Institution Building and Growth in Transition Economies

Drawing on the recent literature on economic institutions and the origins of economic development, the authors offer a political economy explanation of why institution building has varied so much across transition economies. They identify dependence on natural resources and the historical experience of these countries during socialism as major determinants of institution building during transition by influencing the political structure and process during the initial years. Their empirical analysis shows that countries that are more reliant on natural resources and spent a longer time under socialist governments are more likely to see former communists remain in power and to start the transition process with less open political systems, with negative repercussions for the development of market-compatible institutions. Using natural resource reliance and the years under socialism to extract the exogenous component of institution building, the authors also show the importance of institutions in explaining the variation in economic development and growth across transition economies during the first decade of transition.

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Laeven, Luc, Beck, Thorsten
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2005-07
Subjects:ACCOUNTABILITY, BANKING SECTOR, BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT, CAPITA GROWTH, CAUSAL EFFECT, CENTRALIZATION, CITIZEN, CITIZENS, CIVIL SOCIETY, CIVIL SOCIETY INSTITUTIONS, CIVIL WAR, COMPETITION POLICY, COMPETITIVENESS, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, CONSOLIDATION, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT, CORRUPTION, COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS, DATA SOURCES, DEPOSITS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, ECONOMIC DECLINE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, ECONOMIC GROWTH PERFORMANCE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, ECONOMIC POWER, ECONOMIC REFORMS, ECONOMIC RENTS, ECONOMIC] GROWTH, EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, ETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATION, EXPORTS, FINANCIAL CAPITAL, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, FREE ELECTIONS, GDP, GDP PER CAPITA, GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS, GROWTH PERFORMANCE, GROWTH RATES, HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION, HOUSING, HUMAN CAPITAL, INCOME, INFLATION, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY, INSTITUTIONAL REFORM, INTANGIBLE ASSETS, LANDLOCKED COUNTRY, MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, MACROECONOMIC POLICIES, MACROECONOMIC REFORMS, MARKET ECONOMIES, MARKET ECONOMY, NATURAL RESOURCES, NEW ENTRANTS, OIL, OIL RESERVES, PARLIAMENT, POLICY RESEARCH, POLITICAL CONDITIONS, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS, POLITICAL ECONOMY, POLITICAL INFLUENCE, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLITICAL LEADERS, POLITICAL PARTIES, POLITICAL STABILITY, POLITICAL SYSTEM, PRIME MINISTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY, PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY RIGHTS, REGULATORY QUALITY, RELATIVE IMPORTANCE, REVERSE CAUSATION, RULE OF LAW, SAFETY NET, SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS, STATE ENTERPRISES, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, STRUCTURAL REFORM, SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, TERTIARY EDUCATION, TRADE LIBERALIZATION, TRADE UNIONS, TRANSITION COUNTRIES, TRANSITION ECONOMIES, TRANSITION PROCESS, WESTERN EUROPE, Microdata Set,
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2005/07/6045505/institution-building-growth-transition-economies
https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8203
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