT VALUE PRIME MINISTER PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS REAL SECTOR REGRESSION MODELS SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRANSPARENCY VALUE ADDED VALUE OF OUTPUT WAGES WORKING CAPITAL |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION ASSET PRICES ASSOCIATED COMPANIES AVERAGE COSTS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING CONCENTRATION BANKING CRISES BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAPITAL BUDGETING CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CONNECTED LENDING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION VARIABLE CREDIT MARKETS DATA AVAILABILITY DEBT DEREGULATION DEVALUATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMERGING MARKETS EXCHANGE RATES FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL ECONOMICS FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS GDP GDP PER CAPITA ILLIQUIDITY INCOME INFLATION INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES MONOPOLY RENTS MORAL HAZARD NET PROFIT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PRESENT VALUE PRIME MINISTER PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS REAL SECTOR REGRESSION MODELS SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRANSPARENCY VALUE ADDED VALUE OF OUTPUT WAGES WORKING CAPITAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION ASSET PRICES ASSOCIATED COMPANIES AVERAGE COSTS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING CONCENTRATION BANKING CRISES BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAPITAL BUDGETING CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CONNECTED LENDING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION VARIABLE CREDIT MARKETS DATA AVAILABILITY DEBT DEREGULATION DEVALUATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMERGING MARKETS EXCHANGE RATES FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL ECONOMICS FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS GDP GDP PER CAPITA ILLIQUIDITY INCOME INFLATION INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES MONOPOLY RENTS MORAL HAZARD NET PROFIT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PRESENT VALUE PRIME MINISTER PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS REAL SECTOR REGRESSION MODELS SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRANSPARENCY VALUE ADDED VALUE OF OUTPUT WAGES WORKING CAPITAL Feijen, Erik Do Incumbents Manipulate Access to Finance During Banking Crises? |
| description |
The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three-digit manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for about 15 industrial and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. The author shows that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of corruption. He finds the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation techniques. |
| topic_facet |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ADVERSE SELECTION ASSET PRICES ASSOCIATED COMPANIES AVERAGE COSTS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING CONCENTRATION BANKING CRISES BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKS BARRIERS TO ENTRY BENCHMARK CAPITAL BUDGETING CAPITAL EXPENDITURES CONNECTED LENDING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPT COUNTRIES CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION VARIABLE CREDIT MARKETS DATA AVAILABILITY DEBT DEREGULATION DEVALUATION ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC POWER ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE EMERGING MARKETS EXCHANGE RATES FINANCIAL CRISES FINANCIAL CRISIS FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL ECONOMICS FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION FINANCIAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SECTOR FINANCIAL STRUCTURE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS GDP GDP PER CAPITA ILLIQUIDITY INCOME INFLATION INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES MONOPOLY RENTS MORAL HAZARD NET PROFIT PERCEPTIONS INDEX PERFECT COMPETITION POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS PRESENT VALUE PRIME MINISTER PROFITABILITY PROPERTY RIGHTS REAL SECTOR REGRESSION MODELS SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES TOTAL OUTPUT TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRANSPARENCY VALUE ADDED VALUE OF OUTPUT WAGES WORKING CAPITAL |
| author |
Feijen, Erik |
| author_facet |
Feijen, Erik |
| author_sort |
Feijen, Erik |
| title |
Do Incumbents Manipulate Access to Finance During Banking Crises? |
| title_short |
Do Incumbents Manipulate Access to Finance During Banking Crises? |
| title_full |
Do Incumbents Manipulate Access to Finance During Banking Crises? |
| title_fullStr |
Do Incumbents Manipulate Access to Finance During Banking Crises? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Do Incumbents Manipulate Access to Finance During Banking Crises? |
| title_sort |
do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2005-07 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6048663/incumbents-manipulate-access-finance-during-banking-crises https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8209 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT feijenerik doincumbentsmanipulateaccesstofinanceduringbankingcrises |
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1809105581734100992 |